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Distributed systems are critical to reliable and scalable computing; however, they are complicated
in nature and prone to bugs. To modularly manage this complexity, network middleware has been
traditionally built in layered stacks of components. We present a novel approach to compositional
verification of distributed stacks to verify each component based on only the specification of lower
components. We present TLC (Temporal Logic of Components), a novel temporal program logic that
offers intuitive inference rules for verification of both safety and liveness properties of functional
implementations of distributed components. To support compositional reasoning, we define a novel
transformation on the assertion language that lowers the specification of a component to be used
as a subcomponent. We prove the soundness of TLC and the lowering transformation with respect
to the operational semantics for stacks of distributed components. We successfully apply TLC to
compose and verify a stack of fundamental distributed components.
1 INTRODUCTION
Distributed systems are the backbone of the modern computing infrastructure. They support the
reliable, scalable and responsive execution of Internet services and replicated aviation control
systems, and are at the core of crypto-currencies. However, due to their combinatorially large state
spaces, and node and network failures, distributed systems are complicated and prone to bugs.
Therefore, they repeatedly suffer data and currency loss, and service outages [Guo et al. 2013; Web
2018a,b,c]. Several projects [Dragoi et al. 2016; Hawblitzel et al. 2015; Lesani et al. 2016; Padon et al.
2016; Rahli 2012; Sergey et al. 2017; Wilcox et al. 2015] have been recently successful in verification
of various distributed systems. However, they either do not benefit from a program logic and carry
out verification in the semantic domain [Hawblitzel et al. 2015; Lesani et al. 2016; Wilcox et al.
2015], do not consider compositional reasoning [Dragoi et al. 2016; Hawblitzel et al. 2015; Padon
et al. 2016; Rahli 2012], or do not verify liveness properties [Sergey et al. 2017].
Both operating systems, and and network middleware have been traditionally built in layers [Gu
et al. 2016; Peterson and Davie 2003]. Each node hosts a stack of protocol layers and communicates
with other nodes by the communication primitives at the bottom layers. This modular approach
brings separation of the implementation from the interface. A higher layer only uses the interface
and is separate from the implementation of the lower layers. Similarly, modular verification of each
layer using only the specification of the lower layers reduces the proof engineering effort and brings
scalability to the development of reliable distributed systems. Layers can be verified separately and
composed to build verified stacks of distributed systems. Further, a component remains correct if
one of its subcomponents is replaced with a new component with the same specification.
This paper presents a novel framework for compositional specification and verification of distributed
system stacks. A central goal of this project is intuitiveness to urge adoption. Protocol designers
and practitioners do reason about their distributed systems. We observe that they often state the
properties of a protocol as natural language statements on events, assume the properties of the
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sub-protocols, and argue about correctness using intuitive arguments about the temporal precedence
of the events that the protocol and the sub-protocols exchange [Cachin et al. 2011]. They find it
more natural to state properties about the past events rather than add ghost state. Similarly, they
prove liveness properties by simple reasoning about future events. This observation led us to the
following questions: Can we capture the properties in a temporal logic for components? Can we
capture the use of the specifications of subcomponents as a sound transformation? Can we formalize
the principles used in these intuitive proofs as logical inference rules? Program logics have been
traditionally developed as extensions of the classical Floyd-Hoare logic. In the past decade, the
community has witnessed increasingly complicated Hoare logics for concurrent programs that can
be effectively used by experts. This project takes a distinct approach and strives to keep the formal
techniques as close as possible to the practitioner language. It presents a new compositional and
temporal approach to verification of stacks of distributed protocols.
We present a layered programming model to separately capture functional implementations of
distributed components. Layers of components communicate through the interface of request and
indication events: request events are input from the higher layer and output to the lower layers
while indication events are input from the lower layers and output to the higher layer. We present
a temporal assertion language on event traces to specify properties of components. The assertion
language can naturally capture both safety and liveness properties of components in terms of their
incoming requests and outgoing indications.We present a novel program logic calledTLC (Temporal
Logic of Components) that features intuitive inference rules to directly reason about implementations
of distributed components. We want to compositionally verify each component based on only its
own implementation and the specifications of its subcomponents. Thus, we present a novel syntactic
transformation to lower the temporal specifications of a component to be used as a subcomponent.
We present an operational semantics for stacks of distributed components where events propagate
across layers in a node, nodes communicate via the bottom link layer and nodes may fail. We prove
the soundness of TLC and the lowering transformation with respect to the operational semantics.
We successfully applied the programming model, the lowering transformation and TLC to compose
and verify stacks of fundamental distributed components including stubborn links, perfect links, best-
effort broadcast, uniform reliable broadcast, epoch consensus, epoch change and Paxos consensus.
Further, we present our progress in proof mechanization towards building certified middleware.
In summary, the main contribution of this paper is the novel program logic TLC and the lowering
transformation for compositional verification of both safety and liveness properties of distributed
components. More precisely, the paper makes the following contributions: (1) a compositional
programming model for distributed stacks (§ 2) and its semantics (§ 6), (2) a temporal assertion
language on event traces to specify safety and liveness properties of components (§ 3), and a
sound composable verification technique based on lowering specifications (§ 4), (3) a program logic
to reason about components (§ 5) and its soundness with respect to the semantics (§ 7) and (4)
verification of stacks of fundamental distributed components (the appendix [Appendix 2020] § 5.2)
and encoding of the programming model, logic and lowering in Coq to mechanize the proofs (§ 8).
We start with an overview.
2 OVERVIEW
In this section, we illustrate composable verification with a simple component that uses a subcompo-
nent. We present the specification of the properties of the component and the subcomponent, lower
the specification of the subcomponent and then apply TLC to verify a property of the component.
Component Composition.We define the type of components Comp as a parametric record
that is represented in Fig. 1. A component is parametric for the type of the events at the top and
the bottom of the component as depicted in Fig. 2.(a). The events at the top are the interface of
 (a) (b) (c)
Fig. 2. (a) Events. IR: Input Request, OR: Output request, II: Input Indication, OI: Output Indication (b)
Uniform Reliable Broadcast stack at two nodes and (c) Paxos Consensus stack
the component. They are the input requests of type IR and the output indications of type OI . A
component may have multiple subcomponents. The events at the bottom are the output requests
of types OR to and the input indications of types II from the subcomponents. We use the overline
notation to denote multiple instances; for example, we use OR to denote multiple output request
types, one per subcomponent. A component defines the State type and its initial value per node
as the function init. It also defines three handler functions, request, indication and periodic, that
are called in response to input request, input indication and periodic events. Periodic events are
automatically issued regularly on correct nodes. Nodes may have crash-stop failures. A node is
correct if it does not crash. The periodic handlers usually react to certain conditions; for example,
when enough acknowledgements are received, an output indication is issued. Each of the three
functions get the current node identifier (of typeN) and the pre-state of the component (of type State)
as parameters. As the next parameter, the request function gets the input request from the higher
component and the indication function gets the input indication from one of the subcomponents.
The handler functions return the post-state, a list of output requests (to subcomponents) and a list
of output indications (to the parent component).
As Fig. 1 presents, we define the stack of components Stack as an inductive type that is
parametrized on the interface of the stack. The interface of a stack is the top events IR and OI of its
top component. A stack is constructed by either a component and its matching substacks (as the
inductive case) or is a bottom link (as the base case). Basic links are the weakest components at the
leaves of a stack. They accept requests sendl(n,m) of type Reql to send messagem to node n and
issue indications deliverl(n,m) of type Indl to deliver messagem from node n. The semantics of a
link can drop messages. However, it does not unfairly drop a particular message that is repeatedly
sent. If a sender keeps resending a message and the receiver is not failed, the message is eventually
delivered.
As Fig. 2.(b) and (c) show, increasingly stronger components can be built on top of basic links:
stubborn links, perfect links, best-effort broadcast, uniform reliable broadcast, epoch consensus,
epoch change, and Paxos (uniform) consensus. We have spent extensive effort to write proofs of
correctness for these components. The implementation, properties and detailed proofs of all these
components are available in the appendix [Appendix 2020] § 4 and 5.3. Fig. 2.(b) shows the stack of
the uniform reliable broadcast. Two identical stacks are drawn to show replication at two different
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PLC∶Component Reqpl Indpl (Reqsl, Indsl) B
L1 let slc ∶= 0 in
L2 ∐︀State ∶= ∐︀counter∶Nat,
L3 received∶ Set(︀∐︀N,Nat̃︀⌋︀̃︀,
L4 init ∶= λn. ∐︀0,∅̃︀,
L5
L6 request ∶= λ n,s,ir .
L7 let ∐︀c,r̃︀ ∶= s in
L8 match ir with
L9 ⋃︀ sendpl(n′,m)⇒
L10 let c
′ ∶= c + 1 in
L11 let or ∶= (slc,sendsl(n′,∐︀c′,m̃︀)) in
L12 ∐︀∐︀c′,r̃︀,(︀or⌋︀,(︀⌋︀̃︀,
L13 end
L14
L15 indication ∶= λ n′,s,ii .
L16 let ∐︀c,r̃︀ =∶ s in
L17 match ii with
L18 ⋃︀ (slc,deliversl(n,∐︀c′,m̃︀)⇒
L19 if (∐︀n,c′̃︀ ∈ r)
L20 ∐︀s,(︀⌋︀,(︀⌋︀̃︀
L21 else
L22 let r
′ ∶= r ∪ {∐︀n,c′̃︀} in
L23 let oi ∶= deliverpl(n,m) in
L24 ∐︀∐︀c,r ′̃︀,(︀⌋︀,(︀oi⌋︀̃︀
L25 end
L26
L27 periodic ∶= λ n,s . ∐︀s,(︀⌋︀,(︀⌋︀̃︀ ̃︀
(a)
SL1 (Stubborn delivery):
n ∈ Correct ∧ n′ ∈ Correct→(n ● ⊺ ↓ sendsl(n′,m))⇒ □◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliversl(n,m))
If a correct node n sends a messagem to a correct node n′,
then n′ deliversm infinitely often.
SL2 (No-forge):(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliversl(n′,m))f (n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendsl(n,m))
If a node n delivers a messagem with sender n′,
thenm was previously sent to n by n′.
(b)
PL1 (Reliable delivery):
n ∈ Correct ∧ n′ ∈ Correct→(n ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n′,m)⇝ (n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n,m))
If a correct node n sends a messagem to a correct node n′,
then n′ will eventually deliverm.
PL2 (No-duplication):(︀n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m)⇒
⊟ˆ¬(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m))⌋︀→(︀n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m)⇒
⊟ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))⌋︀
If a message is sent at most once,
it will be delivered at most once.
PL3 (No-forge):(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))f (n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m))
If a node n delivers a messagem with sender n′,
thenm was previously sent to n by node n′.
(c)
Fig. 3. (a) Perfect Link Component PLC. (b) Stubborn Links Specification. (c) Perfect Links Specification. It is
notable that (p ⇒ ⊟ˆ¬p)→ (p ⇒ □ˆ¬p); hence the □ˆ conjunct is omitted in the no-duplication property.
nodes. The bottom horizontal lines show the low-level message passing by the basic link. Fig. 2.(c)
shows the Paxos consensus [Lamport 1998] stack. The Paxos consensus component is at the top
and uses epoch change and epoch consensus as its two subcomponents. In the epoch consensus
component, a leader tries to impose a value to the correct nodes. The epoch change component
initiates the next epoch with a new leader if the current one fails. The two subcomponents are
horizontally composed and epoch consensus is vertically composed on top of them.
The stubborn link repeatedly resends messages by the basic link so that they are eventually
delivered. However, retransmission results in multiple deliveries that may not be desired by the
higher-level components. Thus, the perfect link component is built on top of the stubborn link to
eliminate duplicate messages. It keeps track of delivered messages and ignores duplicates. Fig. 3.(a)
presents the perfect link component, PLC. It provides the perfect link interface and uses a substack
with the stubborn link interface. The state of each node stores the number of messages sent by
the current node, counter, initialized to zero and the set of received message identifiers, received,
initialized to empty (at L2-L4). The counter is used to assign unique numbers to messages that
the node sends. Each message can be uniquely identified by the pair of the sender node identifier
and the number of the message in that node. Upon a request to send a message (at L6-L9), the
counter is incremented (at L10) and the message is sent together with the new counter value using
the stubborn link subcomponent (at L11-L12). Upon a delivery indication of a message from the
stubborn link subcomponent (at L15-L18), if the message is already received, it is ignored (at L19-L20).
Otherwise, the message identifier is added to the received set and a delivery indication event is
issued (at L21-L24). PLC does not need a periodic handler (at L27).
Comp IR OI (OR, II) B∐︀ State∶Type,
init∶N→ State,
let Out = State × List (Σ OR) × List OI in
request∶N→ State→ IR → Out,
indication∶N→ State→ Σ II → Out,
periodic∶N→ State→ Out ̃︀
Stack∶Type→ Type→ Type B⋃︀ stack∶Comp IR OI (OR, II)→∏ (Stack OR II)→
Stack IR OI⋃︀ link∶ Stack Reql Indl
Fig. 1. Component and Stack. Let Σ and Π be paramet-
ric sum and product types. In component descriptions,
we write a sum term constructed from a term t of the
i-th type parameter as (i,t) for brevity.
Semantics. In § 6, we define the operational
semantics of distributed components. It mod-
els the propagation of events across the stack,
message passing across nodes in partially syn-
chronous networks and node failures. Here, we
illustrate the structure of a stack and a fragment
of a round of a trace in Fig. 4. Components are
represented as boxes and the orientation o of re-
quest, periodic and indication events are shown
as ↓, ⇝ and ↑ respectively. Incoming events are
executed on the component itself and outgoing
events are issued to be executed on other com-
ponents. The distinct location identifier d of a
component in the tree of a distributed stack is
the reverse list of branch indices from the top
component to that component. Going down
and up the tree simply corresponds to adding
and removing a subcomponent index at the
head of this list. For example, the identifier d for the top component C1 is (︀⌋︀, for its left child
C2 is (︀0⌋︀ and for its right grandchild C5 is (︀1,0⌋︀. The interface of each component is the events
immediately above it and they share its identifier. For example, the identifier d of the right child C3
and its interface events are both (︀1⌋︀. Similarly, the location identifier of a substack is the location
identifier of its top component. For example, the left substack rooted at C2 is at location (︀0⌋︀. A
simple trace is shown on the right of Fig. 4 where the lines show a sequence of events from left to
right at different interface levels. The execution of an event at a component updates the state of the
component and may issue other request and indication events. The issued events are subsequently
executed. The trace starts with e1, a request ↓ at the top (︀⌋︀ from the client. When e1 is processed in
the top component C1 at (︀⌋︀, e2, a request ↓ on the left child component C2 at (︀0⌋︀ is issued. When e2
is processed in C2, in turn, e3, a request ↓ to its right child C5 at (︀1,0⌋︀, is issued. Processing of e3 on
C5 issues e4, an indication ↑ event at (︀1,0⌋︀. When e4 is processed in the parent componentC2 at (︀0⌋︀,
e5 that is an indication ↑ at (︀0⌋︀, is issued. (We note that C2 could instead issue another request like
e3 to one of its children.) When e5 is executed at the parent componentC1 at (︀⌋︀, finally, e6 that is an
indication ↑ at the top level (︀⌋︀, is issued (that is executed in the client). An (infinite) sequence of
event labels is an execution trace. Given a stack, the semantics defines its set of execution traces.
Assertion Language. To represent the specifications of distributed component stacks, we define
a temporal assertion language that can describe traces of events across the stack. It features specific
variables for the properties of the handler calls and a location variable to distinguish the unique
places of the composed components in the stack. It can concisely capture safety and liveness
properties of distributed components. In § 3, we will describe the assertion language and here,
briefly describe the parts that we use in the overview. The always assertion □𝒜 states that the
assertion 𝒜 holds at every event in the future including the current event. The always in the
past assertion ⊟𝒜 states that 𝒜 holds at every event in the past including the current event. The
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eventually assertion ◇𝒜 states that 𝒜 holds at some future event. The eventually in the past
assertion x𝒜 states that 𝒜 holds at some past event. The strict versions □ˆ, ⊟ˆ, ◇ˆ and xˆ exclude
the current event. The strong implication 𝒜 ⇒ 𝒜′ is syntactic sugar for □(𝒜 → 𝒜′) where →
is the logical implication. The leads-to assertion 𝒜 ⇝ 𝒜′ is syntactic sugar for □(𝒜 → ◇𝒜′).
Similarly, the preceded-by assertion 𝒜f 𝒜′ is syntactic sugar for □(𝒜→x𝒜′). An assertion is
non-temporal if it does not include any temporal operators.
Fig. 4. Semantics of Component Stacks.
The user events are the event ob-
jects that the protocol handlers take
as argument and issue, for example
sendpl(n,m). A trace event represents
the execution of a user event by a han-
dler. The assertion language can de-
scribe event traces across the stack. Vari-
ables are partitioned into rigid and flex-
ible variables. A rigid variable has the
same value in all events of an execution,
while a flexible variable may assume dif-
ferent values in different events. We represent the flexible variables with the bold face. The flexible
variables for an event are the identifier n of the node that executes the event, the round number r
that executes the event, location identifier d that the event is executed at, the orientation o of the
event, the user event e that is processed, the output requests ors and output indications ois that
the event issues, the pre-state s of the event, and the post-state s′ of the event. The pre and the
post-state represent functions from node identifiers to the state of the component at the nodes. We
call the top component self as it is the top component that is verified assuming the correctness of
the subcomponents. We use the syntactic sugar assertion self to describe events that are applied to
the top component. A self event is either a request or periodic event at the top or an indication
event from a subcomponent at the second level. The constants Correct represents the set of correct
node identifiers.
The syntactic sugar assertion n ● 𝒜 (where ● is used as a separator) is sugar for n = n ∧𝒜; it
describes an event that is executed at node n and satisfies 𝒜. The syntactic sugar assertion ⊺o e
stands for d = (︀⌋︀ ∧ o = o ∧ e = e; it describes an event that is at the top (⊺) level interface (︀⌋︀,
its orientation is o (either the constant ↓ for requests, ⇝ for periodics or ↑ for indications) and
its user event is e . For example, the assertion (n ● ⊺ ↓ sendsl(n′,m)) describes an event at node n
at the top level interface (︀⌋︀ where the request (↓) event sendsl(n′,m) is executed. As the periodic
handler is not called with a user event, we use the constant per to represent periodic user events.
Similarly, the syntactic sugar assertion i o e stands for d = (︀i⌋︀ ∧ o = o ∧ e = e; it describes an
event that is at the interface of the i-th subcomponent at location (︀i⌋︀, its orientation is o and its
user event is e . For example, the assertion (n ● 1 ↑ deliversl(n′,m)) describes an event at node n at
the interface location (︀1⌋︀ where the indication (↑) event deliversl(n′,m) is executed. It is notable
that as a pleasant result of compositional reasoning, we only need to refer to the events at the top
and events at the second level. Therefore, we defined syntactic sugar for only the first two levels.
Specifications. Fig. 3 shows the specification of stubborn links and perfect links that are written
almost verbatim from their natural language descriptions. A stubborn link stubbornly retransmits
messages. The stubborn delivery property SL1 states that once a message is sent, it is delivered
infinitely often. The no-forge property SL2 states that a stubborn link never forges a message. The
properties SL1 and SL2 are liveness and safety properties respectively. Intuitively, a safety property
states that a bad state never happens and a liveness property states that a good state eventually
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 5. Illustration of Lowering. (a) Stack 𝒮1 and its specification ℐ(︀⌋︀1 . (b) Stack 𝒮2 and its specification ℐ(︀⌋︀2 .
(c) Stack 𝒮 that composes 𝒮1 and 𝒮2 as subcomponents. To prove the specification 𝒜 of 𝒮 , the lowering ofℐ(︀⌋︀1 and ℐ(︀⌋︀2 can be assumed.
happens. The reliable delivery property PL1 states that perfect links can reliably transmit messages
between correct nodes. The no-duplication property PL2 states that perfect links do not redundantly
deliver messages. The no-forge property PL3 states that perfect links do not forge messages. The
property PL1 is a liveness and the properties PL2 and PL3 are safety properties.
Lowering Specifications. We now showcase lowering specifications and the program logic
inference rules with the short proof of the no-forge property of the perfect link component PLC.
PLC uses the stubborn link interface and relies on its properties. The specification of the stub-
born link in Fig. 3.(b) is stated on its interface as the top-level component but PLC uses it as a
subcomponent. When a component is used as a subcomponent, its events are at lower locations
and are also interleaved with the events of the parent and sibling components. Given the top-level
specification of the stubborn link, how can we transform it to be used as the specification of a
subcomponent for the perfect link? Not every assertion can be lowered. In § 4, we present a subset
of the assertion language that can be lowered by a syntactic transformation lower.
Fig. 5 illustrates lowering. The specification of each stack 𝒮i is given as an invariant ℐ(︀⌋︀i (Fig. 5.(a)
and (b)). Consider that we have a stack 𝒮 with the component c at the top and the substacks 𝒮i
i.e. 𝒮 = stack(c,𝒮i). We want to verify that 𝒮 satisfies its specification 𝒜. What can we assume
for each subcomponents 𝒮i? (Fig. 5.(c)) We define the translation function lower on invariants and
show that to prove the validity of 𝒜 for 𝒮 , it is sufficient to assume lower(i,ℐ(︀⌋︀i ) and derive 𝒜 in
TLC.
The SL2 assertion is in the invariant sub-language. Applying the lower transformation to SL2 to
use it as the 0-th subcomponent results in the following:
SL′2 = lower(0,SL2) = lower(0,(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliversl(n′,m))f (n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendsl(n,m))) =(n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′,m))f (n′ ● 0 ↓ sendsl(n,m)) (1)
We will see the transformation details later in § 4, but notice here that ⊺ is changed to 0. The
lowering transformation can be similarly applied to SL1 to result in SL′1.
The judgements of the logic are of the form Γ ⊢c 𝒜 that states that under assumptions Γ, the
assertion 𝒜 holds for the component c . The two lowered assertions are assumed; thus, we have
Γ = SL′1,SL′2.
Program Logic. We now showcase the program logic using a simple example. The no-forge
property of perfect links states that a perfect link delivery event is preceded by a corresponding
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OR′⊢c n ● i ↓ e ⇒ xˆ(n ● (i,e) ∈ ors ∧ self)
OI′ ⊢c n ● ⊺ ↑ e ⇒ xˆ(n ● e ∈ ois ∧ self)
InvL∀e . ⊺ ↓ e ∧ requestc(n,s(n),e) = (s′(n),ois,ors)→ 𝒜∀e,i . i ↑ e ∧ indicationc(n,s(n),(i,e)) = (s′(n),ois,ors)→ 𝒜⊺ ⇝ per ∧ periodicc(n,s(n)) = (s′(n),ois,ors)→ 𝒜𝒜 non-temporal⊢c self⇒ 𝒜
Transx(𝒜⇒x𝒜′ ∧ 𝒜′ ⇒ 𝒜′′) →𝒜⇒x𝒜′′
Transxx(𝒜⇒x𝒜′ ∧ 𝒜′ ⇒x𝒜′′)→𝒜⇒x𝒜′′
Fig. 6. Three Selected TLC Inference Rules and Two Basic Temporal Logic Lemmas
Fig. 7. Illustration of the Proof Steps. The trace is a sequence of events from left to right. Each rectangle
represents an event. In a sequence of steps, the proof shows that a perfect link deliver event deliverpl is
preceded by a perfect link send event sendpl.
perfect link send event. We want to apply TLC to prove the following judgement that states that
assuming Γ, the no-forge property is valid for PLC.
Γ ⊢PLC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))f (n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m))
At a high-level level, the proof shows a precedence sequence that transitively imply the desired
precedence. The proof steps are illustrated in Fig. 7. Step 1: A perfect link delivery event is executed;
hence, the event should have been previously issued. Step 2: By the component implementation
(in Fig. 3.(a)), a perfect link delivery event is issued by only the indication handler function. Thus,
the issuing event is a stubborn link delivery event. Step 3: By the no-forge property of stubborn
links, a stubborn link delivery is preceded by a stubborn link send. Step 4: A stubborn link send
event is executed before; thus, it should have been previously issued. Step 5: By the component
implementation (in Fig. 3.(a)), a stubborn link send event is issued by only the request handler
function. Thus, the issuing event is a perfect link send event. By the transitivity of precedence, it is
concluded form the above steps that A perfect link delivery is preceded by a perfect link send.
The rules and lemmas that we use for this proof are presented in Fig. 6. We will look at the rules
closely in § 5. Here, we use two basic rules: rule OR′ and rule OI′, one derived rule: rule InvL and
two basic temporal logic lemmas Transx and Transxx. Intuitively, the two rules OR′ and OI′
state that if an event is executed, it should have been previously issued. The rule OR′ states that if
at a node n and the subcomponent i , a request ↓ event e is processed, then in the past, at the same
node n, the request (i,e) is issued by a self event. Similarly, the rule OI′ states that if at a node n
and at the top level ⊺, an output indication ↑ event e is processed, then in the past, at the same node
n, the indication e is issued by a self event. The rule InvL states that if a non-temporal assertion
holds for all the three handler functions of the component, request, periodic and indication, then
the assertion holds in every self event. It is notable that InvL reduces a temporal global assertion to
non-temporal local proof obligations: each premise of this rule is a non-temporal assertion about
a single handler function. Thus, the functional implementation of the component can be directly
used to infer its properties. The two temporal logic lemmas Transx and Transxx state basic
temporal transitivity properties. By rule OI′, we have
Step 1: Γ ⊢PLC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))⇒x(n ● deliverpl(n′,m) ∈ ois ∧ self) (2)
that states that if a perfect link indication is executed, it is previously issued by a self event. We
now prove that it is issued only when a stubborn link delivery is executed. We use rule InvL with𝒜 = n ● deliverpl(n′,m) ∈ ois→ ∃c . (n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′,∐︀c,m̃︀)) (3)
Considering the implementation in Fig. 3.(a), the two cases for request and periodic are straight-
forward as ois = (︀⌋︀ in both and the premise is refuted. The other case is for indication where the
stubborn link indication is executed. Thus, by rule InvL (and then reducing two implications to
one), we have:
Step 2: Γ ⊢PLC (self ∧ n ● deliverpl(n′,m) ∈ ois)⇒ ∃c . (n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′,∐︀c,m̃︀)) (4)
By Lemma Transx on Eq. 2 and Eq. 4, and existential elimination for c , we have
Γ ⊢PLC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))⇒x(n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′,∐︀c,m̃︀)) (5)
that states that the perfect link delivery event is preceded by a stubborn link delivery event.
From Γ, and Eq. 1 (lowered SL′2), instantiatingm with ∐︀c,m̃︀ and unfolding⇝, we have
Step 3: Γ ⊢PLC (n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′,∐︀c,m̃︀))⇒x(n′ ● 0 ↓ sendsl(n,∐︀c,m̃︀)) (6)
that is the assumption that every stubborn link delivery event is preceded by a stubborn link send
event. By rule OR′, we have
Step 4: Γ ⊢PLC (n′ ● 0 ↓ sendsl(n,∐︀c,m̃︀))⇒x(n′ ● (0,sendsl(n,∐︀c,m̃︀)) ∈ ors ∧ self) (7)
that states that every executed stubborn link send event is previously issued by a self event. We
use rule InvL again with𝒜 = n′ ● (0,sendsl(n,∐︀c,m̃︀)) ∈ ors→ (n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m))
Considering the implementation in Fig. 3.(a), the two cases indication and periodic are straightfor-
ward as ors = (︀⌋︀ in both. The other case is request where the perfect link request is executed. Thus,
we have
Step 5: Γ ⊢PLC (self ∧ n′ ● (0,sendsl(n,∐︀c,m̃︀)) ∈ ors)⇒ (n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m)) (8)
By Lemma Transx on Eq. 7 and Eq. 8, we have
Γ ⊢PLC (n′ ● 0 ↓ sendsl(n,∐︀c,m̃︀))⇒x(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m)) (9)
From Lemma Transxx on Eq. 5, Eq. 6 and Eq. 9, we have
Γ ⊢PLC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))⇒x(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m))
that is
Γ ⊢PLC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))f (n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m))
The implementations, specifications and proofs of the other components are available in the
appendix [Appendix 2020] § 4 and 5.2. After this overview, we first define the assertion language
(§ 3). Next, we define the lowering transformation and prove its soundness for compositional
reasoning (§ 4). Then, we present TLC inference rules (§ 5). We finally present the mechanization
framework (§ 8).
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x ∶= Variable⋃︀ n ⋃︀ d ⋃︀ o ⋃︀ e Rigid⋃︀ ors ⋃︀ ois ⋃︀ s ⋃︀ i⋃︀ n ⋃︀ r ⋃︀ d ⋃︀ o ⋃︀ e Flexible⋃︀ ors ⋃︀ ois ⋃︀ s ⋃︀ s′
c ∶= Constant⋃︀ (︀⌋︀ ⋃︀ ↓ ⋃︀ ↑ ⋃︀ ⇝ ⋃︀ per⋃︀ N ⋃︀ Correct
f ∶= + ⋃︀ ∶∶ ⋃︀ .. Function
t ∶= Term⋃︀ x ⋃︀ c⋃︀ f (t1, ..,tn) ⋃︀ x (t1, ..,tn) Function App
p ∶= Predicate⋃︀ < ⋃︀ = ⋃︀ ∈ ⋃︀ ⊆ ⋃︀ ..
a ∶= p (t1, ..,tn) Atom𝒜 ∶= a Assertion⋃︀ 𝒜 ∧𝒜 ⋃︀ ¬𝒜 Proposition⋃︀ ∀x . 𝒜 Quantification⋃︀ □ˆ𝒜 ⋃︀ ⊟ˆ𝒜 Temporal⋃︀ ◇ˆ𝒜 ⋃︀ xˆ𝒜 ⋃︀ ◯𝒜 Temporal⋃︀ Ⓢ 𝒜 Self Assertion
Assertion for the stack at location d :𝒜d ∶= 𝒜 such that
a ∶= (n = t ∧ d = d′ ∧ o = t ∧ e = t) d′ ⊇ d⋃︀ t ∈ Correct
and ◯ andⓈ are not used.
Invariant for the stack at location d :ℐd ∶= □𝒜d
Invariant:ℐ ∶= □𝒜 such that◯ andⓈ are not used.
Syntactic Sugar:
n ● 𝒜 ≜ n = n ∧ 𝒜⊺ o e ≜ d = (︀⌋︀ ∧ o = o ∧ e = e
i o e ≜ d = (︀i⌋︀ ∧ o = o ∧ e = e
self ≜ (d = (︀⌋︀ ∧ o = ↓) ∨(d = (︀⌋︀ ∧ o = ⇝ ) ∨(∃i . d = (︀i⌋︀ ∧ o = ↑)
□𝒜 ≜ 𝒜 ∧ □ˆ𝒜
⊟𝒜 ≜ 𝒜 ∧ ⊟ˆ𝒜◇𝒜 ≜ 𝒜 ∨ ◇ˆ𝒜x𝒜 ≜ 𝒜 ∨ xˆ𝒜𝒜⇒ 𝒜′ ≜ □(𝒜→ 𝒜′)𝒜⇝ 𝒜′ ≜ □(𝒜→◇𝒜′)𝒜f 𝒜′ ≜ □(𝒜→x𝒜′)
Fig. 8. Assertion Language
3 ASSERTION LANGUAGE
We now present the assertion language of TLC in Fig. 8. It is a temporal language on event traces
of stacks composed of distributed components. It can concisely capture both safety and liveness
properties. We have already seen parts of the language in § 2; we consider the rest here.
The constants N and Correct are the set of participating and correct node identifiers respectively.
Similar to classical first-order logic, a term t can be a variable, a constant or an application of a
function f to other terms. As the pre-state s and post-state s′ variables have function values, a
term can be constructed by applying a variable to terms as well.
An atomic assertion is an application of a predicate p to terms. All propositional and quantified
formula can be constructed as syntactic sugar to conjunction, negation and universal quantification.
Similarly, the grammar only shows the strict versions of the temporal operators as the non-strict
versions can be defined as syntactic sugar. The temporal operators that we did not introduce in
§ 2 are ◯ and Ⓢ . The next operator ◯ states that its operand assertion holds in the immediate
next event. The self subtrace is the sequence of events executed on the top component. The self
operatorⓈ allows stating assertions about the self subtrace. The assertionⓈ 𝒜 asserts 𝒜 on the
self subtrace. The self operator is usually used as the outermost operator.
We use ℐd to represent invariant assertions for the substack at location d . The specification of a
component is written when it is at the top (︀⌋︀ as a top-level invariant ℐ(︀⌋︀. An invariant ℐd is of the
form □𝒜d . To support lowering, the atomic assertions used in an assertion 𝒜d are constrained to
have the form n = t ∧ d = d ′ ∧ o = t ′ ∧ e = t ′′ such that d ′ ⊇ d . The location variable d is explicitly
equal to an extension d ′ of d i.e. the event is executed under the substack at location d . For example,
the event at location (︀2,1,0⌋︀ is executed under the 0-th child of the top component, i.e. (︀2,1,0⌋︀ ⊇ (︀0⌋︀.
Definition 1 (Lowering Assertions). lower(i,ℐ(︀⌋︀)
lower(i,ℐ(︀⌋︀) ≜ restrict(d ⊇ (︀i⌋︀, push(i,ℐ(︀⌋︀))
Definition 2 (Pushing an Assertion).
push(i,𝒜(︀⌋︀)∶
push(i,n = t1 ∧ d = d ∧ o = t2 ∧ e = t3)
≜
n = t1 ∧ d = i ∶∶∶ d ∧ o = t2 ∧ e = t3
push(i,t ∈ Correct) ≜ t ∈ Correct
push(i,𝒜(︀⌋︀1 ∧𝒜(︀⌋︀2 ) ≜ push(i,𝒜(︀⌋︀1 ) ∧
push(i,𝒜(︀⌋︀2 )
push(i,¬𝒜(︀⌋︀) ≜ ¬push(i,𝒜(︀⌋︀)
push(i,∀x . 𝒜(︀⌋︀) ≜ ∀x . push(i,𝒜(︀⌋︀)
push(i,□ˆ𝒜(︀⌋︀) ≜ □ˆpush(i,𝒜(︀⌋︀)
push(i,⊟ˆ𝒜(︀⌋︀) ≜ ⊟ˆpush(i,𝒜(︀⌋︀)
push(i,◇ˆ𝒜(︀⌋︀) ≜ ◇ˆpush(i,𝒜(︀⌋︀)
push(i,xˆ𝒜(︀⌋︀) ≜ xˆpush(i,𝒜(︀⌋︀)
Definition 3 (Restricting an Assertion).
restrict(𝒜′,𝒜)∶
restrict(𝒜′,a) ≜ a
restrict(𝒜′,𝒜1 ∧𝒜2) ≜ restrict(𝒜′,𝒜1) ∧
restrict(𝒜′,𝒜2)
restrict(𝒜′,¬𝒜) ≜ ¬restrict(𝒜′,𝒜)
restrict(𝒜′,∀x . 𝒜) ≜ ∀x . restrict(𝒜′,𝒜)
restrict(𝒜′,□ˆ𝒜) ≜ □ˆ(𝒜′ → restrict(𝒜′,𝒜))
restrict(𝒜′,⊟ˆ𝒜) ≜ ⊟ˆ(𝒜′ → restrict(𝒜′,𝒜))
restrict(𝒜′,◇ˆ𝒜) ≜ ◇ˆrestrict(𝒜′,𝒜)
restrict(𝒜′,xˆ𝒜) ≜ xˆrestrict(𝒜′,𝒜)
Fig. 9. Lowering (Pushing and Restricting) Assertions. An atomic assertion is denoted by a.
The assertion also includes explicit equalities for the executing node n, the orientation o and the
user-level event e. Further, invariant assertions do not use the next ◯ or selfⓈ operators.
4 SPECIFICATION LOWERING
The presented programming model allows a component to be programmed using subcomponents.
The goal of compositional verification is to verify the component using only the specifications (and
not the implementations) of the subcomponents. The specification of each component is written
when it is the main component at the top of the stack; however, it should be later used as the
specification of a subcomponent. A fundamental question is how the specification of a component
should be lowered to be used as a subcomponent. The lowered specifications of the subcomponents
are used as assumptions to verify the specification of the new parent component (that is programmed
on top of the subcomponents). In this section, we define the lowering transformation on specification
assertions and prove its soundness. Lowering is not possible for every assertion. We observed
that lowering specifications requires certain information, such as the location of events, to be
present and certain operators, such as next, to be absent from the specification. We identify a subset
of the assertion language that is both restrictive enough to allow the definition of the lowering
transformation and expressive enough to represent specifications.
As we saw in Fig. 5, the specification of each stack 𝒮i is given as an invariant ℐ(︀⌋︀i (Fig. 5.(a) and
(b)). We have a stack 𝒮 with the component c at the top and the substacks 𝒮i i.e. 𝒮 = stack(c,𝒮i). We
want to verify that 𝒮 satisfies its specification𝒜 (Fig. 5.(c)). We define the translation function lower
on invariants and show that to prove the validity of 𝒜 for 𝒮 , it is sufficient to assume lower(i,ℐ(︀⌋︀i )
and derive 𝒜 in TLC. Fig. 9 represents the the function lower on the invariant sub-language ℐ(︀⌋︀. It
first pushes and then restricts the assertion. We visit each in turn.
Pushing. For the component at the top, the semantics of stacks models the most general client
that may issue any request. However, when the component is used as a subcomponent, the parent
component may only issue a subset of the possible requests. Therefore, if a stack is pushed from
the top to a lower layer, its set of subtraces can only become smaller (or stay the same). Thus, the
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SL′2 = lower(0,SL2) = (10)
lower(0,(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliversl(n′,m))f (n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendsl(n,m))) = (11)
restrict(d ⊇ (︀0⌋︀, push(0, □(︀(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliversl(n′,m))→x(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendsl(n,m))⌋︀)) = (12)
restrict(d ⊇ (︀0⌋︀, □(︀(n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′,m))→x(n′ ● 0 ↓ sendsl(n,m))⌋︀) = (13)
□(︀d ⊇ (︀0⌋︀→ (n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′,m))→x(n′ ● 0 ↓ sendsl(n,m))⌋︀ = (14)
□(︀(n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′,m))→x(n′ ● 0 ↓ sendsl(n,m))⌋︀⌋︀ = (15)(n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′,m))f (n′ ● 0 ↓ sendsl(n,m)) (16)
Fig. 10. Lowering Example
specification of a stack at the top level can serve as a starting point for its specification as the
substack i . However, the stack is now used at a deeper level. The location of every event of the stack
is now under branch i . For example, the location of its highest events is (︀⌋︀ when it is at the top and
is (︀i⌋︀ when it is at the i-th substack. Similarly, an event at location (︀1⌋︀ is pushed to location (︀1,i⌋︀.
Therefore, the first transformation is to push the locations under branch i . The function push is
defined in Fig. 9. As we saw in the definition of the invariant sub-language ℐd ∶= □𝒜d , the location
values d ′ ⊇ d are explicit in assertions 𝒜d . Given a top-level assertion 𝒜(︀⌋︀ and a branch index i , the
function push translates the location value from d ′ to i ∶∶∶ d ′. Appending i to d ′ effectively pushes
the events to branch i .
Restricting. When a stack is at the top, all events belong to that stack. However, when it is
pushed to a substack, its events are interleaved with events from the top component and the sibling
substacks. Therefore, the second transformation is to restrict the specification to remain valid on
traces that are extended with interleaving events. Consider a specification □𝒜 for a stack. After
pushing the assertion to the i-th substack, the resulting assertion □push(i,𝒜) does not necessarily
remain valid because although the assertion push(i,𝒜) is valid on events under branch i , it may
simply not be valid on events of the top component and the sibling substacks. Thus, the restricting
condition of being under branch i should be added and the assertion □push(i,𝒜) is translated to
□(d ⊇ (︀i⌋︀ → push(i,𝒜)). (The assertion push(i,𝒜) should be recursively translated as well.) As
the definition of the function restrict in Fig. 9 shows, the other variants of the always operator are
translated similarly. On the other hand, an eventually assertion ◇𝒜 remains the same. If an event
will happen in the future, it will still happen if other events are interleaved before it. Similarly, the
other variants of the eventually operator remain the same.
As an example, Fig. 10 elaborates lowering of SL2 that we saw in Eq. 1. The property SL2 is in the
invariant language ℐ(︀⌋︀ and can be easily lowered by the syntactic transformation. The steps follow
the definition in Fig. 9. We only explain a couple of subtleties. In Eq. 12 - Eq. 13, the push function
translates d = (︀⌋︀ to d = (︀0⌋︀. Thus, in the syntactic sugar, ⊺ is translated to 0. In Eq. 14, the syntactic
sugar (n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′,m)) includes the conjunct d = (︀0⌋︀. From basic propositional logic, for any𝒜 and𝒜′, we have that d ⊇ (︀0⌋︀→ ((d = (︀0⌋︀∧𝒜)→ 𝒜′) simplifies to (d ⊇ (︀0⌋︀∧d = (︀0⌋︀∧𝒜)→ 𝒜′.
Since d = (︀0⌋︀ is stronger than d ⊇ (︀0⌋︀, it further simplifies to (d = (︀0⌋︀ ∧𝒜)→ 𝒜′.
We note that if the location was not explicit in the assertion, the assertion could not be pushed and
would remain too general. For example, consider the assertion e = send(n,m)⇒m > 0 for a stack 𝒮1
that states that all the messages that it sends are positive. This assertion is too general for the stack
S that composes S1 as a subcomponent because the top component or the sibling subcomponents
may send negative messages. Further, if the assertions included the next operator ◯ , they could not
be restricted to remain valid after the trace is interleaved with events of the top component and the
sibling subcomponents. For example, consider the assertion (d = (︀⌋︀ ∧ o = ↓)⇒ ◯ (d = (︀⌋︀ ∧ o = ↑)
for a stack 𝒮1 that states that every top-level request is immediately followed by a indication. The
pushed assertion (d = (︀1⌋︀ ∧ o = ↓)⇒ ◯ (d = (︀1⌋︀ ∧ o = ↑) is not valid for the stack S that composes
S1 as a subcomponent because the events of the other components may be interleaved between the
request and indication. Similarly, assertions that use the self operatorⓈ cannot be lowered. For
example, consider the assertionⓈ(∀n. s(n) > 0) for a stack 𝒮1 that states that the state of the top
component of 𝒮1 remains positive. Obviously, this assertion does not necessarily hold for the new
top component.
Soundness. The following theorem states the soundness of the lowering transformation for
compositional reasoning. If a top-level invariant ℐ(︀⌋︀i is valid for the stack 𝒮i and 𝒮i is a substack of
the stack 𝒮 , then the lowered invariant lower(i,ℐ(︀⌋︀i ) is valid for 𝒮 . We use the validity judgement⊧𝒮 𝒜 that states that 𝒜 is valid in every trace of 𝒮 . (Validity is defined more precisely in § 7.) The
detailed proofs are available in the appendix [Appendix 2020] § 5.2.
Theorem 1. For all 𝒮 , c , and 𝒮i , such that 𝒮 = stack(c,𝒮i), if ⊧𝒮i ℐ(︀⌋︀i then ⊧𝒮 lower(i,ℐ(︀⌋︀i ).
We now state the compositional proof technique and its soundness. The specifications of substacks
can be lowered and used to derive the specification of the stack. Judgements of TLC are of the form
Γ ⊢c 𝒜 where Γ is the assumed assertions and 𝒜 is the deduced assertion. Consider valid top-level
invariants ℐ(︀⌋︀i for stacks 𝒮i , and a stack 𝒮 built by the component c on top of 𝒮i . The following
theorem states that assuming the lowered invariants lower(i,ℐ(︀⌋︀i ), any assertion that TLC deduces
for c is valid for 𝒮 .
Corollary 1 (Composition Soundness). For all 𝒮 , c , and 𝒮i such that 𝒮 = stack(c,𝒮i), if⊧𝒮i ℐ(︀⌋︀i and lower(i,ℐ(︀⌋︀i ) ⊢c 𝒜 then ⊧𝒮 𝒜.
5 TLC INFERENCE RULES
In this section, we present the basic and derived inference rules of TLC. The basic inference rules
of TLC are intuitive and fit in half a page. Yet, they provide the basis for verification of full stacks
such as Fig. 2.(b) and (c). We incrementally captured fundamental reasoning steps required for
verification of the use-case protocols as the basic rules. Further, we captured the other common
reasoning steps as derived rules. The sequent judgements are of the form Γ ⊢c 𝒜 where c is
the component, Γ is a set of assumed assertions and 𝒜 is the deduced assertion. The inference
rules axiomatize the properties of the semantics and the low-level communication primitive. More
importantly, they allow deducing assertions about execution traces from the functional definition
of the component. Fig. 11 presents the basic inference rules of TLC. (We elide the standard rules of
sequent logic to the appendix [Appendix 2020] § 1.1). Derived rules present higher-level reasoning
steps than basic rules. We present a few derived rules in Fig. 12. A full list of derived rules are
available in the appendix [Appendix 2020] § 1.3.
The first three rules IR, II and Pe state that when an event is executed on the top component, the
correspond handler function of the component is applied. These rules take the reasoning to the
functional definitions of the component. (Rule IR): The rule IR (for input request) states that if at
the top level ⊺, a request ↓ event e is executed then the requestc handler function is called. The
requestc function of the component c represents a relation between its inputs: the stepping node
n, the pre-state s(n) of n, and the user event e , and its outputs: the post-state s′(n), the issued
output requests ors and the issued output indications ois. The rules II (for input indication) and Pe
(for periodic) are similar. (Rule II): The rule II states that if an indication ↑ event e from the i-th
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IR⊢c ⊺ ↓ e ⇒ (s′(n),ors,ois) = requestc(n,s(n),e)
II ⊢c i ↑ e ⇒ (s′(n),ors,ois) = indicationc(n,s(n),(i,e))
Pe⊢c ⊺ ⇝ per ⇒ (s′(n),ors,ois) = periodicc(n,s(n))
OR⊢c n ● (i,e) ∈ ors ∧ self ⇒ ◇ˆ(n ● i ↓ e)
OI⊢c n ● e ∈ ois ∧ self ⇒ ◇ˆ(n ● ⊺ ↑ e)
OR′⊢c n ● i ↓ e ⇒ xˆ(n ● (i,e) ∈ ors ∧ self)
OI′⊢c n ● ⊺ ↑ e ⇒ xˆ(n ● e ∈ ois ∧ self)
APer⊢c n ∈ Correct ↔ □◇(n ● ⊺ ⇝ per)
ASelf⊢c Ⓢ □ self
SInv⊢c (Ⓢ ℐ) ↔ restrict(self,ℐ)
Init⊢c Ⓢ (s = λn. initc(n))
PostPre⊢c Ⓢ (s′ = s ⇔ ◯ s = s)
SEq⊢c n ≠ n ⇒ s′(n) = s(n)
RSeq⊢c r = r ⇒ ⊟ˆ(r ≤ r)
GST⊢c n′ ∈ Correct ∧ r ≥ rGST ∧(n ● d ↓ sendl(n′,m) ∧ r = r)⇒◇(n′ ● d ↑ deliverl(n,m) ∧ r = r)
FDup⊢c □◇(n′ ● d ↑ deliverl(n,m))→
□◇(n ● d ↓ sendl(n′,m))
NForge⊢c (n′ ● d ↑ deliverl(n,m))⇒x(n ● d ↓ sendl(n′,m))
Node⊢c □ n ∈ N
UniOR⊢c (occ(ors,e) ≤ 1 ∧
⊟ˆ(n = n ∧ self→ (i,e) ⇑∈ ors) ∧
□ˆ(n = n ∧ self→ (i,e) ⇑∈ ors))⇒(n ● i ↓ e)⇒
⊟ˆ¬(n ● i ↓ e) ∧ □ˆ¬(n ● i ↓ e)
Fig. 11. TLC Basic Inference Rules. We use requestc , indicationc and periodicc to refer to the handler
functions of the component c . The function call occ(l ,e) counts the number of the element e in the list l .
subcomponent is executed then the indicationc handler function is called. An indication event e
from a subcomponent i is passed to the indicationc function as the sum term (i,e). (Rule Pe): The
rule Pe states that if at the top ⊺, a periodic ⇝ event per is executed then the periodicc handler
function is called.
The next four rules axiomatize the relation of issued and executed events. The rules OR and OI
state that an event that is issued for a component is eventually executed on the component, and the
rules OR′ and OI′ state that executed events are previously issued. These rules let the reasoning
follow a chain of actions. (Rule OR): An output request from the top component is a downward (↓)
event e to a subcomponent i that is issued as the sum term (i,e). The rule OR (for output request)
states that if at a node n, an output request (i,e) is issued by a self event, then eventually at n and
the subcomponent i , the request ↓ event e is executed. (Rule OI): Similarly, the rule OI (for output
indication) states that if at a node n, an output indication e is issued by a self event, then eventually
at n and the top level ⊺, the indication ↑ event e is executed. The rules OR′ and OI′ state the relation
of issued and executed events in the opposite direction of the rules OR and OI. (Rule OR′): The
rule OR′ states that if at a node n and a subcomponent i , a request ↓ event e is executed, then in
the past, at that node n, the request event for that subcomponent (i,e) is issued by a self event.
(Rule OI′): Similarly, the rule OI′ states that if at a node n and the top level ⊺, an output indication ↑
event e is executed, then in the past, at that node n, that indication event e is issued by a self event.
(Rule APer): The rule APer (for always periodic) states that if a node is correct, it infinitely often
executes the periodic event.
(Rule ASelf): The self subtrace is the sequence of events executed on the top component. The
rule ASelf (for always self) states that every event in the self subtrace is a self event. (Rule SInv):
The rule SInv (for self invariant) states that an invariant for the self subtrace can be transformed to
an invariant for the whole trace using the restrict function that we defined earlier in Fig. 9. The
restriction condition is the self assertion as the invariant continues to hold in the self events. The
rules ASelf and SInv lead to the derived rule InvLSe (in Fig. 12). (Rule InvLSe): The rule InvLSe
states that if a non-temporal assertion holds for all the three handler functions, request, indication
and periodic, then the assertion holds in every self event. We note that this rule reduces a global
temporal assertion to local non-temporal proof obligations about the handler functions. To derive
the rule InvLSe, the self assertion in the rule ASelf is expanded to the disjunction of three events.
Then, for the three cases, the rule SInv is applied to the rules IR, II and Pe to derive the same
assertions for the self subtrace. Similarly, the rule InvL that we saw in the overview section (in
Fig. 6) is in fact derived by applying the rule SInv to the rule InvLSe (in Fig. 12).
(Rule Init): The rule Init states that at the beginning of the execution, the state s of every node n
is the state defined by the initc function of the implementation. (Rule PostPre): The rule PostPre
states that in the self subtrace, the post-state s′ of every event is the pre-state s of the next event.
We note that this assertion does not hold on the whole trace as the events of different components
are interleaved. (Rule SEq): The rule SEq (for state equality) states that if the stepping node n is not
a node n, then the state of n stays unchanged ie. its pre-state s(n) and post-state s′(n) are equal.
The above four rules derive inductive inference rules for the state of the top component. Let us
consider the derived rule InvSSe′ in Fig. 12. (Rule InvSSe′): The rule InvSSe′ states that if a state
predicate S holds in the initial state and all the three handler functions, request, indication and
periodic preserve S , then S always holds in self events. This rule is used to prove state invariants.
Similar to the rule InvLSe, this rule reduces a global temporal assertion to local non-temporal
assertions about the handler functions. To derive this rule, the rule Init is used in the base case.
For the inductive case, the rule PostPre brings the invariant S on the state from the post-state of
an event to the pre-state of the next event. Then, if the node is not stepping, the rule SEq is used. If
it is stepping, expanding self in the rule ASelf leads to a case-analysis for the handler functions.
(RuleRSeq): The ruleRSeq (for round sequence) states that the round numbers are non-decreasing.
Messages are transmitted using basic links at the leaves of the stack. A basic link is a weak
communication primitive; it can drop, reorder and duplicate messages. The next three rules GST,
FDup and NForge. state the properties of basic links. Stronger communication primitives can be
programmed based on these properties. (Rule GST): The rule GST states that after the round rGST
if a message is sent to a correct node, it is delivered in the same round. It axiomatizes the partial
synchrony of the network and is used to prove liveness properties. In particular, it is used to show
that the eventual failure detector component eventually suspects no correct node. The rule GST
also derives the rule FLoss (in Fig. 12). (Rule FLoss): The rule FLoss (for fair-loss) states that links
are fair in dropping messages in the sense that they do not systematically drop any particular
message. If a node sends a message infinitely often and the receiver is correct, then the message
is delivered to the receiver infinitely often. The rule FLoss is used to verify stubborn links that
are implemented on top of basic links. (Rule FDup): The rule FDup (for finite duplication) states
that links duplicate a message only a finite number of times. If the same message is delivered to a
node infinitely often, then it is sent infinitely often. (Rule NForge): The rule NForge (for no-forge)
states that links do not forge messages. If a message is delivered, it is previously sent.
(Rule UniOR): The rule UniOR (for unique output request) states that if a request is issued at
most once, then it is executed at most once. If an output request e is issued at most once at the
current event and it is not issued at any other event, then if e is executed at an event, it is never
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InvLSe∀e . ⊺ ↓ e ∧ requestc(n,s(n),e) = (s′(n),ois,ors)→ 𝒜∀e,i . i ↑ e ∧ indicationc(n,s(n),(i,e)) = (s′(n),ois,ors)→ 𝒜⊺ ⇝ per ∧ periodicc(n,s(n)) = (s′(n),ois,ors)→ 𝒜𝒜 non-temporal⊢c Ⓢ □𝒜
InvSSe′
S(initc(n))∀s,e,s′. S(s) ∧ requestc(n,s,e) = (s′,_,_)→ S(s′)∀s,i,e,s′. S(s) ∧ indicationc(n,s,(i,e)) = (s′,_,_)→ S(s′)∀s,s′. S(s) ∧ periodicc(n,s) = (s′,_,_)→ S(s′)⊢c Ⓢ □S(s(n))
FLoss⊢c n′ ∈ Correct→ □◇(n ● d ↓ sendl(n′,m))→ □◇(n′ ● d ↑ deliverl(n,m))
Quorum⋃︀Correct⋃︀ > t1 ⊢c N ⊆ N ∧ ⋃︀N ⋃︀ > t2 ∧ t1 + t2 ≥ ⋃︀N⋃︀⇒ ∃n. n ∈ N ∧ n ∈ Correct
Fig. 12. A subset of the TLC Derived Inference Rules. S is a predicate on Statec . N is a set.
executed before or after that event. The rule UniOI (unique output indication) states a similar fact
for indications and is elided.
(Rule Node): The rule Node states that the current node n is always in the set of executing nodes
N. This rule is used to reason about the subsets of nodes such as quorums. (RuleQuorum): The
derived rule Quorum states that assuming that the number of correct nodes is more than t1, if
the size of a subset N of nodes (called a quorum) is more than t2 and the sum of t1 and t2 is more
than the total number of nodes, then there is at least one correct node in N . Usually t1 and t2 are
both half the number of nodes N. Intuitively, this rule holds because the two sets are large enough
to have at least one common element. Quorums are the basis of many distributed protocols and
theQuorum rule presents an intuitive reasoning principle for them. We illustrate the use of the
quorum rules in verification of the uniform reliable broadcast in the appendix [Appendix 2020] § 2.
6 DISTRIBUTED STACK SEMANTICS
In this section, we present the semantics of distributed components. It is a novel operational
semantics that models the interaction of composed components in a partially synchronous network.
The transitions are labeled with traces of events. Thus, the operational semantics leads to a trace
semantics for composed components. TLC is proved sound with respect to this semantics in § 7.
Given a stack 𝒮 of components, the semantics defines the transitions that nodes deploying 𝒮
take. It models propagation and processing of downward request and periodic events, and upward
indication events across layers of components. It also models the crash-stop failure of nodes, and
loss and duplication of messages. After a node crashes, it does not take any steps. A node is called
correct if it does not crash.
The semantics models partially synchronous networks. In synchronous networks, a fixed upper
bound on message delivery time is known. In contrast, no such bound exists for asynchronous
networks and many distributed computing abstractions including consensus are impossible in this
model. However, most practical networks including the Internet fall in the partially synchronous
model. In these networks, either a bound holds but is not known a priori, or a bound eventually holds.
Partial synchrony [Dwork et al. 1988] presented the basic round model for partially synchronous
networks. Our semantics follows the basic round model. In this model, each round consists of
sending, delivering and processing messages. In each round, only a subset of sent messages may be
delivered; the rest are lost. However, after a round rGST called the Global Stabilization Time (GST),
every message that a correct node sends to another correct node is delivered in the same round.
After this round, the network stabilizes and protocols can rely on its synchrony. In practice, the
network will eventually remain stable long enough for the protocol to achieve its goal.
n ∶ N Node ID
d ∶ 𝒟 = List Nat Distinct Location
cs ∶ Statec Component State
s ∶ S =Map N Statec Dist. Comp. State
σ ∶ Σ =Map 𝒟 S Stack state
m ∶ M Message Payload
ms ∶ ℳ =MultiSet (N ×N ×𝒟 ×M) Messages
f ∶ N Failed nodes
r ∶ ℛ Round
w ∶ 𝒲 = Σ ×ℳ ×N ×ℛ World
w0(𝒮) = ∐︀(λd, n . let (c, _) = 𝒮(d) in Initial World
initc (n)),∅,∅, r0̃︀
e, oi ∶ E User Event
or ∶ IE = Nat × E Output request
fe ∶ FE Event or Fail∶= e ⋃︀ fail
o ∶ O Orientation∶= ↓ ⋃︀ ↑ ⋃︀ ⇝
ℓ ∶ N ×ℛ ×𝒟 ×O × FE × Σ × Σ × IE × E Event Label
τ ∶∶= ℓ∗ Trace
Fig. 13. Operational Semantics Variables
The variables used in the opera-
tional semantics are defined in Fig. 13.
We denote the set of node identi-
fiers by N. As mentioned before, we
uniquely identify each component in
a stack by the (reverse) list of branch
numbers in the path from the top to
that component. With the reverse list,
moving up and down the tree corre-
sponds to adding and removing an in-
dex at the head of the list. We call this
sequence the distinct location d ∈ 𝒟
of the component. The substack at
location d of a stack 𝒮 is denoted
by 𝒮(d). The definition of each com-
ponent declares the component state
type Statec . The state of a distributed
component s ∈ S is a mapping from
N to Statec . The state of a distributed
stack σ ∈ Σ is a heterogeneous map
from 𝒟 to S types. A messagem is a tuple of the sender node, the receiver node, the location of
the receiver component and the payload. We usems ∈ℳ to denote a multi-set of messages. The
state of the transition systemw ∈𝒲 (for world) is a tuple (σ ,ms, f ,r) where σ is the state of the
distributed stack,ms is the multi-set (or bag) of in-transit messages, f is the set of failed nodes and
r is the round number. Given a stack 𝒮 , the initial statew0(𝒮) maps the state of every node and
location to the state that the init function of the component at that location returns, assigns the
empty sets to the initial set of messagesms and failed nodes f , and the initial round r0 to r . We use
e to denote user-level events. The orientation o of an event is either ↓ for request, ↑ for indication
or
⇝
for periodic events.
An event label ℓ is a record (n,r ,d ,o,fe,σ ,σ ′,or ,oi) where n is the node, r is the round and d is
the location where the event is executed, o is the orientation of the event, fe is either fail or an
executed user event e , σ and σ ′ are the stack pre-state and post-state, or is the issued request event
and oi is the issued indication event. To access the fields of a label, we use functions with the same
names as fields. An output request event or is a tuple (i,e) of the target subcomponent number i
and the user event e . (We note that to present a core semantics, the request, indication and periodic
handler functions of the components return one rather than a list of request and indication events.
A list of events can be similarly processed in sequence. We also elide the complication that o, or and
oi are option values.) A trace τ is a sequence of label events. The i-th event of a trace τ is denoted
by τ(i). The trace τi ..j denotes the sub-trace of τ from and including location i to and excluding
location j and the trace τi .. denotes the sub-trace of τ from and including location i onward. Given
a predicate p on event labels, the sub-trace τ ⋃︀p is the projection of τ for events that satisfy p. We
use the overline notation to denote multiple instances; for example, we use τi to denote multiple
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traces τi one for each index i in the context. The trace τ ⋅ τ ′ denotes the concatenation of the traces
τ and τ ′ and ⋅τi denotes the concatenation of the traces τi .
Given a stack of components 𝒮 , Fig. 14 presents the operational semantics for 𝒮 . The semantics
is parametric in the round rGST (Global Stabilization Time). We start with an overview. A roundÐ→
comprises two parts. The first part τÐ→∗t is a finite sequence of (1) top-level request transitions (and
their following request and indication transitions) and (2) node failure transitions. Send request
transitions at the leaf layers result in messages. The second part τ
′Ð→p is a transition that delivers and
processes messages and executes the periodic handlers. The two parts result is a round transition
τ ⋅ τ ′ÐÐÐ→. The trace semantics T (𝒮) of 𝒮 is the set of traces τ of infinite transitions τÐ→∗ starting from
the initial statew0(𝒮). We consider infinite traces to reason about liveness properties.
In the rules, we use _ as a place holder for variables that are not used in the context. The two rules
Fail and Reqestmake top-level transitions→t . The rule Reqest uses the helper transition→r eq .
The transition→r eq that processes request events is taken by the two rules Req and Req′. The rule
Req uses the helper transition →ind . The transition →ind that processes indication events is taken
by the two rules Ind and Ind′. The rule Ind, in turn, uses the helper transition→r eq . The transitions→r eq and→ind are interdependent; the rule Req that makes the transition→r eq uses the transition→ind and the rule Ind that makes the transition →ind uses the transition →r eq . The rule Periodic
makes periodic transitions →p . It uses the helper transitions →msд and →per . The transition →msд
that processes messages is taken by the ruleMsg. The transition→per that executes the periodic
functions is taken by the rules Per and Per′. Next, we take a closer look at each rule.
The rule Fail makes a top-level transition with a fail event for a node that has not already failed
and adds it to the set of failed nodes f . Similarly, the other rules require that the executing node
has not already failed.
The rule Reqest executes a top-level request that, in turn, may result in a sequence of requests
and indications. It makes a transition →t , if a request transition →r eq can be taken with a trace
starting with a top-level (request) event. The rule Req makes transitions →r eq for request events
on the internal (non-leaf) components. We take a close look at the rule Req and the other rules are
similar to it. The first event of the trace represents that at a node n and a component at location d ,
a request ↓ event e is executed that takes the pre-state of the stack σ to the post-state σ ′, issues
the request event e1 to the i-th subcomponent and issues the indication event e2. Let c be the top
component of the stack at location d . The state s for the component c is obtained from the stack state
σ . The request function requestc is called with the node identifier n, the pre-state for the node s(n)
and the request event e and results in the post-state s′n for n, the request event (i,e1) i.e. the request
e1 for the i-th subcomponent and the indication event e2. The state s of the component is updated
to s′ with the new state s′n for the node n and the state of the stack σ is updated to σ ′ with the new
state s′ at location d . The issued request event (i,e1) inductively results in a transition→r eq at the
i-th substack whose location is i ∶∶ d . Similarly the issued indication event e2 inductively results
in a transition→ind at location d for the parent component. The trace for the whole transition is
the original request event concatenated with the two transition traces for the issued request and
indication events.
Basic links are used as the leaves of a stack. If the component at the location d is a link, the
rule Req′ makes a transition for a send request. The rule adds tuples to the in-transit messages
that contain the sender and the receiver node identifiers, the component location and the message
payload. A message can be duplicated in the network. Therefore, a finite number of duplicate tuples
are added (with the overline notation). Further, we note that messages are added to an unordered
multi-set of messages. Therefore, messages can be arbitrarily reordered.
The rule Ind makes a transition→ind for indication events from components except the topmost.
(We note that the location of the first event in its trace is i ∶∶ d to exclude the top.) The rule is similar
to the rule Req in structure but executes an indication instead of a request event. The indication
event is executed at the parent component that is at location d . The rule Ind′ makes a transition→ind for indication events from the topmost component. As there is no explicit parent component,
the rule simply records the issued indication in its label.
The rule Periodic delivers messages and executes periodic functions. It drops messages sent
to failed nodes f (using the drop function). In addition, before the round rGST , it may drop some
other messages and retain a subset of messagesms′. The set of remained messages are delivered
by the message transition →msд and calls to the periodic handlers are started at the top level by
the period transition→per . The rule Msg that makes the transition→msд delivers all the messages
in its pre-state. For every message, it issues a delivery indication event at the recipient node and
component location. The trace of the transition is the concatenation of the traces of all the indication
transitions. The rule Per executes the periodic function of a component at a (non-leaf) location
d and recursively for every subcomponent i at location i ∶∶ d . The rule Per is similar to the rule
Req in structure but in addition to calling the periodic function on the component, propagates
the periodic calls to lower-level components as well. At the leaf layers, the rule Per′ makes trivial
periodic transitions.
7 SOUNDNESS OF TLC
In this section, we define the semantics of assertions on execution traces and prove the soundness
of TLCwith respect to distributed stack semantics (defined in § 6). We note that TLC is independent
of the distributed stack semantics and its soundness can be studied for alternative semantics.
We define a modelm = (τ ,i,I) as a tuple of a trace τ , a position i in the trace and an interpretation
I . A trace τ is the sequence of event labels of an execution. To evaluate temporal operators, the
model includes a position i in the trace. The model also includes an interpretation I that maps
free rigid variables, and interpreted functions and predicates to concrete values, functions and
predicates. We define the set of models M(𝒮) of a stack 𝒮 as the set of tuples (τ ,0,I0) where τ
is a trace of 𝒮 , 0 is the first position and I0 is an initial interpretation that includes mappings for
commonly used integer, list and set functions and predicates. The traces of a stack 𝒮 is the set of
traces of the executions of 𝒮 (for any rGST ).
In Fig. 16, we define the models relation,m ⊧ 𝒜, that is read as the modelm models or satisfies
the assertion 𝒜. We also use the models relation for terms,m ⊧ t ∶v , that is read as the modelm
evaluates the term t to the value v . We remember from the classical temporal logic [Manna and
Pnueli 1992] that a rigid variable has the same value in all elements of a trace, while a flexible
variable may assume distinct values in different elements. The rule VarM evaluates a rigid variable
x using the interpretation I . On the other hand, separate rules evaluate the flexible variables n, r, d,
o, e, s, s′, ois and ors based on τ(i), the event at the i-th position in the trace τ . For instance, the
rule NM evaluates the flexible variable n for the current node to the first element n of τ(i). The rule
SM evaluates the flexible variable s (pre-state). We remember from the distributed stack semantics
that if an event at location d is a request or periodic event, then it is applied to the component at
location d , but if it is an indication event, it is applied to the parent component at location tail(d).
Therefore, if the event at location d has a downward orientation i.e. ↓ or ⇝ then the location d is
applied to the stack state σ to obtain the component state. However, if it has an upward orientation
i.e. ↑ then the location tail(d) is applied to σ . The rule SM′ for the post-state s′ is similar. The rule
CM evaluates constants except Correct by the interpretation I . The rule CSM evaluates the constant
Correct to the set of nodes in N that do not have a fail transition in the trace. As the pre-state s and
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Reqest
n ∈ N ∖ {f }(σ ,ms, f ,r) τÐ→r eq (σ ′,ms′)
τ = (n,r ,(︀⌋︀,_,_,_,_,_,_) ⋅ τ ′(σ ,ms, f ,r) τÐ→t (σ ′,ms′, f ,r)
Fail
n ∈ N ∖ {f }(σ ,ms, f ,r)(n,r ,(︀⌋︀,,fail,σ ,σ ,,)ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→t(σ ,ms′, f ∪ {n},r)
Periodic{ms′ = drop(ms, f ) if r ≥ rGST
ms′ ⊆ drop(ms, f ) else(σ ,ms′, f ,r) τÐ→msд (σ0,ms0)(σn ,msn , f ,r + 1) τnÐ→per (σn+1,msn+1)n∈N∖{f }
τn = (n,r + 1,(︀⌋︀, ⇝ ,per,_,_,_,_) ⋅ τ ′nn∈N∖{f }
σn = σn+1 msn =msn+1n∈f
(σ ,ms, f ,r) τ ⋅ ⋅τnn∈N∖{f }ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→p (σ⋃︀N⋃︀,ms⋃︀N⋃︀, f ,r + 1)
Req
n ∈ N ∖ {f } 𝒮(d) = stack(c,_) σ(d) = s
requestc(n,s(n),e) = (s′n ,(i,e1),e2)
s′ = s(︀n ↦ s′n⌋︀ σ ′ = σ(︀d ↦ s′⌋︀(σ ′,ms, f ,r) τ1Ð→r eq (σ1,ms1) τ1 = (n,r ,i ∶∶ d,↓,e1,_,_,_,_) ⋅ τ ′1(σ1,ms1, f ,r) τ2Ð→ind (σ2,ms2) τ2 = (n,r ,d,↑,e2,_,_,_,_) ⋅ τ ′2
τ = (n,r ,d,↓,e,σ ,σ ′,(i,e1),e2) ⋅ τ1 ⋅ τ2(σ ,ms, f ,r) τÐ→r eq (σ2,ms2)
Req′
n ∈ N ∖ {f } 𝒮(d) = link(σ ,ms, f ,r)(n,r ,d,↓,sendl(n′,m),σ ,σ ,,)ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→r eq(σ ′,ms ⊎ {(n,n′,d,m)})
Ind
n ∈ N ∖ {f } 𝒮(d) = stack(c,_) σ(d) = s
indicationc(n,s(n),(i,e)) = (s′n ,(i′,e1),e2)
s′ = s(︀n ↦ s′n⌋︀ σ ′ = σ(︀d ↦ s′⌋︀(σ ′,ms, f ,r) τ1Ð→r eq (σ1,ms1) τ1 = (n,r ,i′ ∶∶ d,↓,e1,_,_,_,_) ⋅ τ ′1(σ1,ms1, f ,r) τ2Ð→ind (σ2,ms2) τ2 = (n,r ,d,↑,e2,_,_,_,_) ⋅ τ ′2
τ = (n,r ,i ∶∶ d,↑,e,σ ,σ ′,(i′,e1),e2) ⋅ τ1 ⋅ τ2(σ ,ms, f ,r) τÐ→ind (σ2,ms2)
Ind′
n ∈ N ∖ {f }(σ ,ms, f ,r)(n,r ,(︀⌋︀,↑,e,σ ,σ ,,)ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→ind(σ ,ms)
Msg
ms = {(ni ,n′i ,di ,mi)i∈I } σ0 = σ ms0 = ∅(σi ,msi , f ,r) τiÐ→ind (σi+1,msi+1)i∈I
τi = (n′i ,r ,di ,↑,deliverl(ni ,mi),_,_,_,_) ⋅ τ ′i i∈I(σ ,ms, f ,r) ⋅τi i∈IÐÐÐ→msд (σ⋃︀I ⋃︀,ms⋃︀I ⋃︀)
Per′
n ∈ N ∖ {f } 𝒮(d) = link
(σ ,ms, f ,r) (n,r ,d, ⇝ ,,σ ,σ ,,)ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ→per (σ ,ms)
Per
n ∈ N ∖ {f } 𝒮(d) = stack(c,𝒮′) k = ⋃︀𝒮′⋃︀ σ(d) = s
periodicc(n,s(n)) = (s′n ,(i,e1),e2) s′ = s(︀n ↦ s′n⌋︀ σ ′ = σ(︀d ↦ s′⌋︀(σ ′,ms, f ,r) τ1Ð→r eq (σ ′′,ms′′) τ1 = (n,r ,i ∶∶ d,↓,e1,_,_,_,_) ⋅ τ ′1(σ ′′,ms′′, f ,r) τ2Ð→ind (σ0,ms0) τ2 = (n,r ,d,↑,e2,_,_,_,_) ⋅ τ ′2(σi ,msi , f ,r) τiÐ→per (σi+1,msi+1)i∈{0..k−1} τi = (n,r ,i ∶∶ d, ⇝ ,_,_,_,_,_) ⋅ τ ′i i∈{0..k−1}
τ = (n,r ,d, ⇝ ,per,σ ,σ ′,(i,e1),e2) ⋅ τ1 ⋅ τ2 ⋅ ⋅τi i∈{0..k−1}(σ ,ms, f ,r) τÐ→per (σk ,msk)
Fig. 14. Semantics of Distributed Stacks.
post-state s′ variables take function values, not only a function but also a variable can be applied
to terms. The two applications are evaluated in FunM and FunM′ respectively.
The rule PredM evaluates predicates using the interpretation I . The definition of models for
conjunction, negation and quantification is standard. The strict always operator □ˆ requires the
assertion to hold in every future position starting from the position after the current. The strict
always in the past operator ⊟ˆ requires a similar condition in the past. The strict eventual operator◇ˆ requires the assertion to hold in at least one future position starting from the position after the
current. The strict eventual in the past operator xˆ requires a similar condition in the past. As we
defined the non-strict temporal operators as syntactic sugar for strict ones, their semantics are
derived from the above semantics. The next operator ◯ requires the assertion to hold in the position
after the current. As defined at the bottom of Fig. 16, we say that an event label ℓ is on the self
component mself(ℓ), if it is a request (↓) or periodic ( ⇝ ) at the top location ((︀⌋︀) or is an indication
(↑) at the second level (at location (︀i⌋︀ for some i). The self operator Ⓢ requires the assertion to
hold on the self subtrace i.e. the projection of the trace overmself. More precisely, the self operator
requires the assertion to hold on the first self position after the current position.
We are now ready to state the soundness of TLC. An assertion 𝒜 is valid for a stack 𝒮 , written
as ⊧𝒮 𝒜, if and only if every model of 𝒮 satisfies 𝒜.
Definition 4 (Valid Assertion). For all 𝒮 and 𝒜, ⊧𝒮 𝒜 iff for allm ∈M(𝒮),m ⊧ 𝒜.
We say that a set of assertions Γ entail an assertion 𝒜 if and only if every modelm of 𝒮 that
models Γ also models 𝒜.
Definition 5 (Models Relation). For all Γ, 𝒮 and 𝒜, Γ ⊧𝒮 𝒜 iff ∀m ∈M(𝒮),m ⊧ Γ →m ⊧ 𝒜.
The following theorem states the soundness of TLC. If assuming assertions Γ, TLC derives an
assertion 𝒜 then Γ entails 𝒜.
Theorem 2 (Soundness). For all Γ, 𝒮 , c , 𝒮 ′,𝒜, such that 𝒮 = stack(c,𝒮 ′), if Γ ⊢c 𝒜, then Γ ⊧𝒮 𝒜.
The detailed proofs are available in the appendix [Appendix 2020] § 5.1. The following corollary
is immediately derived. It states that if assuming valid assertions, TLC derives an assertion then that
assertion is valid as well. In other words, TLC derives only valid assertions from valid assertions.
Corollary 2. For all Γ, c , 𝒮 , 𝒮 ′, 𝒜 such that 𝒮 = stack(c,𝒮 ′), if ⊧𝒮 Γ and Γ ⊢c 𝒜, then ⊧𝒮 𝒜.
8 MECHANIZATION
The ultimate goal of this project is mechanized distributed middleware. This goal is a huge un-
dertaking and fully achieving it may take multiple years. The main topic of this paper is TLC,
its compositionality and applicability. We have finished all the proofs of the components in the
appendix to ensure that TLC is comprehensive. Nonetheless, we have been mechanizing the proofs
in Coq. The TLC Coq framework provides a deep embedding of an enriched lambda calculus for
defining functional components, an evaluation engine for embedded terms, an inductive definition
of TLC, and a set of tactics for constructing TLC proof terms. We have used this library to success-
fully mechanize the verification of the stubborn link and the perfect link components and we are
extending mechanization to the other components.
Embedding Approaches. We tried different approaches for encoding TLC in Coq. The earliest
attempts were shallow embeddings of TLC. The intent was to utilize Coq’s Gallina functional
programming language to capture component definitions and its Ltac proof language to construct
proof terms. These approaches proved unsuccessful due to the syntactic nature of proofs in TLC.
The syntactic rules of TLC require recursive analysis of the syntax of terms, which cannot be
done directly on Gallina terms. We define a deep embedding of a minimal functional programming
language to program component terms. This embedding is an untyped lambda calculus enriched
with pattern matching terms, externally defined functions, value literals, value constructors, and
locally nameless parameters. Similarly, we define a deep embedding of the syntax of TLC as well.
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Inductive term :=
| TParameter (p : parameter) (* Nameless bound params *)
| TVariable (v : variable) (* Named free variables *)
| TAbstraction (tb : term) (* Function abstraction *)
| TApplication (tf ta : term) (* Function application *)
| TConstructor (c : constr) (* Value constructors *)
| TLiteral (l : literal) (* Value literals *)
| TFunction (f : function) (* External functions *)
| TFailure (* Computation error *)
| TMatch (ta : term) (cs : cases) (* Pattern matching *)
(* Cases of pattern matching *)
with acase :=
| TCase (p : pattern) (t : term)
with cases :=
| TCNil
| TCCons (c : acase) (cs : cases).
(a)
Theorem SL_1 :
Context [:: V "m"; V "n’"; V "n"] [::]
|- stubborn_link, {A:
correct "n" /\ correct "n’" ->
on "n", event []-> CSLSend $ "n’" $ "m" =>>
always eventually
on "n’", event []<- CSLDeliver $ "n" $ "m" }.
(b)
Inductive derives : context -> assertion -> Prop :=
| DAEvaluateP Delta Gamma Ap Ap’ Ac :
(* Replaces the head premise with its evaluation *)
[[A Ap]] = Success Ap’ ->
Context Delta (Ap’ :: Gamma) |- Ac ->
Context Delta (Ap :: Gamma) |- Ac
(* ... *)
| DSCut Delta Gamma Ap Ac :
(* Add a proven assertion to the proof context *)
Context Delta Gamma |- Ap ->
Context Delta (Ap :: Gamma) |- Ac ->
Context Delta Gamma |- Ac
(* ... *)
| DPIR ctx :
ctx |- {A: forall: "?e": event []-> "?e" =>>
("Fs’" $ "Fn", "Fors", "Fois") =
request C $ "Fn" $ ("Fs" $ "Fn") $ "?e"}
(c)
Fig. 15. Mechanizing TLC
Embedding. The syntax of terms is
defined as the inductive type presented
in Fig. 15.(a). The TParameter, TAbstrac-
tion, and TApplication terms come di-
rectly from untyped lambda calculus.
We adopted the locally nameless repre-
sentation [Charguéraud 2012] to sepa-
rately define parameters and variables.
We chose this encoding instead of im-
plementing capture-avoiding substitu-
tion of arbitrarily named variables. Coq
requires all recursive functions to be
structurally decreasing. Algorithms for
capture-avoiding substitution are not
strictly decreasing and are rejected by
Coq. Bound variables, represented by
the TParameter constructor, are refer-
enced using deBruijn indices. Free vari-
ables, represented by the TVariable con-
structor, are named strings.
The TConstructor term represents a
constructor of an inductive type. The
TLiteral term represents a literal value
of a Coq type, such as the natural num-
bers. The TFunction term represents a
function that is not defined explicitly in
the term language, such as recursively
defined functions. These terms are lifted
into Coq, evaluated, and the result is low-
ered into the embedded term type. The
TMatch constructor represents a pattern
matching expression. The TFailure term
is the empty term, produced when an
ill-formed term is evaluated.
To simplify the definition of terms, we
have defined a library of Coq notations
for the term language. The library allows
for the relatively direct translation of
the implementation of the components
into embedded terms. Similarly, Coq no-
tations are provided for the assertion language and the sequent judgements. These notations allow
writing judgements in the commonly used form. The context of a sequent is the set of variable
names that are universally quantified along with the list of assumed assertions. As an example,
Fig. 15.(b) shows the statement of the stubborn delivery property: if a message is sent, it is infinitely
often delivered. The context declares the list of free variable n, n’ and m and no assumed assertions
[::]. The conclusion is read as follows: if two nodes n and n’ are correct and n at the top level []
sends a request event -> to send the message m to n’, then infinitely often at n’, at the top level [],
the indication event <- that delivers the message m from n is executed.
Definition 6 (Model relation).
VarM (τ ,i,I) ⊧ x ∶ I(x) if x rigid
NM (τ ,i,I) ⊧ n ∶n(τ(i))
RM (τ ,i,I) ⊧ r ∶ r(τ(i))
DM (τ ,i,I) ⊧ d ∶d(τ(i))
OM (τ ,i,I) ⊧ o ∶o(τ(i))
EM (τ ,i,I) ⊧ e ∶e(τ(i))
SM (τ ,i,I) ⊧ s ∶σ(τ(i))(d′) where d′ = {d(τ(i)) if o(τ(i)) = ↓ ∨ o(τ(i)) = ⇝
tail(d(τ(i))) else
SM′ (τ ,i,I) ⊧ s′ ∶σ ′(τ(i))(d′) where d′ = {d(τ(i)) if o(τ(i)) = ↓ ∨ o(τ(i)) = ⇝
tail(d(τ(i))) else
ORSM (τ ,i,I) ⊧ ors ∶ors(τ(i))
OISM (τ ,i,I) ⊧ ois ∶ois(τ(i))
CM (τ ,i,I) ⊧ c ∶ I(c) if c ≠ Correct
CSM (τ ,i,I) ⊧ Correct ∶{n ⋃︀ n ∈ N ∧ ⇑∃ j ≥ 0. τ(j) = (n,(︀⌋︀,,fail,_,_,_,_)}
FunM m ⊧ f (t1, ..,tn)∶ f ′(v1, ..,vn) if I(f ) = f ′, m ⊧ t1∶v1, .., m ⊧ tn ∶vn
FunM′ m ⊧ x(t1, ..,tn)∶ f ′(v1, ..,vn) if m ⊧ x ∶ f ′, m ⊧ t1∶v1, .., m ⊧ tn ∶vn
PredM m ⊧ p(t1, ..,tn) iff I(p) = p′,
m ⊧ t1∶v1, .. m ⊧ tn ∶vn ,
p′(v1, ..,vn) = true
τ(j) ≠ (n,(︀⌋︀,,fail,_,_,_,_), for all j ≥ 0
AndM m ⊧ 𝒜 ∧𝒜′ iff m ⊧ 𝒜 and m ⊧ 𝒜′
NotM m ⊧ ¬𝒜 iff m ⇑⊧ 𝒜
ForallM (τ ,i,I) ⊧ ∀x . 𝒜 iff (τ ,i,I(︀x ↦ v⌋︀) ⊧ 𝒜 for all v ∈ dom(I)
AlwaysM (τ ,i,I) ⊧ □ˆ𝒜 iff (τ , j,I) ⊧ 𝒜 for all j, j > i
PAlwaysSM (τ ,i,I) ⊧ ⊟ˆ𝒜 iff (τ , j,I) ⊧ 𝒜 for all j, 0 ≤ j < i
EventualSM (τ ,i,I) ⊧ ◇ˆ𝒜 iff (τ , j,I) ⊧ 𝒜 there exists j, j > i
PEventualSM (τ ,i,I) ⊧ xˆ𝒜 iff (τ , j,I) ⊧ 𝒜 there exists j, 0 ≤ j < i
NextM (τ ,i,I) ⊧ ◯𝒜 iff (τ ,i + 1,I) ⊧ 𝒜
SelfM (τ ,i,I) ⊧ Ⓢ 𝒜 iff τ ′1 = τ0 .. i−1⋃︀mself, τ ′2 = τi .. ⋃︀mself,
τ ′ = τ ′1 ⋅ τ ′2, i′ = ⋃︀τ ′1⋃︀, (τ ′,i′,I) ⊧ 𝒜
mself(ℓ) ≜ (d(ℓ) = (︀⌋︀ ∧ o(ℓ) = ↓) ∨ (d(ℓ) = (︀⌋︀ ∧ o(ℓ) = ⇝ ) ∨ (∃i . d(ℓ) = (︀i⌋︀ ∧ o(ℓ) = ↑)
Fig. 16. Models Relation.m ⊧ 𝒜 andm ⊧ t ∶v .
Logic. The basic rules and axioms of TLC are encoded as an inductive type. Fig. 15.(c) shows
three constructors that are representative of the encoding of the rules and axioms of TLC. The rules
are extended with rules specific to the implementation of the extended term language. The first
constructor, DAEvaluateP, states that if the terms within the first premise can be simplified then
proving the conclusion assuming the premise can be reduced to proving the conclusion assuming
the simplified premise. The [[A Ap]] notation represents assertion evaluation, which replaces
all computational terms within an assertion with the terms produced by their evaluation. Terms
are evaluated recursively inside of a monad, which produces a failure case when a failure term is
evaluated. The second constructor, DSCut, is a sequent logic rule that can be used to introduce an
assertion as a premise. The third constructor, DPIR, is an axiom of the TLC program logic, the rule
IR that we saw in § 5.
The framework provides tactics to facilitate applying TLC. For example, it provides a set of
tactics that mirror a subset of Coq’s Ltac tactics for producing Gallina proof terms, as well as a
library of lemmas. These tactics allow proofs to be written in a more natural, Coq-like style. These
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are tactics such as d_left (d refers to the derives relation), d_right, d_splitp (p for premise),
and d_splitc (c for conclusion), which mirror the primitive Coq tactics left, right, destruct
(on conjunctive hypotheses), and split. In addition to these basic tactics, there are tactics that
automate some multi-step common tasks. For example, the d_evalc imitates the Coq simpl tactic,
evaluating all terms in the conclusion assertion, and the d_have tactic automates the application of
the DSCut rule that we saw above.
9 RELATEDWORK
High-level DSLs, language extensions and tools [Bakst et al. 2017; Biely et al. 2013; Burckhardt et al.
2012; Cejtin et al. 1995; Kato et al. 1993; Ketsman et al. 2019; Killian et al. 2007; Liu et al. 2012; Miller
et al. 2016; Salvaneschi et al. 2019; Samanta et al. 2013; Weisenburger et al. 2018] have been used to
raise the level of abstraction, and improve the reliability of distributed systems. Model checking
has been extensively applied for bounded verification [Dutertre et al. 2018; Jackson 2006; John et al.
2013; Killian et al. 2007; Konnov et al. 2017; Marić et al. 2017; Musuvathi and Engler 2004; Yabandeh
et al. 2009; Yang et al. 2009; Zave 2012] of distributed algorithms. Recently, domain specific logics
and verification frameworks have gained momentum to establish the absence of bugs.
Temporal logic [Manna and Pnueli 1992] is a modal logic that can abstract and reason about time.
It can be used to state and check properties of programs specially reactive programs [Alur et al. 2004;
Cave et al. 2014; Cook et al. 2011; Das et al. 2018; Jeffrey 2012]. TLA (Temporal Logic of Actions)
[Lamport 1994, 2000] is a logic for description, specification and verification of distributed protocols.
The transition system of a protocol can be described as action assertions and its specification can
be written as temporal logic assertions [Manna and Pnueli 1992]. It has been used [Chaudhuri et al.
2010; Lamport 2002] for model checking [Newcombe et al. 2015] and interactive verification [Chand
et al. 2016] of distributed systems. A TLA protocol is described as a monolithic transition system.
In contrast, TLC defines event interfaces between components and supports their composition.
More importantly, it supports compositional verification of components. In addition, in contrast
to TLA that requires the protocol to be described as a transition system, TLC supports functional
implementation of protocols that can be directly executed. Further, in contrast to TLA, TLC defines
an operational semantics to support the soundness of the logic.
I/O Automata [Lynch and Tuttle 1989] models specifications and protocols as transition systems
and provides simulation proof techniques [Lynch and W. Vaandrager 1995] between automata. In
contrast, TLC captures component implementations as functional programs and specifications as
descriptive temporal assertions, and provides a program logic and a compositional proof technique
to derive the specification for the implementation.
Both I/O Automata [Lynch and Tuttle 1989] and Reactive Modules [Alur and Henzinger 1999]
model protocols as transition systems. They capture specifications in the semantic domain as
either transitions systems or properties of execution traces. In contrast, TLC captures component
implementations as functional programs and specifications as temporal assertions. I/O Automata
provides simulation proof techniques [Lynch and W. Vaandrager 1995] between automata. The
simulation proofs are written in the semantic domain. In contrast, TLC provides a program logic
to derive the specification for the implementation. Both I/O Automata and and Reactive Modules
support composition of interacting modules with matching input and outputs. They support
assume-guarantee reasoning where each module can be verified based on the specification of the
other module. TLC models distributed systems as structured stacks of components where each
component composes with its subcomponents below and its parent component above. Similar to
the assume-guarantee reasoning, it supports compositional verification of each component based
on the specification of its subcomponents. However, no assumptions for the parent component is
needed. The specification of each component is for the most general parent. A verified component
can serve as the subcomponent of any parent component.
EventML [Rahli 2012] is a functional domain-specific language for distributed protocols. Protocols
written in EventML can be translated to Nuprl [Constable et al. 1986] and then interactively verified.
It has been used to verify monolithic replicated services [Rahli et al. 2018; Schiper et al. 2014];
however, it does not address compositional verification.
IronFleet [Hawblitzel et al. 2015] models a distributed system as a hierarchy of state transi-
tion systems at multiple levels of abstraction from the high-level specification to the low-level
implementation. It proves a refinement [He et al. 1986; Lynch and W. Vaandrager 1995] between a
layer and the layer immediately above it. However, it only considers monolithic protocols without
subcomponents and the verification is carried out using refinement in contrast to a program logic.
Similarly, network refinement [Koh et al. 2019] presents specifications for a swap server that
can be both tested and verified using observational refinement. The server is well-integrated with
several other verified systems. To contrast, TLC is a temporal logic and can verify liveness in
addition to safety properties. Further, TLC focuses on composition of distributed protocols and
builds component stacks on basic links that are much weaker than TCP.
Verdi [Wilcox et al. 2015; Woos et al. 2016] models several network semantics and provides trans-
formations from correct protocols in one semantics to another. It has been applied to verification of
state machine replication. Similar to TLC, Verdi provides a form of vertical composition. However,
its proofs are based on simulation [He et al. 1986; Lynch and W. Vaandrager 1995] in the semantic
domain rather than a program logic.
Chapar [Lesani et al. 2016] presents an operational semantics and a proof technique for verifica-
tion of causally consistent distributed stores. Similar to TLC, Chapar considers the interface between
clients and store implementations; however, only for causal consistency. Further, verification is
based on simulation rather than program logic.
PSync [Dragoi et al. 2016] is a DSL for distributed protocols based on the heard-of round-based
model [Charron-Bost and Schiper 2009]. This lockstep model enables proof automation that has
been successfully applied to verification of consensus variants. However, PSync left composition as
future work.
Ivy [Padon et al. 2016] is an interactive tool that assists in finding inductive invariants. It has
been applied to verification of a few distributed protocols. A follow-up work [Taube et al. 2018]
lets the user split a protocol into logical modules with explicit invariants. Modules facilitate an
assume-guarantee reasoning such that verification of each falls in a separate decidable theory.
While the main focus of Ivy is automatic verification of separate parts of monolithic protocols,
TLC’s focus is compositional verification of stacks of protocols. Further, in contrast to Ivy, TLC
supports verification of liveness properties.
Disel [Sergey et al. 2017; Wilcox et al. 2017] is a program logic for distributed protocols that
provides Floyd-Hoare-style specification [Floyd 1967; Hoare 1969; Reynolds 2002] and proof rules
for horizontal composition. In Disel, the specification of a component is written in terms of its state
and the message pool. On the other hand, in TLC, the temporal specification is written in terms of
the interface events almost verbatim from the natural language description. Disel and Hoare-style
reasoning require definition of stable invariants and sometimes ghost variables. However, TLC does
not require additional annotations on the components. Disel can state and prove safety properties
while TLC can state and prove both safety and liveness properties. A follow-up work [García-Pérez
et al. 2018] similarly applies the rely-guarantee reasoning to verification of a decomposition of
Paxos [Boichat et al. 2003]. However, it does not consider the leader election subcomponent. This
paper considers leader election and epoch change as well.
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10 CONCLUSION
TLC is a temporal program logic for compositional verification of stacks of distributed components.
Its assertion language can capture both safety and liveness properties. Using a transformation
function that lowers the specification of components to be used as subcomponents, TLC supports
compositional verification of components based on only the specification of their subcomponents.
It features intuitive inference rules and induction principles that can deduce assertions about
a component based on its functional implementation. TLC and the transformation are proved
sound with respect to the operational semantics of distributed stacks. They have been successfully
applied to verify a stack of fundamental distributed components as the first steps towards certified
distributed system stacks.
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1 Logic
1.1 Sequent Logic
IA ⊢ A
Thin
Γ ⊢ A′
Γ,A ⊢ A′
Contraction
Γ,A,A ⊢ A′
Γ,A ⊢ A′
Exchange
Γ,A,A′ ⊢ A′′
Γ,A′,A ⊢ A′′
Cut
Γ ⊢ A Γ,A ⊢ A′
Γ ⊢ A′
¬l
Γ ⊢ A
Γ,¬A ⊢ A′
¬r
Γ,A ⊢ 
Γ ⊢ ¬A
∧l
Γ,A,A′ ⊢ A′′
Γ,A ∧A′ ⊢ A′′
∧r
Γ ⊢ A Γ ⊢ A′
Γ ⊢ A ∧A′
∨l
Γ,A ⊢ A′′ Γ,A′ ⊢ A′′
Γ,A ∨A′ ⊢ A′′
∨rl
Γ ⊢ A
Γ ⊢ A ∨A′
∨rr
Γ ⊢ A′
Γ ⊢ A ∨A′
→ l
Γ ⊢ A Γ,A′ ⊢ A′′
Γ,A→ A′ ⊢ A′′
→r
Γ,A ⊢ A′
Γ ⊢ A→ A′
∀l
Γ,A(x′) ⊢ A′
Γ,∀x. A(x) ⊢ A′
∀r
Γ ⊢ A(x′) x′ fresh
Γ ⊢ ∀x. A(x)
∃l
Γ,A(x) ⊢ A′ x′ fresh
Γ,∃x. A(x) ⊢ A′
∃r
Γ ⊢ A(x′)
Γ ⊢ ∃x. A(x)
Figure 1: Basic rules
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1.2 Basic Rules
Node⊢c  n ∈ N
IR⊢c ⊺ ↓ e ⇒ (s′(n),ors,ois) = requestc(n, s(n), e)
II⊢c i ↑ e ⇒ (s′(n),ors,ois) = indicationc(n, s(n), (i, e))
Pe⊢c ⊺  per ⇒ (s′(n),ors,ois) = periodicc(n, s(n))
OR⊢c n ● (i, e) ∈ ors ∧ self ⇒ ◇ˆ(n ● i ↓ e)
OI⊢c n ● e ∈ ois ∧ self ⇒ ◇ˆ(n ● ⊺ ↑ e)
OR′⊢c n ● i ↓ e ⇒ xˆ(n ● (i, e) ∈ ors ∧ self)
OI′⊢c n ● ⊺ ↑ e ⇒ xˆ(n ● e ∈ ois ∧ self)
Init⊢c s (s = λn. initc(n))
PostPre⊢c s (s′ = s ⇔ ◯ s = s)
SEq⊢c n ≠ n ⇒ s′(n) = s(n)
ASelf⊢c s  self
SInv⊢c (s I) ↔ restrict(self,I)
APer⊢c n ∈ Correct ↔ ◇(n ● ⊺  per)
Figure 2: Program Logic
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RSeq⊢c r = r ⇒ ˆ(r ≤ r)
GST⊢c n′ ∈ Correct ∧ r > rGST ∧(n ● d ↓ sendl(n′,m) ∧ r = r)⇒◇(n′ ● d ↑ deliverl(n,m) ∧ r = r)
FDup⊢c ◇(n′ ● d ↑ deliverl(n,m))→ ◇(n ● d ↓ sendl(n′,m))
NForge⊢c (n′ ● d ↑ deliverl(n,m))⇒x(n ● d ↓ sendl(n′,m))
UniOR⊢c (occ(ors, e) ≤ 1 ∧
ˆ(n = n ∧ self→ (i, e) /∈ ors) ∧
ˆ(n = n ∧ self→ (i, e) /∈ ors))⇒(n ● i ↓ e)⇒
ˆ¬(n ● i ↓ e) ∧ ˆ¬(n ● i ↓ e)
UniOI⊢c (occ(ois, e) ≤ 1 ∧
ˆ(n = n ∧ self→ e /∈ ois) ∧
ˆ(n = n ∧ self→ e /∈ ois))⇒(n ● ⊺ ↑ e)⇒
ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ e) ∧ ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ e)
ExeOrderOR⊢c [n ● (i, e) ∈ ors ∧ self ∧◇ˆ(n ● (i, e′) ∈ ors ∧ self)]⇒◇ˆ[n ● i ↓ e⇒◇ˆ(n ● i ↓ e)]
ExeOrderOI⊢c [n ● e ∈ ois ∧ self ∧◇ˆ(n ● e′ ∈ ois ∧ self)]⇒◇ˆ[n ● ⊺ ↑ e⇒◇ˆ(n ● ⊺ ↑ e)]
ExeFEOI⊢c ¬(n ● e ∈ ois ∧ self)⇒◇¬(n ● i ↑ e)
ExeFEOR⊢c ¬(n ● (i, e) ∈ ors ∧ self)⇒◇¬(n ● i ↓ e)
Figure 3: Program Logic
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1.3 Derived Rules
FLoss⊢c n′ ∈ Correct→
◇(n ● d ↓ sendl(n′,m))→ ◇(n′ ● d ↑ deliverl(n,m))
IRSe⊢c s [⊺ ↓ e ⇒ (s′(n),ois,ors) = requestc(n, s(n), e)]
PeSe⊢c s [⊺  per ⇒ (s′(n),ois,ors) = periodicc(n, s(n))]
IISe⊢c s [i ↑ e ⇒ (s′(n),ois,ors) = indicationc(n, s(n), (i, e))]
ORSe⊢c s [n ● (i, e) ∈ ors ⇒ ◇ˆ(n ● i ↓ e)]
OISe⊢c s [n ● e ∈ ois ⇒ ◇ˆ(n ● ⊺ ↑ e)]
ORSe′⊢c s [n ● i ↓ e ⇒ xˆ(n ● (i, e) ∈ ors)]
OISe′⊢c s [n ● ⊺ ↑ e ⇒ xˆ(n ● e ∈ ois)]
Figure 4: Program Logic, Derived rules. S is a predicate on state.
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IROI∀s. S(s) ∧ requestc(n, s, e) = ( ,ois, )→ e′ ∈ ois⊢c n ● ⊺ ↓ e ∧ S(s(n)) ⇒ ◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ e′)
IIOI∀s. S(s) ∧ indicationc(n, s, (i, e)) = ( ,ois, )→ e′ ∈ ois⊢c n ● i ↑ e ∧ S(s(n)) ⇒ ◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ e′)
PeOI∀s. S(s) ∧ periodicc(n, s) = ( ,ois, )→ e′ ∈ ois⊢c n ● i  per ∧ S(s(n)) ⇒ ◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ e′)
IROR∀s. S(s) ∧ requestc(n, s, e) = ( , ,ors)→ (i, e′) ∈ ors⊢c n ● ⊺ ↓ e ∧ S(s(n)) ⇒ ◇(n ● i ↓ e′)
IIOR∀s. S(s) ∧ indicationc(n, s, (i, e)) = ( , ,ors)→ (i, e′) ∈ ors⊢c n ● i ↑ e ∧ S(s(n)) ⇒ ◇(n ● i ↓ e′)
PeOR∀s. S(s) ∧ periodicc(n, s) = ( , ,ors)→ (i, e′) ∈ ors⊢c n ● i  per ∧ S(s(n)) ⇒ ◇(n ● i ↓ e′)
Figure 5: Program Logic, Derived rules. S is a predicate on state.
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UniOISe⊢c s (occ(ois, e) ≤ 1 ∧
ˆ(n = n→ e /∈ ois) ∧
ˆ(n = n→ e /∈ ois))⇒(n ● ⊺ ↑ e)⇒ ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ e) ∧ ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ e)
UniORSe⊢c s (occ(ors, e) ≤ 1 ∧
ˆ(n = n→ (i, e) /∈ ors) ∧
ˆ(n = n→ (i, e) /∈ ors))⇒(n ● i ↓ e)⇒ ˆ¬(n ● i ↓ e) ∧ ˆ¬(n ● i ↓ e)
IROISe∀s. S(s) ∧ requestc(n, s, e) = ( ,ois, )→ e′ ∈ ois⊢c s n ● ⊺ ↓ e ∧ S(s(n)) ⇒ ◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ e′)
IIOISe∀s. S(s) ∧ indicationc(n, s, (i, e)) = ( ,ois, )→ e′ ∈ ois⊢c s n ● i ↑ e ∧ S(s(n)) ⇒ ◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ e′)
PeOISe∀s. S(s) ∧ periodicc(n, s) = ( ,ois, )→ e′ ∈ ois⊢c s n ● i  per ∧ S(s(n)) ⇒ ◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ e′)
IRORSe∀s. S(s) ∧ requestc(n, s, e) = ( , ,ors)→ (i, e′) ∈ ors⊢c s n ● ⊺ ↓ e ∧ S(s(n)) ⇒ ◇(n ● i ↓ e′)
IIORSe∀s. S(s) ∧ indicationc(n, s, (i, e)) = ( , ,ors)→ (i, e′) ∈ ors⊢c s n ● i ↑ e ∧ S(s(n)) ⇒ ◇(n ● i ↓ e′)
PeORSe∀s. S(s) ∧ periodicc(n, s) = ( , ,ors)→ (i, e′) ∈ ors⊢c s n ● i  per ∧ S(s(n)) ⇒ ◇(n ● i ↓ e′)
APerSe⊢c s n ∈ Correct→ ◇(n ● ⊺  per)
Quorum∣Correct∣ > t1 ⊢c
N ⊆ N ∧ ∣N ∣ > t2 ∧ t1 + t2 ≥ ∣N∣⇒ ∃n. n ∈ N ∧ n ∈ Correct
Figure 6: Program Logic, Derived rules
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SEqSe⊢c s [n ≠ n ⇒ s′(n) = s(n)]
CSelf
n ● self ⇔(∃e. n ● ⊺ ↓ e) ∨ (∃i, e. n ● ⊺ ↑ (i, e)) ∨ (n ● ⊺  per)
InvSe
Γ ⊢c s ∀e. ⊺ ↓ e⇒ A
Γ ⊢c s ∀i, e. i ↑ e⇒ A
Γ ⊢c s ⊺  per⇒ A
Γ ⊢c s A
InvSe′
Γ ⊢c s ∀e. ⊺ ↓ e ∧ ˆA⇒ A
Γ ⊢c s ∀i, e. i ↑ e ∧ ˆA⇒ A
Γ ⊢c s ⊺  per ∧ ˆA⇒ A
Γ ⊢c s A
InvUSe
Γ ⊢c s ∀e. ⊺ ↓ e ∧ (s′(n),ois,ors) = requestc(n, s(n), e) ∧
ˆA⇒ A
Γ ⊢c s ∀e, i. i ↑ e ∧ (s′(n),ois,ors) = indicationc(n, s(n), (i, e)) ∧
ˆA⇒ A
Γ ⊢c s ⊺  per ∧ (s′(n),ois,ors) = periodicc(n, s(n)) ∧
ˆA⇒ A
Γ ⊢c s A
InvMSe
Γ ⊢c s ∀e. ⊺ ↓ e ∧ ˆA ∧ ˆA′ ⇒ A ∧A′
Γ ⊢c s ∀e, i. i ↑ e ∧ ˆA ∧ ˆA′ ⇒ A ∧A′
Γ ⊢c s ⊺  per ∧ ˆA ∧ ˆA′ ⇒ A ∧A′
Γ ⊢c s (A ∧A′)
InvMSe′
Γ ⊢c s ∀e. ⊺ ↓ e ∧ (s′(n),ois,ors) = requestc(n, s(n), e) ∧
ˆA ∧ ˆA′ ⇒ A ∧A′
Γ ⊢c s ∀e, i. i ↑ e ∧ (s′(n),ois,ors) = indicationc(n, s(n), (i, e)) ∧
ˆA ∧ ˆA′ ⇒ A ∧A′
Γ ⊢c s ⊺  per ∧ (s′(n),ois,ors) = periodicc(n, s(n)) ∧
ˆA ∧ ˆA′ ⇒ A ∧A′
Γ ⊢c s (A ∧A′)
Figure 7: Program Logic, Derived rules. S is a predicate on state.
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InvLSe∀e. ⊺ ↓ e ∧ requestc(n, s(n), e) = (s′(n),ois,ors)→ A∀e, i. i ↑ e ∧ indicationc(n, s(n), (i, e)) = (s′(n),ois,ors)→ A⊺  per ∧ periodicc(n, s(n)) = (s′(n),ois,ors)→ AA non-temporal⊢c s A
InvL∀e. ⊺ ↓ e ∧ requestc(n, s(n), e) = (s′(n),ois,ors)→ A∀e, i. i ↑ e ∧ indicationc(n, s(n), (i, e)) = (s′(n),ois,ors)→ A⊺  per ∧ periodicc(n, s(n)) = (s′(n),ois,ors)→ AA non-temporal⊢c self⇒ A
InvUSSe
Γ ⊢c s ∀e. n ● ⊺ ↓ e ∧(s′(n),ois,ors) = requestc(n, s(n), e) ∧
S(s(n))⇒ S(s′(n))
Γ ⊢c s ∀e, i. n ● i ↑ e ∧(s′(n),ois,ors) = indicationc(n, s(n), (i, e)) ∧
S(s(n))⇒ S(s′(n))
Γ ⊢c s n ● ⊺  per ∧(s′(n),ois,ors) = periodicc(n, s(n)) ∧
S(s(n))⇒ S(s′(n))
Γ ⊢c s [S(s(n))⇒ S(s(n))]
InvUSSe′
S(initc(n))
Γ ⊢c s ∀e. n ● ⊺ ↓ e ∧(s′(n),ois,ors) = requestc(n, s(n), e) ∧
S(s(n))⇒ S(s′(n))
Γ ⊢c s ∀e, i. n ● i ↑ e ∧(s′(n),ois,ors) = indicationc(n, s(n), (i, e)) ∧
S(s(n))⇒ S(s′(n))
Γ ⊢c s n ● ⊺  per ∧(s′(n),ois,ors) = periodicc(n, s(n)) ∧
S(s(n))⇒ S(s′(n))
Γ ⊢c s S(s(n))
Figure 8: Program Logic, Derived rules
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InvSSe∀s, e, s′. S(s) ∧ requestc(n, s, e) = (s′, , )→ S(s′)∀s, i, e, s′. S(s) ∧ indicationc(n, s, (i, e)) = (s′, , )→ S(s′)∀s, s′. S(s) ∧ periodicc(n, s) = (s′, , )→ S(s′)⊢c s [S(s(n))⇒ S(s(n))]
InvS∀s, e, s′. S(s) ∧ requestc(n, s, e) = (s′, , )→ S(s′)∀s, i, e, s′. S(s) ∧ indicationc(n, s, (i, e)) = (s′, , )→ S(s′)∀s, s′. S(s) ∧ periodicc(n, s) = (s′, , )→ S(s′)⊢c self ∧ S(s(n))⇒ (self⇒ S(s(n)))
InvSSe′
S(initc(n))∀s, e, s′. S(s) ∧ requestc(n, s, e) = (s′, , )→ S(s′)∀s, i, e, s′. S(s) ∧ indicationc(n, s, (i, e)) = (s′, , )→ S(s′)∀s, s′. S(s) ∧ periodicc(n, s) = (s′, , )→ S(s′)⊢c s S(s(n))
InvS′
S(initc(n))∀s, e, s′. S(s) ∧ requestc(n, s, e) = (s′, , )→ S(s′)∀s, i, e, s′. S(s) ∧ indicationc(n, s, (i, e)) = (s′, , )→ S(s′)∀s, s′. S(s) ∧ periodicc(n, s) = (s′, , )→ S(s′)⊢c (self⇒ S(s(n)))
Figure 9: Program Logic, Derived rules
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InvSSe′′∀s, e, s′. S(s) ∧ requestc(n, s, e) = (s′, , )→ S(s′)∀s, i, e, s′. S(s) ∧ indicationc(n, s, (i, e)) = (s′, , )→ S(s′)∀s, s′. S(s) ∧ periodicc(n, s) = (s′, , )→ S(s′)⊢c s S(s′(n))⇒ ˆS(s(n))
InvS′′∀s, e, s′. S(s) ∧ requestc(n, s, e) = (s′, , )→ S(s′)∀s, i, e, s′. S(s) ∧ indicationc(n, s, (i, e)) = (s′, , )→ S(s′)∀s, s′. S(s) ∧ periodicc(n, s) = (s′, , )→ S(s′)⊢c (self ∧ S(s′(n)))⇒ ˆ(self→ S(s(n)))
InvSASe ¬S(initc(n))
∀e. n ● ⊺ ↓ e ∧
requestc(n, s(n), e) = (s′(n),ois,ors) ∧¬S(s(n)) ∧ S(s′(n))→ A
∀e, i. n ● i ↑ e ∧
indicationc(n, s(n), (i, e)) = (s′(n),ois,ors) ∧¬S(s(n)) ∧ S(s′(n))→ A
n ● ⊺  per ∧
periodicc(n, s(n)) = (s′(n),ois,ors) ∧¬S(s(n)) ∧ S(s′(n))→ A
A non-temporal⊢c s [S(s(n))⇒ xˆ(n ● A)]
InvSA ¬S(initc(n))
∀e. n ● ⊺ ↓ e ∧
requestc(n, s(n), e) = (s′(n),ois,ors) ∧¬S(s(n)) ∧ S(s′(n))→ A
∀e, i. n ● i ↑ e ∧
indicationc(n, s(n), (i, e)) = (s′(n),ois,ors) ∧¬S(s(n)) ∧ S(s′(n))→ A
n ● ⊺  per ∧
periodicc(n, s(n)) = (s′(n),ois,ors) ∧¬S(s(n)) ∧ S(s′(n))→ A
A non-temporal⊢c [self ∧ S(s(n))]⇒ xˆ(n ● A)
Figure 10: Program Logic, Derived rules
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InvSAG ¬S(initc(n))
∀e. n ● ⊺ ↓ e ∧
requestc(n, s(n), e) = (s′(n),ois,ors) ∧¬S(s(n)) ∧ S(s′(n))→ A
∀e, i. n ● i ↑ e ∧
indicationc(n, s(n), (i, e)) = (s′(n),ois,ors) ∧¬S(s(n)) ∧ S(s′(n))→ A
n ● ⊺  per ∧
periodicc(n, s(n)) = (s′(n),ois,ors) ∧¬S(s(n)) ∧ S(s′(n))→ A
A non-temporal⊢c [self ∧ ¬S(s(n)) ∧◇S(s(n))]⇒ ◇ˆ(n ● A)
Figure 11: Program Logic, Derived rules
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InvMSIASe ∀x. ¬S(initc(n))
Γ ⊢c s ∀e. [⊺ ↓ e ∧ ˆA ∧ (∀x. S(s(n))→ xˆA′)]⇒A ∧ (∀x. S(s′(n))→xA′)
Γ ⊢c s ∀i, e. [i ↑ e ∧ ˆA ∧ (∀x. S(s(n))→ xˆA′)]⇒A ∧ (∀x. S(s′(n))→xA′)
Γ ⊢c s [⊺  per ∧ ˆA ∧ (∀x. S(s(n))→ xˆA′)]⇒A ∧ (∀x. S(s′(n))→xA′)
Γ ⊢c s A ∧ (∀x. S(s(n))⇒ xˆA′)
ASASe
Γ ⊢c s A⇒ S(s′(n))
Γ ⊢c s S(s(n))⇒ A′
Γ ⊢c s A⇒ ˆA′
ASA
Γ ⊢c self ∧A⇒ S(s′(n))
Γ ⊢c self ∧ S(s(n))⇒ (self⇒ A′)A non-temporal
Γ ⊢c self ∧A⇒ ˆ(self→ A′)
APerSA
S(s(n)) ∧ periodicc(n, s(n)) = (s′(n),ois,ors)→ AA non-temporal
Γ ⊢c n ∈ Correct→ (self⇒ S(s(n))) ⇒ ◇A
Figure 12: Program Logic, Derived rules
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2 Reasoning about Quorums
We have successfully applied the programming model, the lowering transformation and TLC to
program and verify the stacks of distributed components shown in Figure 2.(b) and (c): stubborn
links, perfect links, best-effort broadcast, uniform reliable broadcast and epoch consensus. The
specification and implementation of these components are available in section 4 and the detailed
proofs are available in subsection 5.3. In this section, we present the uniform reliable broadcast
component and present how its proof of uniformity uses the quorum inference rule. Uniform reliable
broadcast guarantees that if a message is delivered to a node (even a faulty one), then it is delivered
to every correct node as well. Uniform reliable broadcast guarantees that the set of messages
delivered to correct nodes is the same and is a superset of the messages delivered to faulty nodes;
hence the name uniform.
Uniform reliable broadcast accepts requests broadcasturb(m) to broadcast the message m and
issues indications deliverurb(n,m) to deliver a message m broadcast by a node n. Figure 13.(a)
presents the specification of the uniform reliable broadcast. In particular, the uniform agreement
property states that if a message is delivered to a node, a correct node does not miss it. More
precisely, if a message m is delivered to some node (whether correct or faulty), then m is eventually
(in the past or future) delivered to every correct node. In this section, we focus on this property.
Uniform reliable broadcast also provides the following properties. Validity: a correct node eventually
receives his own broadcast messages. No-duplication: Messages are not redundantly delivered.
No-forge: delivered messages are previously broadcast.
Figure 13.(b) presents the uniform reliable broadcast component URBC. It assumes that a
majority of nodes is correct i.e. more than ∣N∣/2 nodes are correct (where N is the set of nodes).
The high-level idea of the protocol is that each node, before delivering a message, makes sure that a
quorum (majority) of nodes have acknowledged the receipt of the message. As a majority of nodes
are correct, there is at least one correct node in the acknowledging nodes. Even if the sender fails,
that correct node rebroadcasts the message that leads to its delivery to every correct node.
The component uses a best-effort broadcast subcomponent bebc. It stores the number of
messages sent by the current node count, the set of delivered messages delivered, the set of messages
that are received but are pending for acknowledgement pending, and a mapping from each message
to the set of nodes that have acknowledged the receipt of the message ack. Each message is uniquely
identified by the identifier of the sender node and the number of the message in that node. Messages
are transmitted and stored with their identifiers. The state count is initialized to zero, and the
other sets are all initialized to ∅.
Upon a broadcast request, the counter is incremented, the message is added to the pending
set and is broadcast using bebc together with the current node identifier and the new value of the
counter. Upon a delivery indication by bebc, it is recorded in the acknowledgement map that the
sender has acknowledged the receipt of the message and if the message is not already in the pending
set, it is added to the pending set and broadcast by bebc. Thus, every node broadcasts a message
by bebc only once when it receives it for the first time. In the periodic function, messages in the
pending set are iterated, and if an acknowledgement for a message is received from a quorum of
nodes, and it is not delivered before, then it is delivered.
We present a proof sketch for the uniform agreement property. Let Γ be the assumption that a
quorum of nodes is correct and the lowered specification of the best-effort broadcast.
Γ = ∣Correct∣ > ∣N∣/2; Abebc (1)
The premise is that a message is delivered to a node. Thus the message is previously issued. The
component issues delivery of a message only in the periodic function when the acknowledgement set
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Assumption:∣Correct∣ > ∣N∣/2
URB1 (Validity)
n ∈ Correct→(n ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n,m))
If a correct node n broadcasts a message m,
then n itself eventually delivers m.
URB2 (No-duplication)[n ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)⇒
ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m))]→[(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n,m))⇒
ˆ¬(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n,m))]
If a message is broadcast at most once,
it will be delivered at most once.
URB3 (No-forge)(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′,m))  (n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m))
If a node delivers a message m with sender n′,
then m was previously broadcast by node n′.
URB4 (Uniform Agreement)
n ∈ Correct→(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′′,m))⇒◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′′,m)) ∨x(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′′,m))
If a message m is delivered by some node
(whether correct or faulty), then m is
eventually delivered by every correct node.
(a) Specification
URBC∶Component Requrb Indurb (Reqbeb, Indbeb) ∶=
let bebc ∶= 0 in⟨State ∶=⟨count∶Nat,
delivered∶Set[⟨M,N,Nat⟩],
pending∶Set[⟨M,N,Nat⟩],
ack∶Map[⟨M,N,Nat⟩,Set[N]] ⟩
init ∶= λn. ⟨0,∅,∅,∅⟩
request ∶= λ n, s, ir.
let ⟨c, d, p, a⟩ ∶= s in
match ir with∣ broadcasturb(m)⇒
let c′ ∶= c + 1 in
let p′ ∶= p ∪ {⟨m,n, c′⟩} in
let or ∶= (bebc,broadcastbeb⟨m,n, c′⟩) in⟨⟨ c′, d, p′, a⟩, [or], [] ⟩
end
indication ∶= λ n′, s, ii.
let ⟨c, d, p, a⟩ ∶= s in
match ii with∣ (bebc,deliverbeb(n′′, ⟨m,n, c′⟩))⇒
let a′ ∶= a[⟨m,n, c′⟩↦ a(⟨m,n, c′⟩) ∪ {n′′}] in
if ⟨m,n, c′⟩ /∈ p
let p′ ∶= p ∪ {⟨m,n, c′⟩} in
let or ∶= (bebc,broadcastbeb⟨m,n, c′⟩) in⟨⟨c, d, p′, a′⟩, [or], []⟩
else ⟨⟨c, d, p, a′⟩, [], [] ⟩
end
periodic ∶= λ n, s.
let ⟨c, d, p, a⟩ ∶= s in
let ⟨d′, ois⟩ ∶= foldl ((λ ⟨d′, ois⟩, ⟨m,n′, c′⟩.
if ∣a(⟨m,n′, c′⟩)∣ > ∣N∣/2 ∧ ⟨m,n′, c′⟩ /∈ d⟨d′ ∪ {⟨m,n′, c′⟩}, ois ∶∶ deliverurb(n′,m)⟩
else ⟨d′, ois⟩),⟨∅, []⟩,
p ) in⟨⟨c, d ∪ d′, p, a⟩, [], ois ⟩ ⟩
(b) Implementation
Figure 13: Uniform Reliable Broadcast Component
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of the message is a quorum. The other handler functions do not issue delivery events. Thus, by rule
InvLSe, we have
Γ ⊢URBC s (n′ ● deliverurb(n′′,m) ∈ ois)⇒∃c. ∣ack(s(n′))(⟨m,n′′, c⟩)∣ > ∣N∣/2 (2)
that states that when a delivery is issued for a message, the size of its acknowledgement set is more
than half of the number of nodes. As a quorum of nodes are correct, there should be at least one
correct node in the acknowledging set. We sketch the proof of this fact using the Quorum. We can
separately show that every element of the acknowledgement set is a node.
Γ ⊢URBC s  ack(s(n′))(⟨m,ns, c⟩) ⊆ N (3)
and obviously
Γ ⊢URBC s  (N/2 +N/2 ≥ N) (4)
By rule Quorum on Equation 1, Equation 3 and Equation 4, we have
Γ ⊢URBC s ∣ack(s(n′))(⟨m,n′′, c⟩)∣ > ∣N∣/2⇒∃n. n ∈ Correct ∧ n ∈ ack(s(n′))(⟨m,n′′, c⟩) (5)
that states that if the size of the acknowledgement set for a message is more than half of the number
of nodes, then a correct node is in the set. We note that reasoning about quorums is done in a
simple single step. Thus, from Equation 2 and Equation 5, we have
Γ ⊢URBC s (n′ ● deliverurb(n′′,m) ∈ ois)⇒∃c, n. n ∈ Correct ∧ n ∈ ack(s(n′))(⟨m,n′′, c⟩) (6)
We now present a summary of the rest of the proof that is available in subsection 5.3. We use
the following properties of bebc. Validity: If a correct node broadcasts a message, then the message
is eventually delivered to every correct node. No-forge: Delivered messages are previously broadcast.
We know that a correct node is in the acknowledgement set. The component adds a node to
the acknowledgement set only if a message is delivered from that node via bebc. By the no-forge
property of bebc, the message should have been broadcast. Thus, a correct node has broadcast the
message. By the validity property of bebc, the message is delivered to every correct node. When
the component receives a message via bebc, if the message is not already in the pending set, it
is rebroadcast. If it is already in the pending set, it can be shown that it is already broadcast.
Thus, in any case, every correct node eventually (in the past or future) broadcasts the message.
Thus, by the validity property of bebc, the message is delivered to every correct node from every
correct node via bebc. When the component receives a message via bebc, it adds the sender to the
acknowledgement set. The elements of the acknowledgement set always stay the same or increase.
Thus, eventually forever, every correct node will have every correct node in its acknowledgement
set for the message. As a majority of nodes is correct, the size of this set is more than half of the
number of the nodes. As the periodic function is infinitely often called, it will be eventually called
when the size of the acknowledgement set for the message is more than half of the number of the
nodes. When the periodic function iterates the pending set, if the message is not in the delivered
set, as its acknowledgement set is already large enough, it is delivered. On the other hand, if it is in
the delivered set, it can be shown that it is already delivered. Thus, the message is eventually (in
the past or future) delivered at every correct node.
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3 Lowering Soundness
The following theorem states the soundness of the lowering transformation for compositional
reasoning. If a top-level invariant I[]i is valid for the stack Si and Si is a substack of the stack S,
then the lowered invariant lower(i,I[]i ) is valid for S. We use the validity judgement ⊧S A that
states that A is valid in every trace of S. (Validity is defined more precisely in section 7, and the
detailed proofs are available in subsection 5.2.)
Theorem 3. For all S, c, and Si, such that S = stack(c,Si), if ⊧Si I[]i then ⊧S lower(i,I[]i ).
We now state the compositional proof technique and its soundness. The specifications of substacks
can be lowered and used to derive the specification of the stack. Judgements of TLC are of the
form Γ ⊢c A where Γ is the assumed assertions and A is the deduced assertion. Consider valid
top-level invariants I[]i for stacks Si and a stack S built by the component c on top of Si. The
following theorem states that assuming the lowered invariants lower(i,I[]i ), any assertion that TLC
deduces for c is valid for S.
Corollary 1 (Composition Soundness). For all S, c, and Si such that S = stack(c,Si), if ⊧Si I[]i
and lower(i,I[]i ) ⊢c A then ⊧S A.
Let us present an overview of why the above theorem holds. We first define a few helper
definitions and lemmas.
The transitions of the operational semantics generate labels ` that are tuples of (n, d, o, e, σ, σ′,
ors, ois). A label represents the execution of an event and its components are the node identifier n,
the location d, the orientation o, the user event e, the pre-state σ, the post-state σ′, issued output
requests ors and issued output indications ois of the executed event. A trace τ is a sequence of
labels. The set of traces of a stack S is denoted as T (S). To determine satisfiability of temporal
assertions, we define a model m = (τ, i, I) as a tuple of a trace τ , a position i in the trace and an
interpretation I (to evaluate rigid free variables). The set of models of a stack S is denoted as
M(S). (We elaborate these definitions in section 6 and section 7). A trace is pushed to a branch i
by appending i to the location of its events. Pushing is naturally lifted to a model by pushing its
trace.
Definition 7 (Pushing a Trace and a Model).
push(i, τ) , map (λ(d, e, n, s, s′, ors, ois).(i ∶∶∶ d, e, n, s, s′, ors, ois), τ)
push(i, (τ, j, I)) , (push(i, τ), j, I)
The following lemma intuitively states that a substack generates a subset of the traces that it
generates at the top level (modulo the location of events). More precisely, for every stack S with a
substack Si, for any trace τ of S, there exists a trace τ ′ of Si, such that subtrace of τ for Si is equal
to τ ′ pushed to branch i. We use τ ∣d⊇[i] to denote the projection of τ over events whose location is
an extension of [i] i.e. the events that are from the stack at location [i]. This projection is simply
lifted to models.
Lemma 1. For all c, Si and τ , if τ ∈ T (stack(c,Si)), there exists τ ′ ∈ T (Si) such that τ ∣d⊇[i] =
push(i, τ ′).
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The above lemma is proved using a simulation from the semantics of stack(c,Si) to the semantics
of Si. The following corollary for models is immediate from the definition of push on models
(Definition 7).
Corollary 2. For all c, Si and m, if m ∈ M(stack(c,Si)), there exists m′ ∈ M(Si) such that
m∣d⊇[i] = push(i,m′).
The following lemma states that if a model m satisfies a top-level assertion A[], then the model
resulted from pushing m to branch i satisfies the assertion resulted from pushing A[] to branch i.
Lemma 2. For all m, A[] and i, if m ⊧ A[] then push(i,m) ⊧ push(i,A[]).
The above lemma is proved by induction on the structure of A[]. We now define extensions of a
model that preserve the subtrace of branch i. A model is extended when its trace is extended. A
model (τ ′′, 0, I) is an extension of the model (τ, 0, I) if τ ′′ is an interleaving of τ with another trace
τ ′; to preserve the events under branch i in τ , there should not be any event under branch i in τ ′.
Definition 8 (Extending a Model).
extend((τ,0, I), i) , {(τ ′′,0, I) ∣ ∃τ ′. τ ′′ ∈ interleave(τ, τ ′) ∧∀j. d(τ ′(j)) /⊇ [i]}
Based on the above definition, the following lemma states that if a model m satisfies an invariantI[i], then any extension of m (that preserves the events of branch i) satisfies the restriction of I[i]
to branch i.
Lemma 3. For all m, i, I[i], m′, if m ⊧ I[i] and m′ ∈ extend(m, i) then m′ ⊧ restrict(d ⊇ [i],I[i]).
A generalization of this lemma is proved by structural induction on the invariant I[i]. To prove
this lemma for the not operator, the lemma is generalized to bi-implication. As we mentioned before,
the next operator was excluded from the sublanguage of invariants. If we had mapped the next
operator to the eventually operator, the forward implication would but the backward implication
would not hold.
Now, use apply the above lemmas, to present a proof sketch for Theorem 3. From ⊧Si I[]i , we
have that for every model m′ of Si, (1) m′ ⊧ I[]i . By Lemma 2 on [1], both the model and the
invariant can be pushed i.e. (2) push(i,m′) ⊧ push(i,I[]i ). By Corollary 2 on [2], for every model
m in M(S), there exists a model m′ in M(Si) such that (3) the projection m∣d⊇[i] is equal to
push(i,m′). Thus, from [2] and [3], we have (4) m∣d⊇[i] ⊧ push(i,I[]i ). The whole model m is an
extension of the projection that is (5) m ∈ extend(i,m∣d⊇[i]). Thus, by Lemma 3 on [4] and [5],
we have that m models the restriction of push(i,I[]i ) i.e. m ⊧ restrict(d ⊇ [i],push(i,I[]i )) that by
definition of lower (Definition 1) is m ⊧ lower(i,I[]i ). Therefore, as m is an arbitrary model of S, we
have ⊧S lower(i,I[]i ).
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4 Components
4.1 Stubborn Links
Figure 14 shows the specification of stubborn links. It accepts requests sendsl(n,m) to send the
message m to the node n. It issues indications deliversl(n,m) to deliver the message m sent by the
node n. A stubborn link stubbornly retransmits messages. The stubborn delivery property states
that once a message is sent, it is delivered infinitely often. More precisely, if a correct node n sends
a message m to a correct node n′, then n′ delivers m infinitely often. A stubborn link never forges
a message. More precisely, if a node n delivers a message m with sender n′, then m was in fact
previously sent to n by n′.
Figure 15 shows the component SLC that implements the stubborn link. It uses the underlying
basic link to retransmit messages. Its state stores the set of sent messages as the set sent of pairs
of destination and message with the initial state ∅. Upon receiving a request sendsl(n′,m), the
pair ⟨n′,m⟩ is added to the sent set and a sendl(n′,m) request is issued to the lower-level basic
link. Upon receiving an indication deliverl(n,m) from the basic link, a deliversl(n,m) indication is
issued. The basic link transmits the message with losses. Therefore, the messages in the sent set are
periodically resent by the basic link.
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Stubborn Link Interface
Reqsl ∶= sendsl(n,m) Requests to send message m to node n
Indsl ∶= deliversl(n,m) Delivers message m sent by node n
SL1 (Stubborn delivery):
n ∈ Correct ∧ n′ ∈ Correct→(n ● ⊺ ↓ sendsl(n′,m))⇒ ◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliversl(n,m))
If a correct node n sends a message m to a correct node n′, then n′ delivers m infinitely often.
SL2 (No-forge):(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliversl(n′,m))  (n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendsl(n,m))
If a node n delivers a message m with sender n′, then m was previously sent to n by n′.
Figure 14: Stubborn Links Specification
SLC∶Component Reqsl Indsl (Reql, Indl) ∶=
let lc ∶= 0 in⟨State ∶= ⟨sent∶Set[⟨N,M⟩]⟩,
init ∶= λn. ∅,
request ∶= λ n, s, ir.
match ir with∣ sendsl(n′,m)⇒⟨⟨s ∪ {⟨n′,m⟩}⟩,[(lc, sendl(n′,m))],[]⟩
end
indication ∶= λ n′, s, ii.
match ii with∣ (lc,deliverl(n,m)⇒⟨s, [], [deliversl(n,m)]⟩
end
periodic ∶= λ n, s.
let ors ∶= map (λ⟨n,m⟩. (lc, sendl(n,m))) s in⟨s, ors, []⟩⟩
Figure 15: Stubborn Link Component
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4.2 Perfect Links
The specification of perfect links is presented in Figure 16. Perfect links accept requests sendpl(n,m)
to send the message m to the node n and issue indications deliverpl(n,m) to deliver a message m
sent by a node n. The reliable delivery property states that perfect links can reliably transmit
messages between correct nodes. More precisely, it states that if a correct node n sends a message
m to a correct node n′, then n′ will eventually deliver m. The no-duplication property states that
perfect links do not redundantly deliver messages. More precisely, it states that if a message is sent
at most once, it will be delivered at most once. The no-forge property states that perfect links do
not forge messages. More precisely, it states that if a node n delivers a message m with sender n′,
then m was previously sent to n by node n′.
Figure 17 presents the component PLC that implements the perfect link. It uses a stubborn
link as the lower-level component. As the stubborn link delivers messages infinitely often, the
component keeps track of delivered messages and ignores redelivered messages. It stores the number
of messages sent by the current node counter initialized to zero and the set of received messages
received initialized to empty. The counter is used to uniquely assign a number to each message sent
by the same node. The set of received messages are the pairs of node identifier and the number
of the message in that node. Upon a request to send a message, the counter is incremented and
the message is sent using the stubborn link subcomponent with the new counter value. Upon an
indication of delivery of a message from the stubborn link subcomponent, if the message is already
received, it is ignored. Otherwise, the pair of the sending node and the message number are added
to the received set and the component delivers the message.
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Perfect Link Interface
Reqpl ∶= sendpl(n,m) Requests to send message m to node n
Indpl ∶= deliverpl(n,m) Delivers message m sent by node n
PL1 (Reliable delivery):
n ∈ Correct ∧ n′ ∈ Correct→(n ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n′,m)  (n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n,m))
If a correct node n sends a message m to a correct node n′, then n′ will eventually deliver m.
PL2 (No-duplication):[n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m)⇒
ˆ¬(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m))] →[n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m)⇒
ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))]∗
If a message is sent at most once, it will be delivered at most once.
PL3 (No-forge):(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))  (n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m))
If a node n delivers a message m with sender n′, then m was previously sent to n by node n′.
∗It is notable that (p⇒ ˆ¬p)→ (p⇒ ˆ¬p)
Figure 16: Perfect Links Specification
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PLC∶Component Reqpl Indpl (Reqsl, Indsl) ∶=
let slc ∶= 0 in⟨State ∶= ⟨counter∶Nat,
received∶Set[⟨N,Nat⟩]⟩,
init ∶= λn. ⟨0,∅⟩,
request ∶= λ n, s, ir.
let ⟨c, r⟩ ∶= s in
match ir with∣ sendpl(n′,m)⇒
let c′ ∶= c + 1 in
let or ∶= (slc, sendsl(n′, ⟨c′,m⟩)) in⟨⟨c′, r⟩, [or], []⟩,
end
indication ∶= λ n′, s, ii.
let ⟨c, r⟩ =∶ s in
match ii with∣ (slc,deliversl(n, ⟨c′,m⟩)⇒
if (⟨n, c′⟩ ∈ r)⟨s, [], []⟩
else
let r′ ∶= r ∪ {⟨n, c′⟩} in
let oi ∶= deliverpl(n,m) in⟨⟨c, r′⟩, [], [oi]⟩
end
periodic ∶= λ n, s. ⟨s, [], []⟩ ⟩
Figure 17: Perfect Link Component
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4.3 Best-Effort Broadcast
The specification of best-effort broadcast is presented in Figure 18. Best-effort broadcast accepts
requests broadcastbeb(m) to broadcast the message m and issues indications deliverbeb(n,m) to
deliver a message m broadcast by a node n. The validity property states that the best-effort
broadcast delivers the same set of messages from every correct node to every correct node. More
precisely, it states that if a correct node broadcasts a message m, then every correct node eventually
delivers m. The no-duplication property states that the best-effort broadcast does not redundantly
deliver messages. More precisely, it states that if a message is broadcast at most once, it will be
delivered at most once. The no-forge property states that the best-effort broadcast does not forge
messages. More precisely, it states that if a correct node delivers a message m with sender n′, then
m was previously broadcast by node n′.
Figure 19 presents the component BEBC that implements the best-effort broadcast. It uses a
perfect link as the lower-level component. It does not store any state. Upon a request to broadcast
a message, it sends the message to every node using the perfect-link subcomponent. Upon an
indication of delivery of a message from the perfect link subcomponent, the component delivers the
message.
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Best-Effort Broadcast
Reqbeb ∶= broadcastbeb(m) Broadcast a message m to all nodes.
Indbeb ∶= deliverbeb(n,m) Delivers a message m broadcast by node n.
BEB1 (Validity)
n ∈ Correct ∧ n′ ∈ Correct→(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m)) (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))
If a correct node broadcasts a message m, then every correct node eventually delivers m.
BEB2 (No-duplication)[n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m)⇒
ˆ¬(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m))] →[n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m)⇒
ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))]
If a message is broadcast at most once, it will be delivered at most once.
BEB3 (No-forge)(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))  (n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m))
If a correct node delivers a message m with sender n′, then m was previously broadcast by node n′.
Figure 18: Best-Effort Broadcast Specification
BEBC∶Component Reqbeb Indbeb (Reqpl, Indpl) ∶=
let plc ∶= 0 in⟨State ∶= Unit
init ∶= λn. 
request ∶= λ n, s, ir.
match ir with∣ broadcastbeb(m)⇒
let ors ∶= map (λn. (plc, sendpl(n,m))) N in⟨s, ors, []⟩
end
indication ∶= λ n′, s, ii.
match ii with∣ (plc,deliverpl(n,m))⇒⟨s, [], [deliverbeb(n,m)]⟩
end
periodic ∶= λ n, s.⟨s, [], []⟩⟩
Figure 19: Best-Effort Broadcast Component
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4.4 Uniform Reliable Broadcast
Uniform reliable broadcast guarantees that if a node (even a faulty one) delivers a message, then
every correct node also delivers it. It precludes the situation where a faulty node delivers a message
and failes and a correct node never delivers the message. Uniform reliable broadcast guarantees
that the set of messages delivered by correct nodes is always a superset of the messages delivered by
faulty nodes; hence, it is called uniform.
Figure 20 presents the specification of uniform reliable broadcast. It accepts requests broadcasturb(m)
to broadcast the message m and issues indications deliverurb(n,m) to deliver a message m broadcast
by a node n. The validity property states that a correct node receives his own messages. More
precisely, it states that if a correct node n broadcasts a message m, then n itself eventually delivers
m. The no-duplication property states that messages are not redundantly delivered. More precisely,
it states that if a message is broadcast at most once, it will be delivered at most once. The no-forge
property states that messages are not forged. More precisely, it states that if a node delivers a
message m with sender n′, then m was previously broadcast by node n′. The uniform agreement
states that if a node delivers a message, a correct node does not miss it. More precisely, it states
that if a message m is delivered by some node (whether correct or faulty), then m is eventually
delivered by every correct node.
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Uniform Reliable Broadcast
Requrb ∶= broadcasturb(m)
Broadcasts a message m to all nodes.
Indurb ∶= deliverurb(n,m)
Delivers a message m broadcast by node n.
Assumption:∣Correct∣ > ∣N∣/2
URB1 (Validity)
n ∈ Correct→(n ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n,m))
If a correct node n broadcasts a message m, then n itself eventually delivers m.
URB2 (No-duplication)[n ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)⇒
ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m))]→[(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n,m))⇒
ˆ¬(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n,m))]
If a message is broadcast at most once, it will be delivered at most once.
URB3 (No-forge)(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′,m))  (n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m))
If a node delivers a message m with sender n′, then m was previously broadcast by node n′.
URB4 (Uniform Agreement)
n ∈ Correct→(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′′,m))⇒◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′′,m)) ∨x(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′′,m))
If a message m is delivered by some node (whether correct or faulty), then m is eventually delivered by
every correct node.
Figure 20: Uniform Reliable Broadcast Specification
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Figure 21 presents the uniform reliable broadcast component URBC that implements the uniform
reliable broadcast. It uses a best-effort broadcast beb and assumes that a majority of processes
are correct. It stores the number of messages sent by the current node count, the set of delivered
messages delivered, the set of messages that are received but are pending for acknowledgement
pending, and a mapping from each message to the set of nodes that have acknowledged the receipt
of the message ack. Each message is uniquely identified by the identifier of the sender node and the
number of the message in that node. The state count is initialized to zero, and the other sets are
all initialized to ∅.
The high-level idea is that each node, before delivering a message, makes sure that a majority
of nodes have acknowledged the receipt of the message. As a majority of nodes are correct, there
is at least one correct node in the acknowledging nodes. Not only the sender but every receiver
broadcasts the message. Thus, the correct acknowledging node broadcasts the message as well and
its broadcast will be properly delivered by every correct node. The other correct nodes will in turn
broadcast the message. Thus, every correct node eventually receives an acknowledgement from
every correct node. There is a majority of correct nodes. Thus, each correct node will eventually
receive acknowledgement from a majority of nodes and deliver the message.
Upon a broadcast request, the counter is incremented, the message is added to the pending set
and is broadcast using beb together with the sender identifier and the new value of the counter.
Upon a delivery indication by beb, it is recorded in the acknowledgement map that the sender has
acknowledged the receipt of the message and if the message is not already in the pending set, it is
added to the pending set and broadcast by beb. Every node broadcasts each message by beb only
once when it receives it for the first time. In the periodic function, messages in the pending set are
iterated, and if an acknowledgement for a message is received from a majority of processes, and it is
not delivered before, then it is delivered.
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URBC∶Component Requrb Indurb (Reqbeb, Indbeb) ∶=
let bebc ∶= 0 in⟨State ∶=⟨count∶Nat,
delivered∶Set[⟨M,N,Nat⟩],
pending∶Set[⟨M,N,Nat⟩],
ack∶Map[⟨M,N,Nat⟩,Set[N]] ⟩
init ∶= λn. ⟨0,∅,∅,∅⟩
request ∶= λ n, s, ir.
let ⟨c, d, p, a⟩ ∶= s in
match ir with∣ broadcasturb(m)⇒
let c′ ∶= c + 1 in
let p′ ∶= p ∪ {⟨m,n, c′⟩} in
let or ∶= (bebc,broadcastbeb⟨m,n, c′⟩) in⟨⟨ c′, d, p′, a⟩, [or], [] ⟩
end
indication ∶= λ n′, s, ii.
let ⟨c, d, p, a⟩ ∶= s in
match ii with∣ (bebc,deliverbeb(n′′, ⟨m,n, c′⟩))⇒
let a′ ∶= a[⟨m,n, c′⟩↦ a(⟨m,n, c′⟩) ∪ {n′′}] in
if ⟨m,n, c′⟩ /∈ p
let p′ ∶= p ∪ {⟨m,n, c′⟩} in
let or ∶= (bebc,broadcastbeb⟨m,n, c′⟩) in⟨⟨c, d, p′, a′⟩, [or], []⟩
else ⟨⟨c, d, p, a′⟩, [], [] ⟩
end
periodic ∶= λ n, s.
let ⟨c, d, p, a⟩ ∶= s in
let ⟨d′, ois⟩ ∶= foldl ((λ ⟨d′, ois⟩, ⟨m,n′, c′⟩.
if ∣a(⟨m,n′, c′⟩)∣ > ∣N∣/2 ∧ ⟨m,n′, c′⟩ /∈ d⟨d′ ∪ {⟨m,n′, c′⟩}, ois ∶∶ deliverurb(n′,m)⟩
else ⟨d′, ois⟩),⟨∅, []⟩,
p ) in⟨⟨c, d ∪ d′, p, a⟩, [], ois ⟩ ⟩
Figure 21: Uniform Reliable Broadcast Component
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4.5 Eventually Perfect Failure Detector
Eventually Perfect Failure Detector
Reqepfd = Unit None.
Indepfd ∶= suspect(n) The indication that the node n is suspected to have crashed.∣ restore(n) The indication that the node n is not suspected anymore.
EPFD1 (Strong Completeness):∀n,n′. n ∈ Correct ∧ ¬n′ ∈ Correct→◇[(n ● ⊺ ↑ suspect(n′)) ∧¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ restore(n′))]
Every incorrect node is eventually permanently suspected by every correct node.
EPFD2 (Eventual Strong Accuracy):∀n,n′. n ∈ Correct ∧ n′ ∈ Correct→
¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ suspect(n′)) ∨◇[(n ● ⊺ ↑ restore(n′)) ∧¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ suspect(n′))]
Eventually no correct node is suspected by any correct node.
Figure 22: Eventual Perfect Failure Detector Specification
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EPFDC∶Component Reqepfd Indepfd (Reql, Indl) ∶=⟨State ∶=⟨alive∶Nat→ Set[N],
failed∶Set[N],
r∶Nat⟩
init ∶= ⟨N, [],0⟩
request ∶= λ n, s, ir.⟨s, [], []⟩
indication ∶= λ n′, s, ii.
let ⟨a, f, r⟩ ∶= s in
match ii with∣ (0,deliverl(n,HB))⇒⟨⟨a[r ↦ a(r) ∪ {n}], f, r⟩, [], []⟩
end
periodic ∶= λ n, s.
let ⟨a, f, r⟩ ∶= s in
let ⟨f ′, ors, ois⟩ ∶= foldl(
N(λ⟨f ′, ors, ois⟩, n.
if (n /∈ a(r) ∧ n /∈ f)⟨f ′ ∪ {n},
ors ∪ {sendl(n,HB)}
ois ∪ {suspect(n)}⟩
else if (n ∈ a(r) ∧ n ∈ f)⟨f ′ ∖ {n},
ors ∪ {sendl(n,HB)}
ois ∪ {restore(n)}⟩
else ⟨f ′,
ors ∪ {sendl(n,HB)}
ois⟩)⟨f, [], []⟩ ) in⟨⟨[], f ′, r + 1⟩, ors, ois⟩⟩
Figure 23: Eventual Perfect Failure Detector Component
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4.6 Eventual Leader Elector
Eventual Leader Elector
Reqeld = Unit None.
Indeld ∶= trust(n) It indicates that the node n is the leader.
ELE1(Eventual Leadership)
Eventually every correct process trusts the same correct process.∃l. l ∈ Correct ∧[n ∈ Correct→◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ trust(l) ∧ ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ trust(l′)))]
Figure 24: Eventual Leader Elector Specification
ELEC∶Component Reqeld Indeld (Reqepfd, Indepfd) ∶=
let epfd ∶= 0 in⟨State ∶=⟨suspected∶Set[N],
leader∶N⟩,
init ∶= λn. ⟨∅,⟩,
request ∶= λ n, s, ir.⟨s, [], []⟩
indication ∶= λ n, s, ii.
let ⟨p, l⟩ ∶= s in
match ii with∣ (epfd, suspect(n′))⇒
let p′ ∶= p ∪ {n′} in⟨⟨p′, l⟩, [], []⟩∣ (epfd, restore(n′))⇒
let p′ ∶= p ∖ {n′} in⟨⟨p′, l⟩, [], []⟩
end,
periodic ∶= λ n, s.
let ⟨p, l⟩ ∶= s in
if l ≠maxRank(N ∖ p) in
let l′ =maxRank(N ∖ p) in⟨⟨p, l′⟩, [], []⟩
else ⟨s, [], []⟩⟩
Figure 25: Eventual Leader Elector Component
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4.7 Epoch Consensus
Epoch Consensus
Reqec ∶= proposeec(v) ∣ epochec(n, ts)
proposeec(v) proposes value v.
epochec(n, ts) starts a new epoch with the leader n and timestamp ts.
Indec ∶= decideec(v)
decideec(v) outputs the decided value v.
EC1 (Validity)(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))⇒∃n′. x(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ proposeec(v))
If a node decides the value v, then v was proposed by a node.
EC2 (Uniform agreement)
n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v) ∧◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v′))⇒
v = v′
No two nodes decide differently.
EC3 (Integrity)(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))⇒
ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v′))
Every node decides at most once.
EC4 (Termination)∣Correct∣ > ∣N∣/2 ∧ n ∈ Correct→(n ● ⊺ ↓ proposeec(v))⇒(n ● 1 ↓ epochec(n, ts)) ∧ ¬(n ● 1 ↓ epochec(n′, ts′))⇒∀n′. n′ ∈ Correct→x◇∃v′. (n′ ● 1 ↑ decideec(v′))
If a correct node proposes and an epoch is started with that node as the leader, then every correct node
eventually decides a value.
Figure 26: Epoch Consensus Specification
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ECC∶Component Reqec Indec (Reqbeb, Indbeb,Reqpl, Indpl) ∶=
let plc ∶= 0 in
let bebc ∶= 1 in⟨State ∶=⟨ets∶Nat,
valts∶Nat, val∶Nat,
rts∶Nat,
prop∶Nat,
wval∶Map[Nat,Nat]
states∶Map[N, ⟨Nat,Nat⟩],
accepted∶Set[N],
decided∶Bool ⟩
init ∶= λn. ⟨−n,0,,0,, λn. ,∅,∅, false⟩
request ∶= λ n, s, ir.
let ⟨ets, vts, val, rts, p,wv, st, ac, d⟩ ∶= s in
match ir with∣ proposeec(v)⇒
let p′ ∶= v in⟨⟨ets, vts, val, rts, p′,wv, st, ac, d⟩, [], []⟩∣ epochec(nl, tsl) ∧ nl = n⇒
let ets′ ∶= tsl in
let st′ ∶= ∅ in
let or ∶= (bebc,broadcastbeb(Prepare (ets′))) in⟨⟨ets′, vts, val, rts, p,wv, st′, ac, d⟩, [or], []⟩∣ ⇒⟨s, [], []⟩
end
Figure 27: Epoch Consensus (part 1)
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indication ∶= λ n′, s, ii.
let ⟨ets, vts, val, rts, p,wv, st, ac, d⟩ ∶= s in
match ii with∣ (bebc,deliverbeb(n,m)) ⇒
match m with∣ Prepare (ets′) ∧ ets′ > rts ⇒
let rts′ ∶= ets′ in
let or ∶= (plc, sendpl(nl,State (ets′, vts, val)) in⟨⟨ets, vts, val, rts′, p,wv, st, ac, d⟩, [or], []⟩
∣ Accept (ets′, v) ∧ ets′ ≥ rts ⇒
let ⟨vts′, val′⟩ ∶= ⟨ets′, v⟩ in
let or ∶= (plc, sendpl(n,Accepted(ets′))) in⟨⟨ets, vts′, val′, rts, p,wv, st, ac, d⟩, [or], []⟩
∣ Decided (ets′, v) ∧ ¬d ⇒
let d′ ∶= true in
let oi ∶= decideec(v)⟨⟨ets, vts, val, rts, p,wv, st, ac, d′⟩, [], [oi]⟩
∣ ⇒ ⟨s, [], []⟩
end
∣ (plc,deliverpl(n,m))⇒
match m with∣ State (ets′, ts, v) ∧ ets′ = ets ⇒
let st′ ∶= st[n↦ ⟨ts, v⟩] in
if (∣dom(st′)∣ > ∣N∣/2 ∧ wv(ets) =  ∧ p ≠ )
let st′′ = ∅
let ⟨vts′, val′⟩ ∶= highest(st′) in
let wv′ ∶= wv[ets↦ if (val′ ≠ ) val′ else p] in
let or ∶= (bebc,broadcastbeb(Accept (ets,wv′(ets)))) in⟨⟨ets, vts′, val′, rts, p,wv′, st′′, ac, d⟩, [or], []⟩
else ⟨⟨ets, vts, val, rts, p,wv, st′, ac, d⟩, [], []⟩
∣ Accepted (ets′) ∧ ets′ = ets ⇒
let ac′ ∶= ac ∪ {n} in
if (∣ac′∣ > N/2)
let or ∶= (bebc,broadcastbeb(Decided (ets,wv(ets)))) in⟨⟨ets, vts, val, rts, p,wv, st, ac′, d⟩, [or], []⟩
else ⟨⟨ets, vts, val, rts, p,wv, st, ac′, d⟩, [], []⟩
∣ ⇒ ⟨s, [], []⟩
end
end
periodic ∶= λ n, s.⟨s, [], []⟩ ⟩
Figure 28: Epoch Consensus (part 2)
35
4.8 Epoch Change
Epoch Change
Indech ∶= startEpochech(ts, nl)
The event startEpochech(ts, nl) starts the epoch identified by timestamp ts with the leader nl.
ECH1 (Monotonicity)
n ∈ Correct→(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl))⇒
ˆ(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l)→ ts′ > ts)
If a correct process starts an epoch (ts, nl) and later starts an epoch (ts′, n′l), then ts′ > ts.
ECH2 (Consistency)
n ∈ Correct ∧ n′ ∈ Correct→(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl))⇒(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, n′l)⇒ nl = n′l)
If a correct process starts an epoch (ts, nl) and another correct process starts an epoch (ts, n′l), then
nl = n′l.
ECH3 (Eventual leadership)∃ts, nl. nl ∈ Correct ∧[n ∈ Correct→◇[(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl)) ∧
ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l))]]
There is a timestamp ts and a correct process nl such that eventually every correct process starts an
epoch with ts and nl and does not start another epoch afterwards.
Figure 29: Epoch Change Specification
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ECHC∶Component Indech (Reqeld, Indeld,Reqbeb, Indbeb,Reqpl, Indpl) ∶=
let plc ∶= 0 in
let bebc ∶= 1 in
let eldc ∶= 2 in⟨State ∶=⟨trusted∶N,
lastts∶ Int,
ts∶ Int,
nk∶Set[Bool] ⟩
init ∶=⟨nl0 ,0, rank(n),∅ ⟩
request ∶= λ n, s, ir. ⟨s, [], []⟩
indication ∶= λ n, s, ii.
let ⟨tr, lts, t, nk⟩ ∶= s in
match ii with∣ (eldc, trusteld(nl))⇒
let tr′ ∶= nl in
let nk[tr′] ∶= false in
if (tr′ ∶= n)
let t′ ∶= t +N in
let or ∶= (bebc,broadcastbeb(NewEpoch(t′))) in⟨⟨tr′, lts, t′, nk⟩, [or], []⟩
else ⟨⟨tr′, lts, t, nk⟩, [], []⟩∣ (bebc,deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(newt)))⇒
if (tr = nl ∧ nk[tr] = false)
let nk[tr] ∶= true in
let or ∶= (plc, sendpl(nl,State(lts))) in⟨⟨tr, lts′, t, nk⟩, [], [oi]⟩
else if (tr = nl ∧ newt > lts)
let lts′ ∶= newt in
let oi ∶= (ech, startEpoch(lts′, tr)) in⟨⟨tr, lts, t, nk⟩, [or], []⟩
else if (tr ≠ nl)
let or ∶= (plc, sendpl(nl,Nack(lts))) in⟨⟨tr, lts, t, nk⟩, [or], []⟩
else ⟨s, [], []⟩
Figure 30: Epoch Change Component (part 1)
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∣ (plc,deliverpl(n′,State(lts′))) ∧ tr = n ⇒
if (lts′ > t)
let t′ ∶= t + ((lts′ − t)/N + 1) ∗N in
let or ∶= (bebc,broadcastbeb(NewEpoch(t′))) in⟨⟨tr, lts, t′, nk⟩, [or], []⟩
else
let or ∶= (bebc,broadcastbeb(NewEpoch(t))) in⟨⟨tr, lts, t, nk⟩, [or], []⟩
∣ (plc,deliverpl(n′,Nack(lts′))) ∧ tr = n ⇒
let or ∶= (bebc,broadcastbeb(NewEpoch(t))) in⟨⟨tr, lts, t, nk⟩, [or], []⟩
∣ ⇒⟨s, [], []⟩
end
periodic ∶= λ n, s. ⟨s, [], []⟩ ⟩
Figure 31: Epoch Change Component (part 2)
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4.9 Uniform Consensus
Uniform Consensus
Requc ∶= proposeuc(v)
Propose value v for consensus.
Induc ∶= decideuc(v)
Outputs a decided value v of consensus.
UC1 (Termination)∣Correct∣ > ∣N∣/2 ∧ n ∈ Correct→[∀n′.n′ ∈ Correct→ ∃v. v ≠  ∧x(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ proposeuc(v))]⇒∃v. x◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v))
Every correct node eventually decides some value.
UC2 (Validity)(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v))  ∃n′. (n′ ● ⊺ ↓ proposeuc(v))
If a node decides v, then v was proposed by some node.
UC3 (Integrity)(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v))⇒
ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v′))
No node decides twice.
UC4 (Uniform agreement)(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v)) ∧◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v′))⇒
v = v′
No two nodes decide differently.
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UCC∶Component Requc Induc (Reqec, Indec,Reqech, Indech) ∶=
let echc ∶= 0 in
let ecc ∶= 1 in⟨State ∶= ⟨prop ∶ Nat,
leader ∶ N,
ts ∶ Nat
started ∶ false⟩
init ∶= λn.⟨,,0, false⟩
request ∶= λ n, s, ir.
let ⟨p, l, ts, str⟩ ∶= s in
match ir with∣ proposeuc(v)⇒
let p′ = v in
let or ∶= (ecc,proposeec(v)) in⟨⟨p′, l, ts, str⟩, [or], []⟩
end
indication ∶= λ n′, s, ii.
let ⟨p, l, ts, str⟩ ∶= s in
match ii with∣ (echc, startEpochech(ets, nl))⇒
let l′ ∶= nl in
let ts′ ∶= ets in
let str′ ∶= false
if (n′ = nl)
if (p ≠ )
let str′ ∶= true
let or ∶= (ecc, epochec(nl, ets)) in⟨⟨p, l′, st′, str′⟩, [or], []⟩
else ⟨⟨p, l′, st′, str′⟩, [], []⟩
else
let or ∶= (ecc, epochec(nl, ets)) in⟨⟨p, l′, st′, str′⟩, [or], []⟩
∣ (ecc,decideec(v))⇒
let oi ∶= decideuc(v) in⟨s, [], [oi]⟩
end
periodic ∶= λ n, s.
let ⟨p, l, ts, str⟩ ∶= s in
if (l = n ∧ str = false ∧ p ≠ )
let str′ = true
let or ∶= (ecc, epochec(nl, ts)) in⟨⟨p, l, ts, str′⟩, [or], []⟩
else ⟨s, [], []⟩ ⟩
Figure 32: Uniform Consensus Component
40
5 Proofs
5.1 Soundness
Definition 9 (Transition).
τ ⋅ τ ′ÐÐÐ→ = τÐ→∗t τ ′Ð→p
Definition 10 (Initial World).
w0(S) = (λd,n. let (c, ) = S(d) in initc(n),∅,∅, r0)
The trace semantics T (S) of S is the set of traces τ of infinite transitions τÐ→∗ starting from the
initial state w0(S) (with any rGST ). We consider infinite traces to reason about liveness properties.
Definition 11 (Traces of a stack).
T (S) = {τ ∣ w0(S) τÐ→∗ }
Definition 12 (Models of a stack).
M(S) = {(τ,0, I0) ∣ τ ∈ T (S)}
Definition 13. Let
mself(d, o) ,(d = [] ∧ o = ↓) ∨(d = [] ∧ o =  ) ∨(d = [i] ∧ o = ↑)
mself(`) ,
mself(d(`),o(`))
Definition 14. Let
mcorrect(τ, n) =∀j ≥ 0. ∃k ≥ j.
τk = (n, , , , , , , , )
Theorem 2. (Soundness)
Let S = stack(c,S ′)
If Γ ⊢c A, then Γ ⊧S A.
Proof.
41
Assumption:
(1) Γ ⊢c A
Conclusion:
Γ ⊧S A
From Definition 5, the conclusion is∀m ∈M(S),m ⊧ Γ→m ⊧ A
Assumption:
(2) m ∈M(S)
(3) m ⊧ Γ
Conclusion:
(4) m ⊧ A
From Definition 12 and Definition 11 on [2], we have
(5) m = (τ,0, I0)
(6) w0(S) τÐ→∗
Induction on the derivation of [1]:
Case SEq:
(7) A = n ≠ n ⇒ s′(n) = s(n)
From Definition 6 on [4], [5] and [7], we need to show that for all j ≥ 0:
Let τ(j) = (nj , rj , dj , oj , ej , σj , σ′j , orsj , oisj),
d′j = {d if o = ↓ ∨ o =  tail(dj) else
nj ≠ n→ σ′(d′j)(n) = σ(d′j)(n)
Immediate from Lemma 4.
Case IR:
(8) A = ∀e. ⊺ ↓ e ⇒ (s′(n),ois,ors) = request(n, s(n), e)
From Definition 6 on [4], [5] and [8], we need to show that for all j ≥ 0:
Let τ(j) = (nj , rj , dj , oj , ej , σj , σ′j , orsj , oisj),∀e. dj = [] ∧ oj = ↓ ∧ ej = e→(σ′(dj)(nj), oisj , orsj) = request(nj , σ(dj)(nj), e)
Induction on the derivation of [6]:
Cases except Req: By induction hypothesis.
Case Req: Immediate from the assumption of Req.
σ(d) = s
request(c, n, s(n), e) = (s′n, (i, e1), e2)
s′ = s[n↦ s′n]
σ′ = σ[d↦ s′]
Case II:
Similar to the case IR.
Case Pe:
Similar to the case IR.
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Case OI:
(9) A = ∀n, e. n ● e ∈ ois ∧ self ⇒ ◇ˆ(n ● ⊺ ↑ e)
From Definition 6 on [4], [5] and [9], we need to show that:∀j ≥ 0.∀n, d, ois.
τ(j) = (n, , d, o, , , , , ois) ∧ e ∈ ois ∧ mself(d, o)→∃k > j. τk = (n, , [], e, ↑, , , , )
Case analysis on the disjuncts of Definition 13:
Case 1:
(10) d = [] ∧ o = ↓
We assume that
(11) τ(j) = (n, , [], ↓, , , , , ois)
(12) e ∈ ois
We show that∃k > j. τk = (n, , [], ↑, e, , , , )
Induction on the derivation of [6]:
Case Req: From the assumption of Req:
request(n, s(n), e′) = ( , , e)
τ2 = (n, , [], ↑, e, , , , ) ⋅ τ ′2
τ = (n, , [], ↓, e′, , , , e) ⋅ ⋅ τ2
Thus
τ = (n, , [], ↓, e′, , , , e) ⋅ ⋅ (n, , [], ↑, e, , , , ) ⋅
After the event (n, , [], ↓, e′, , , , e),
the event (n, , [], ↑, e, , , , ) comes.
Also, the induction hypothesis is used for the
rest of events in τ such as the events in τ ′2.
Cases except Req:
By induction hypothesis.
Case 2:
(13) d = [] ∧ o =  
Similar to case Req.
Case 3:
(14) d = [i] ∧ o = ↑
Similar to Case 1.
Induction on the derivation of [6].
Rule Ind is main case.
Case OI′:
(15) A = ∀n, e. n ● ⊺ ↑ e ⇒ ˆ(n ● e ∈ ois ∧ self)
From Definition 6 on [4], [5] and [15], we need to show that:∀j ≥ 0. Let τ(j) = (nj , , dj , oj , ej , , , , ),∀n, e. nj = n ∧ dj = [] ∧ oj = ↑ ∧ ej = e→∃k < j. Let τk = (nk, , dk, ok, , , ,, oisk),
nk = n ∧ e ∈ oisk ∧mself(dk, ok)
Induction on the derivation of [6]:
Cases except Req, Ind and Per: By induction hypothesis.
Case Req: From the assumption of Req:
request(c, n, s(n), e′) = ( , , e)
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τ2 = (n, [], ↑, e, , , , ) ⋅ τ ′2
τ = (n, , [], ↓, e′, , , , e) ⋅ τ1 ⋅ τ2
Before the event (n, , [], ↑, e, , , , ),
there is the event (n, , [], ↓, e′, , , , e).
d = [] ∧ o = ↓ satisfies the first disjunct of mself.
Also, the induction hypothesis is used for the
rest of events in τ such as the events in τ ′2.
Case Ind:
Similar to Case Req.
The second disjunct of mself is satisfied.
Case Per:
Similar to Case Req.
The first disjunct of mself is satisfied.
Case OR:
Similar to the Case OI.
Case OR′:
Similar to the Case OI′.
Case Init:
(16) A = s (s = λn. initc(n))
By [4], [5], and rule SelfM, we have
τ ′1 = 
τ ′2 = τ0..∣mself
τ ′ = τ ′1 ⋅ τ ′2
i′ = 0
We need to show that(τ0..∣mself,0, I0) ⊧ (s = (λn. initc(n)))
By [6]
w0(S) τÐ→∗
By Definition 10
w0(S) = (λd,n. let (c, ) = S(d) in initc(n),∅,∅, r0)
Thus, the state is equal to the user-defined init at the beginning.
σ(τ ′0)([])(n) = initc(n)
By Definition 9, →t appears at the beginning of →
τ = τ ′ ⋅ τ ′′ ⋅ τ ′′′
w0(S) τ ′Ð→∗t τ ′′Ð→p W ′ τ ′′′Ð→
There are two →t transitions:
The rule Fail: It preserves the state σ.
The rule Request: It is a self transition.
Thus, the init state is preserved to the first self step,
that is either by the rule Request or the rule Periodic.
Case ASelf:
(17) A = s self
From Definition 6 on [4], [5] and [17], we need to show that:
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∀j ≥ 0. Let (τ ∣mself)j = ( , , dj , oj , , , , , , ),
mself(dj , oj)
That is∀j ≥ 0. Let τ(j) = ( , , dk, ok, , , , , , ),
mself(dj , oj)→ mself(dj , oj)
That is trivial.
Case SInv:
(18) A = s I ↔ restrict(self,I)
Let I = A
where ◯ and s are not used in A.
Forward Direction:
We have
(19) m ⊧s A
We show that
(20) m ⊧ restrict(self,A)
Thus, from [5], we need to show that
(21) (τ,0, I0) ⊧ restrict(self,A)
Thus, from Definition 3 on [21], we need to show that
(22) (τ,0, I0) ⊧ (self→ restrict(self,A))
Thus, from Definition 6, we need to show that:(τ, k, I0) ⊧ self→ restrict(self,A) forall k ≥ 0
From Definition 6 on [19] and [5], we have
(23) τ ′ = τ ∣mself
(24) (τ ′,0, I0) ⊧ A
Let
(25) j be the location of the first mself event in τ
that is
(26) τ ′0 = τ(j)
We consider two cases:
Case:
(27) k < j
From [25] and [27],
(28) ¬mself(τk)
Thus(τ, k, I0) ⊧ self→ restrict(self,A)
Case:
(29) k ≥ j
From Lemma 14 on [23], [26], [24],
(30) (τ, j, I0) ⊧ restrict(self,A)
From Definition 3 on [30],
(31) (τ, j, I0) ⊧ (self→ restrict(self,A))
From Definition 6 on [31], we have(τ, k, I0) ⊧ self→ restrict(self,A) forall k ≥ j
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Backward Direction:
We have
(32) m ⊧ restrict(self,A)
We show that
m ⊧s A
Let
(33) τ ′ = τ ∣mself
From [5] and Definition 6, we need to show that(τ ′, k, I0) ⊧ A forall k ≥ 0
From [32] and [5], we have
(34) (τ,0, I0) ⊧ restrict(self,A)
Thus, from Definition 3 on [34], we have
(35) (τ,0, I0) ⊧ (self→ restrict(self,A))
Thus, from Definition 6, we have
(36) (τ, j, I0) ⊧ self→ restrict(self,A) forall j ≥ 0
From [33], forall k ≥ 0, there exists j such that
(37) τ ′k = τ(j)
(38) mself(τ(j))
From [36] and [38],
(39) (τ, j, I0) ⊧ restrict(self,A)
From Lemma 14 on [33], [37], [39],(τ ′, k, I0) ⊧ A
Case PostPre:
(40) A = s (s′ = s ⇔ ◯ s = s)
From Definition 6 on [4], [5] and [40], we need to show that:∀j ≥ 0. σ′((τ ∣mself)j)([]) = σ((τ ∣mself)j+1)([])
That is straightforward from Lemma 5 and Lemma 6.
Case RSeq:
Immediate from the periodic transition →p that increments the round r.
Case ROrd:
Immediate from the periodic transition →p that increments the round r for the transition →per for
the periodic events per.
Case GST:
Every message that is sent in round r stays in ms until the periodic transition →p of round r
(Lemma 7).
After the GST round rGST , the periodic transition →p does not drop messages.
The periodic transition →p of round r includes the transition →msg that delivers the messages.
Case FDup:
(41) A =
◇(n′ ● d ↑ deliverl(n,m))→
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◇(n ● d ↓ sendl(n′,m))
We prove the contra-positive that is
(42) A =◇¬(n ● d ↓ sendl(n′,m))→◇¬(n′ ● d ↑ deliverl(n,m))
From Definition 6 on [4], [5] and [42], we need to show that:(∃j. ∀i ≥ j.¬(n(τ(i)) = n ∧ d(τ(i)) = d ∧
o(τ(i)) =↓ ∧e(τ(i)) = sendl(n′,m)))→(∃j. ∀i ≥ j.¬(n(τ(i)) = n′ ∧ d(τ(i)) = d ∧
o(τ(i)) = ↑ ∧e(τ(i)) = deliverl(n,m)))
Immediate by Lemma 24.
Case NForge:
(43) A =(n′ ● d ↑ deliverl(n,m))⇒x(n ● d ↓ sendl(n′,m))
From Definition 6 on [4], [5] and [43], we need to show that:∀i.(n(τ(i)) = n′ ∧ d(τ(i)) = d ∧
o(τ(i)) = ↑ ∧e(τ(i)) = deliverl(n,m)))→→∃j ≤ i.(n(τ(j)) = n ∧ d(τ(j)) = d ∧
o(τ(j)) =↓ ∧e(τ(j)) = sendl(n′,m)
Immediate by Lemma 27.
Case UniOI:
(44) A =(occ(ois, e) ≤ 1 ∧
ˆ(n = n ∧ self→ e /∈ ois) ∧
ˆ(n = n ∧ self→ e /∈ ois))⇒(n ● ⊺ ↑ e)⇒
ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ e) ∧ ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ e)
From Definition 6 on [4], [5] and [44], we need to show that:∀S, τ, i, j, k, oi, n.
occ(ois(τ(i)), e) ≤ 1 ∧∀k < i. (n(τk) = n ∧mself(τk))→ e /∈ ois(τk) ∧∀k > i. (n(τk) = n ∧mself(τk))→ e /∈ ois(τk) ∧
n(τ(j)) = n ∧
d(τ(j)) = [] ∧
o(τ(j)) = ↑ ∧
e(τ(j)) = e →
k < j → ¬[n(τk) = n ∧ d(τk) = [] ∧ o(τk) = ↑ ∧ e(τk) = e]
k > j → ¬[n(τk) = n ∧ d(τk) = [] ∧ o(τk) = ↑ ∧ e(τk) = e]
That is immediate from Lemma 32.
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Case UniOR:
Similar to rule UniOI
Case APer:
(45) A =
n ∈ Correct→ ◇(n ● ⊺  per)
From Definition 6 on [4], [5] and [45], we need to show that:∀n. n ∈ N ∧∀i. ¬(n(τ(i)) = n ∧ d(τ(i)) = [] ∧ e(τ(i)) = fail)→∀j. ∃k ≥ j.
n(τk) = n ∧ d(τk) = [] ∧ o(τk) =  ∧ e(τk) = per
This is proved using Lemma 13 on [6].
Case Node:
(46) A =
 n ∈ N
From Definition 6 on [4], [5] and [46], we need to show that:∀i. n(τ(i)) ∈ N
This is proved using Lemma 33.
Corollary 2.
For all Γ, A, S, c and S ′ such that S = stack(c,S ′), if ⊧S Γ and Γ ⊢c A, then ⊧S A.
Proof.
Assumption:
(1) ⊧S Γ
(2) Γ ⊢c A
Conclusion:⊧S A
From Definition 4 on [1]
(3) ∀m ∈M(S). m ⊧ A
From Theorem 2 on [2], we have
(4) Γ ⊧S A
From Definition 5 on [4], we have
(5) ∀m ∈M(S). m ⊧ Γ→m ⊧ A
From [3] and [5], we have
(6) ∀m ∈M(S). m ⊧ A
From Definition 4 on [6], we have⊧S A
Lemma 4.
Only steps in a node change the state for that node.
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∀W1,W2, τ, n, n′, d, o, σ, σ′.
W1
τÐ→∗ W2 ∧
Let (n, , d, o, , σ, σ′, , ) ∈ τ
d′ = {d if o = ↓ ∨ o =  
tail(d) else
n′ ≠ n→ σ′(d′)(n′) = σ(d′)(n′)
Proof.
Immediate from induction on steps.
Lemma 5.
The post-state of every event is the same as the pre-state of its next event.∀W1,W2, τ, j.
W1
τÐ→∗ W2→
σ′(τ(j)) = σ(τ(j + 1)
Proof.
Immediate from induction on steps.
Lemma 6.
Only the self events change the top-level state.∀W1,W2, τ, d, o, σ, σ′.
W1
τÐ→∗ W2 ∧
Let ( , , d, o, , σ, σ′, , ) ∈ τ¬mself(d, o)→
σ′([]) = σ([])
Proof.
Immediate from induction on steps.
Lemma 7.
The transitions
τÐ→t, τÐ→req, τÐ→ind, and τÐ→per preserve messages.∀σ,σ′,ms,ms′, f, f ′, r, r′, τ.(σ,ms, f, r) τÐ→∗t (σ′,ms′, f ′, r′) ∨(σ,ms, f, r) τÐ→∗req (σ′,ms′) ∨(σ,ms, f, r) τÐ→∗ind (σ′,ms′) ∨(σ,ms, f, r) τÐ→∗per (σ′,ms′)→
ms ⊆ms′
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Proof.
Immediate from induction on steps.
Lemma 8.
If a node is failed, it remains failed.∀σ,σ′,ms,ms′, f, f ′, r, r′, τ, n.[(σ,ms, f, r) τÐ→∗ (σ′,ms′, f ′, r′) ∨(σ,ms, f, r) τÐ→∗t (σ′,ms′, f ′, r′) ∨(σ,ms, f, r) τÐ→p (σ′,ms′, f ′, r′)] ∧
n ∈ f→
n ∈ f ′
Proof.
Immediate from Definition 9 and induction on steps.
Lemma 9.
If a node is failed, it does not take any step.∀σ,σ′,ms,ms′, f, f ′, r, r′, τ, n.[(σ,ms, f, r) τÐ→∗ (σ′,ms′, f ′, r′) ∨(σ,ms, f, r) τÐ→∗t (σ′,ms′, f ′, r′) ∨(σ,ms, f, r) τÐ→p (σ′,ms′, f ′, r′) ∨(σ,ms, f, r) τÐ→req (σ′,ms′) ∨(σ,ms, f, r) τÐ→ind (σ′,ms′) ∨(σ,ms, f, r) τÐ→per (σ′,ms′)] ∧
n /∈ N ∨ n ∈ f→/∃ j. n(τ(j)) = n ∧
Proof.
Immediate from Definition 9, induction on steps and Lemma 8.
Lemma 10.
If a node is not failed, it takes a periodic step on a p step.∀σ,σ′,ms,ms′, f, f ′, r, r′, τ, n.(σ,ms, f, r) τÐ→p (σ′,ms′, f ′, r′)
n ∈ N ∖ f→∃i. n(τ(i)) = n ∧ d(τ(i)) = [] ∧ o(τ(i)) =  ∧ e(τ(i)) = per
Proof.
Immediate from the definition of the rules rule Periodic and rule Per.
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Lemma 11.
If a node takes steps, it is not failed.∀σ,ms, f, r, τ, n.(σ,ms, f, r) τÐ→∗ ∧
mcorrect(τ, n)→
n ∈ N ∖ f
Proof.
Contra-positive is proved using induction on the steps and using Lemma 9 and Lemma 8.
Lemma 12.
If a node is in the failed set, it has failed before.∀σ,ms, f, r, τ, n.
w0(S) τÐ→∗(σ,ms, f, r) ∧
n ∈ f→∃i. n(τ(i)) = n ∧ d(τ(i)) = [] ∧ e(τ(i)) = fail
Proof.
By induction on the steps.
Lemma 13.
For all S and τ ,
w0(S) τÐ→∗ ∧ n ∈ N∀i. ¬(n(τ(i)) = n ∧ d(τ(i)) = [] ∧ e(τ(i)) = fail)→∀j. ∃k ≥ j.
n(τk) = n ∧ d(τk) = [] ∧ o(τk) =  ∧ e(τk) = per
Proof.
We assume
(1) w0(S) τÐ→∗
(2) n ∈ N
We prove the contra-positive that is
(3) ∃j. /∃ k ≥ j.
n(τk) = n ∧ d(τk) = [] ∧ o(τk) =  ∧ e(τk) = per→∃i. n(τ(i)) = n ∧ d(τ(i)) = [] ∧ e(τ(i)) = fail
We assume
(4) ∃j. /∃ k ≥ j.
n(τk) = n ∧ d(τk) = [] ∧ o(τk) =  ∧ e(τk) = per→
By Definition 9 on [1]
(5) τ = τ ′i ⋅ τi
51
(6) W1 = w0(S)
(7) Wi
τ ′iÐ→∗t W ′i τiÐ→p Wi+1
From [4], [5],
(8) ∃i. ∀` ∈ τi.¬(n(`) = n ∧ d(`) = [] ∧ o(`) =  ∧ e(`) = per)
By the contra-positive of Lemma 10 on [7], [2] and [8]
(9) n ∈ f(W ′i )
By Lemma 12 on [7], [5], and [9]∃i. n(τ(i)) = n ∧ d(τ(i)) = [] ∧ e(τ(i)) = fail
Lemma 14.∀τ, τ ′, i, j.
τ ′ = τ ∣mself ∧
τ ′(i) = τ(j) →(τ ′, i, I) ⊧ A ↔ (τ, j, I) ⊧ restrict(self,A)
where ◯ and s are not used in A.
Proof.
Similar to Lemma 36.
Lemma 15.
A message is not added to the message set unless it is sent.∀σ,σ′,ms,ms′, f, f ′, r, r′, τ, n, n′, d,m.(n,n′, d,m) /∈ms ∧[(σ,ms, f, r) τÐ→∗t (σ′,ms′, f ′, r′) ∨(σ,ms, f, r) τÐ→∗req (σ′,ms′) ∨(σ,ms, f, r) τÐ→∗ind (σ′,ms′) ∨(σ,ms, f, r) τÐ→∗per (σ′,ms′)] ∧(∀i, ¬(n(τ(i)) = n ∧ d(τ(i)) = d ∧ o(τ(i)) =↓ ∧e(τ(i)) = sendl(n′,m)))→(n,n′, d,m) /∈ms′
Proof.
Immediate from induction on steps.
Lemma 16.∀W1,W2, n, n′, d,m.
W1
τÐ→p W2 ∧(∀i.¬(n(τ(i)) = n ∧ d(τ(i)) = d ∧ o(τ(i)) =↓ ∧e(τ(i)) = sendl(n′,m)))→(n,n′, d,m) /∈ ms(W2)
Proof.
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By the definition of the transition →p and Lemma 15.
Lemma 17.∀W1,W2, τ, τ1, τ2, n, n′, d,m.
W1
τ1Ð→∗t τ2Ð→p W2 ∧
τ = τ1 ⋅ τ2 ∧(n,n′, d,m) /∈ ms(W1) ∧(∀i.¬(n(τ(i)) = n ∧ d(τ(i)) = d ∧ o(τ(i)) =↓ ∧e(τ(i)) = sendl(n′,m)))→(n,n′, d,m) /∈ ms(W2)
Proof.
By Lemma 15 and Lemma 16.
Lemma 18.∀σ,σ′,ms,ms′, f, r, r′, τ, n, n′, d,m.(n,n′, d,m) /∈ms ∧[(σ,ms, f, r) τÐ→∗t (σ′,ms′, f ′, r′) ∨(σ,ms, f, r) τÐ→∗req (σ′,ms′) ∨(σ,ms, f, r) τÐ→∗ind (σ′,ms′) ∨(σ,ms, f, r) τÐ→∗per (σ′,ms′)] ∧→(∀i.¬(n(τ(i)) = n′ ∧ d(τ(i)) = d ∧ o(τ(i)) = ↑ ∧e(τ(i)) = deliverl(n,m)))
Proof.
Immediate from induction on steps.
Lemma 19.∀W1,W2, n, n′, d,m.
W1
τÐ→p W2 ∧(n,n′, d,m) /∈ ms(W1) ∧→(∀i.¬(n(τ(i)) = n′ ∧ d(τ(i)) = d ∧ o(τ(i)) = ↑ ∧e(τ(i)) = deliverl(n,m)))
Proof.
By the definition of the transition →p and Lemma 18.
Lemma 20.∀W1,W2, τ, τ1, τ2, n, n′, d,m.
W1
τ1Ð→∗t τ2Ð→p W2 ∧
τ = τ1 ⋅ τ2 ∧
53
(n,n′, d,m) /∈ ms(W1)(∀i.¬(n(τ(i)) = n ∧ d(τ(i)) = d ∧ o(τ(i)) =↓ ∧e(τ(i)) = sendl(n′,m)))→(∀i.¬(n(τ(i)) = n′ ∧ d(τ(i)) = d ∧ o(τ(i)) = ↑ ∧e(τ(i)) = deliverl(n,m)))
Proof.
By Lemma 18 and then Lemma 15 and Lemma 19.
Lemma 21.∀W1,W2, τ, τ1, τ2, n, n′, d,m.
W1
τ1Ð→∗t τ2Ð→p W2 ∧
τ = τ1 ⋅ τ2 ∧(n,n′, d,m) /∈ ms(W1) ∧(∀i.¬(n(τ(i)) = n ∧ d(τ(i)) = d ∧ o(τ(i)) =↓ ∧e(τ(i)) = sendl(n′,m)))→(n,n′, d,m) /∈ ms(W2) ∧(∀i.¬(n(τ(i)) = n′ ∧ d(τ(i)) = d ∧ o(τ(i)) = ↑ ∧e(τ(i)) = deliverl(n,m)))
Proof.
By Lemma 17 and Lemma 20.
Lemma 22.∀W1, τ, n, n′, d,m.
W1
τÐ→∗ ∧(n,n′, d,m) /∈ ms(W1) ∧(∀i.¬(n(τ(i)) = n ∧ d(τ(i)) = d ∧ o(τ(i)) =↓ ∧e(τ(i)) = sendl(n′,m)))→(∀i.¬(n(τ(i)) = n′ ∧ d(τ(i)) = d ∧ o(τ(i)) = ↑ ∧e(τ(i)) = deliverl(n,m)))
Proof.
By Definition 9, induction on the steps and Lemma 21.
Lemma 23.∀W1,W2, τ, τ1, τ2, n, n′, d,m.
W1
τ1Ð→p W2 τ2Ð→∗ ∧
τ = τ1 ⋅ τ2 ∧(∀i.¬(n(τ(i)) = n ∧ d(τ(i)) = d ∧ o(τ(i)) =↓ ∧e(τ(i)) = sendl(n′,m)))→(∀i.¬(n(τ(i)) = n′ ∧ d(τ(i)) = d ∧ o(τ(i)) = ↑ ∧e(τ(i)) = deliverl(n,m)))
Proof.
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By Lemma 16 and Lemma 22.
Lemma 24.∀W,τ,n,n′, d,m.
W
τÐ→∗ ∧(∃j. ∀i ≥ j.¬(n(τ(i)) = n ∧ d(τ(i)) = d ∧ o(τ(i)) =↓ ∧e(τ(i)) = sendl(n′,m)))→(∃j. ∀i ≥ j.¬(n(τ(i)) = n′ ∧ d(τ(i)) = d ∧ o(τ(i)) = ↑ ∧e(τ(i)) = deliverl(n,m)))
Proof.
By Definition 9 and Lemma 23.
Lemma 25.∀S,W, τ, n, n′, d,m, i.
w0(S) τÐ→∗ W ∧(∀i.¬(n(τ(i)) = n ∧ d(τ(i)) = d ∧ o(τ(i)) =↓ ∧e(τ(i)) = sendl(n′,m)))→(n,n′, d,m) /∈ ms(W )
Proof.
By Definition 9, induction on the steps and Lemma 21.
Lemma 26.∀S,W,W ′, τ1, τ2, τ, n, n′, d,m, i.
w0(S) τ1Ð→∗ W τ2Ð→∗t W ′ ∧
τ = τ1 ⋅ τ2 ∧(∀i.¬(n(τ(i)) = n ∧ d(τ(i)) = d ∧ o(τ(i)) =↓ ∧e(τ(i)) = sendl(n′,m)))→(n,n′, d,m) /∈ ms(W ′)
Proof.
By Lemma 25 and Lemma 15.
Lemma 27.∀S, τ, n, n′, d,m, i.
w0(S) τÐ→∗ ∧(∀j ≤ i.¬(n(τ(j)) = n ∧ d(τ(j)) = d ∧ o(τ(j)) =↓ ∧e(τ(j)) = sendl(n′,m))→¬(n(τ(i)) = n′ ∧ d(τ(i)) = d ∧ o(τ(i)) = ↑ ∧e(τ(i)) = deliverl(n,m)))
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Proof.
By Definition 9, we consider two cases:
Case 1: The index i is in a Ð→t transition.
(1) w0(S) τ1Ð→∗ W ′ τ2Ð→∗t W ′′
(2) τ = τ1 ⋅ τ2
(3) ∣τ1∣ ≤ i < ∣τ1∣ + ∣τ2∣
Immediate from Lemma 18.
Case 2: The index i is in a Ð→p transition.
(4) w0(S) τ1Ð→∗ W ′ τ2Ð→∗t W ′′ τ3Ð→p W ′′′
(5) τ = τ1 ⋅ τ2
(6) ∣τ1∣ + ∣τ2∣ ≤ i < ∣τ1∣ + ∣τ2∣ + ∣τ3∣
Immediate from Lemma 26 and Lemma 19.
Definition 15.
We instrument the transition system with event ID (ei), parent ID (pi) and child index (ci).
The event ID ei uniquely identifies events in a trace.
The parent ID pi is the ID of the event that issued the event.
The child index ci for an event is the index of that event in the list of events that its parent event
issued. For example, if a parent event issues the list of request events [e1, e2, e3], then the child
index of e2 is 1. Similarly, if a parent event issues the list of indication events [e3, e4, e5], then the
child index of e4 is 1.
To create unique IDs, a counter ei is added to the state of the transition system and the counter is
weaved through the rules.
As an example, the rule Req is updated as follows:
The state of the transition system includes the counter ei:(s,ms, f, ei)
The events include the event ID ei, the parent ID pi and the child index ci:(ei, pi, ci, , , , , , , , , )
We use the functions ei, pi and ci to extract the corresponding components of an event.
As the counter in the pre-state is ei, the event id of the main event is ei+ 1 and the updated counter
is passed in the pre-state to the next transition for the issued request event.
The parent Id of the issued indication and request events is ei + 1.
Let us recall that in the interest of simplicity, the rules show only one issued request event and one
issued indication event.
The child index of the issued indication and request events is 0.
Req
n ∈ N ∖ f S(d) = (c, ) σ(d) = s
requestc(n, s(n), e) = (s′n, [(i, e1)], [e2])
s′ = s[n↦ s′n] σ′ = σ[d↦ s′](σ′,ms, f, r, ei + 1) τ1Ð→req (σ1,ms1, ei′) τ1 = ( , ei + 1,0, n, r, i ∶∶ d, ↓, e1, , , , ) ⋅ τ ′1(σ1,ms1, f, r, ei′) τ2Ð→ind (σ2,ms2, ei′′) τ2 = ( , ei + 1,0, n, r, d, ↑, e2, , , , ) ⋅ τ ′2
τ = (ei + 1, , , n, d, ↓, e, σ, σ′, (i, e1), e2) ⋅ τ1 ⋅ τ2(σ,ms, f, r, ei) τÐ→req (σ2,ms2, ei′′)
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It is easy to show that there is a bi-simulation between the original and the instrumented transition
system.
Lemma 28.
Based on Definition 15, the event ID uniquely identifies events.∀S, τ, i, j
w0(S) τÐ→∗ ∧
ei(τ(i)) = ei(τ(j)) →
i = j
Proof.
By the invariants:
In every transition, the event ID in the post-state is greater than the event ID in the pre-state.
The ID of every event in a trace is greater than the ID passed in the pre-state of the transitions.
Straightforward induction on the steps.
Lemma 29.
Based on Definition 15, the parent ID, child index and the event orientation uniquely identify
events.∀S, τ, i, j.
w0(S) τÐ→∗ ∧
pi(τ(i)) = pi(τ(j)) ∧
ci(τ(i)) = ci(τ(j)) ∧
o(τ(i)) = o(τ(j)) →
i = j
Proof.
By the invariants:
In every transition, the event ID in the post-state is greater than the event ID in the pre-state.
The ID of every event in a trace is greater than the ID passed in the pre-state of the transitions.
The event ID in the pre-state is greater than or equal to the child ID of the first event in the trace.
The event ID of every event is greater than its parent ID.
In the trace of every transition, the parent ID of the first event is less than the parent ID of later
events.
Straightforward induction on the steps.
Lemma 30.
Based on Definition 15, the parent ID and the child index of an event point back to the origin of
that event.∀S, τ, i.
w0(S) τÐ→∗ ∧
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d(τ(i)) = [] ∧
o(τ(i)) = ↑ →
ois(τ(pi(τ(i))))(ci(τ(i))) = e(τ(i)) ∧
n(τ(pi(τ(i)))) = n(τ(i)) ∧
mself(τ(pi(τ(i))))
Proof.
Straightforward induction on the steps.
Lemma 31.
If an event is issued only once, every executed event that matches it has the same parent ID and
child index.∀S, τ, i, j, e, n, d.∃k.
w0(S) τÐ→∗ ∧
occ(ois(τ(i)), e) ≤ 1 ∧∀k ≠ i. (n(τk) = n ∧mself(τk))→ e /∈ ois(τk) ∧
n(τ(j)) = n ∧
d(τ(j)) = [] ∧
o(τ(j)) = ↑ ∧
e(τ(j)) = e →
pi(τ(j)) = i ∧
ci(τ(j)) = k
Proof.
Immediate from Lemma 30.
Lemma 32.∀S, τ, i, j, k, e, n, d.
w0(S) τÐ→∗ ∧
occ(ois(τ(i)), e) ≤ 1 ∧∀k ≠ i. (n(τk) = n ∧mself(τk))→ e /∈ ois(τk) ∧
n(τ(j)) = n ∧
d(τ(j)) = [] ∧
o(τ(j)) = ↑ ∧
e(τ(j)) = e ∧
k ≠ j →¬[n(τk) = n ∧ d(τk) = [] ∧ o(τk) = ↑ ∧ e(τk) = e]
Proof.
Immediate from Lemma 31.
Lemma 33.∀W,W ′, τ, i.
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W
τÐ→∗W ′→
n(τ(i)) ∈ N
Proof.
By induction on the steps.
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Lemma 34.
The derived rules are sound.
Proof.
Case rule FLoss:
Immediate from GST.
Case rule IRSe:
By the rule IR, definition of self and rule SInv.
self ∧ a⇒ b
self⇒ a→ b
(self→ a→ b)
s (a→ b)
s (a⇒ b)
Case rule PeSe:
Similar to rule IRSe.
By the rule Pe, definition of self and rule SInv.
Case rule IISe:
Similar to rule IRSe.
By the rule II, definition of self and rule SInv.
Case rule ORSe:
By the rule OR, and rule SInv.
Case rule OISe:
By the rule OR, and rule SInv.
Case rule ORSe′:
By the rule OR′, definition of self and rule SInv.
Case rule OISe′:
By the rule OI′, definition of self and rule SInv.
Case rule IROI:
By the rule IR and rule OI.
Case rule IIOI:
By the rule II and rule OI.
Case rule PeOI:
By the rule Pe and rule OI.
Case rule IROR:
By the rule IR and rule OR.
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Case rule IIOR:
By the rule II and rule OR.
Case rule PeOR:
By the rule Pe and rule OR.
Case rule IROISe to rule PeORSe:
By the rule IROI and rule PeOR and rule SInv.
Case rule APerSe:
By rule APer, rule InvS and rule ASelf.
Case rule UniORSe:
By the rule UniOR and rule SInv.
Case rule UniOISe:
By the rule UniOI and rule SInv.
Case rule CSelf:
By the definition of self.
Case rule SEqSe:
By rule SEq and rule SInv.
Case rule InvSe:
First proving (self→ A), by the definition of self,
distributing ∨ over →, using A ∧A′ → A ∨A′, Lemma 84, and
rule ∧r.
Then using rule ASelf and Lemma 79.
Case rule InvSe′:
Similar to the proof of rule InvSe′. Instead of (self→ A),
we first prove (self ∧ ˆA→ A).
At the end, we use Lemma 110.
Case rule InvUSe:
Using rule InvSe′ and rule IRSe, rule IISe, and rule PeSe.
Case rule InvMSe:
By rule InvSe′ by instantiating A to A ∧A′ and Lemma 93.
Case rule InvMSe′:
By rule InvUSe by instantiating A to A ∧A′ and Lemma 93.
Case rule InvLSe:
By rule InvUSe and rule Gen.
Case rule InvL:
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By rule InvLSe and rule SInv.
Case rule InvUSSe:
By Lemma 82 with p instantiated to S(s(n)).
Then using rule PostPre to convert ◯ s(n) to s′(n).
Then case analysis on whether n = n.
Then rule SEqSe for n ≠ n and rule InvUSe for n = n.
Case rule InvUSSe′:
By rule InvUSSe′, Lemma 83 and rule Init.
Case rule InvSSe:
By rule InvUSSe and rule Gen.
Case rule InvS:
By rule InvSSe and rule SInv.
Case rule InvSSe′:
By rule InvSSe, Lemma 83 and rule Init.
Case rule InvS′:
By rule InvSSe′, and rule SInv.
Case rule InvSSe′′:
By rule InvSSe, Lemma 81, rule PostPre.
Case rule InvS′′:
By rule InvSSe′′, and rule SInv.
Case rule InvSASe:
We have
(1) ¬S(initc(n))
By rule InvLSe withA instantiated to n ● ¬S(s(n)) ∧ S(s′(n)))→ A,
we have
(2) ⊢c s [(n ● ¬S(s(n)) ∧ S(s′(n)))⇒ A]
We need to show that⊢c s (S(s(n))⇒ xˆA)
We show the contra-positive that is⊢c s (ˆ¬A⇒ ¬S(s(n)))
By rule Init and [1]
(3) ⊢c s ¬S(s(n))
The contra-positive of [2] is
(4) ⊢c s [(¬A⇒ n ≠ n ∨ S(s(n)) ∨ ¬S(s′(n)))]
that is
(5) ⊢c s [(¬A⇒ (n ≠ n ∨ ¬S(s(n))→ ¬S(s′(n))))]
By rule SEqSe and [5]
(6) ⊢c s [(¬A⇒
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(¬S(s(n))→ ¬S(s′(n))) ∨ ¬S(s(n))→ ¬S(s′(n))))]
that is
(7) ⊢c s [(¬A⇒ ¬S(s(n))→ ¬S(s′(n))))]
By rule PostPre and [7]
(8) ⊢c s [(¬A⇒ (¬S(s(n))→ ◯¬S(s(n))))]
By Lemma 103, we have
(9) ⊢c s [(¬S(s(n))→(ˆ((¬S(s(n))⇒ ◯ (¬S(s(n)))⇒ ¬S(s(n))]
By [9] and [3]
(10) ⊢c s [(ˆ((¬S(s(n))⇒ ◯ (¬S(s(n)))⇒ ¬S(s(n))]
By [8] and [10]⊢c s [(ˆ¬A⇒ ¬S(s(n))]
Case rule InvSA:
By rule InvSASe, and rule SInv.
Case rule InvMSIASe:
By rule InvSe on the assumptions, we have⊢c s ˆA ∧ (∀x. S(s(n))→ xˆA′)]⇒A ∧ (∀x. S(s′(n))→xA′)
By Lemma 110, we have⊢c A
By rule PostPre, Lemma 114 and Axiom 18, we have⊢c s (∀x. S(s(n))→ xˆA′)⇒◯ (∀x. S(s(n))→ xˆA′)
By Lemma 82⊢c s (∀x. S(s(n))→ xˆA′)⇒ (∀x. S(s(n))→ xˆA′)
From the assumption ∀x.¬S(initc(n)) and rule Init⊢c s (∀x. S(s(n))→ xˆA′)
By Lemma 97⊢c s (∀x. S(s(n))→ xˆA′)
Case rule ASASe:
Assumption:
(11) ⊢c s A⇒ S(s′(n))
(12) ⊢c s S(s(n))⇒ A′
We prove⊢c s A⇒ ˆA′
By rule PostPre on [11],
(13) ⊢c s A⇒ ◯S(s(n))
By Lemma 81 (◯M) on [12]
(14) ⊢c s ◯S(s(n))⇒ ˆA′
By Lemma 80 (⇒T) on [13] and [14],⊢c s A⇒ ˆA′
Case rule ASA:
By rule ASASe, and rule SInv.
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Case rule APerSA:
By rule APer, and rule Pe.
Case rule Quorum:
Let
(15) Γ = ∣Correct∣ > t1; N ⊆ N; ∣N ∣ > t2; t1 + t2 ≥ ∣N∣
We show that
Γ ⊢c ∃n. n ∈ N ∧ n ∈ Correct
We have
(16) Γ ⊢c Correct ⊆ N
From [15]
(17) Γ ⊢c ∣Correct∣ > t1
(18) Γ ⊢c N ⊆ N
(19) Γ ⊢c ∣N ∣ > t2
(20) Γ ⊢c ∣t1 + t2∣ ≥ ∣N∣
From set theory
(21) Γ ⊢c ∀S1, S2, S. S1 ⊆ S ∧ S1 ⊆ S → S1 ∪ S2 ⊆ S
By [21] on [16] and [18]
(22) Γ ⊢c Correct ∪N ⊆ N
From set theory
(23) Γ ⊢c ∀S1, S2. S1 ⊆ S2 → ∣S1∣ ≤ ∣S2∣
By [23] on [22]
(24) Γ ⊢c ∣Correct ∪N ∣ ≤ ∣N∣
From [17], [19], [24], and [20]
(25) ∣Correct∣ + ∣N ∣ − ∣Correct ∪N ∣ > 0
From set theory
(26) Γ ⊢c ∀S1, S2. ∣S1 ∪ S2∣ = ∣S1∣ + ∣S2∣ − ∣S1 ∩ S2∣
that is
(27) Γ ⊢c ∀S1, S2. ∣S1 ∩ S2∣ = ∣S1∣ + ∣S2∣ − ∣S1 ∪ S2∣
By [27] on [25]
(28) Γ ⊢c ∣Correct ∩N ∣ > 0
From set theory
(29) Γ ⊢c ∀S. ∣S∣ > 0↔ S ≠ ∅
By [29] on [28]
(30) Γ ⊢c Correct ∩N ≠ ∅
From set theory
(31) Γ ⊢c ∀S. S = ∅↔/∃ s. s ∈ S
By contrapositive of [31] on [30]
(32) Γ ⊢c ∃n. n ∈ Correct ∩N
From set theory
(33) Γ ⊢c ∀S1, S2.∀s. s ∈ S1 ∩ S2 ↔ s ∈ S1 ∧ s ∈ S2
By contrapositive of [33] on [32]
(34) Γ ⊢c ∃n. n ∈ Correct ∧ n ∈ N
Thus, we showed that∣Correct∣ > t1; N ⊆ N; ∣N ∣ > t2; t1 + t2 ≥ ∣N∣ ⊢c
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∃n. n ∈ N ∧ n ∈ Correct
By rule →r, we have∣Correct∣ > t1 ⊢c
N ⊆ N ∧ ∣N ∣ > t2 ∧ t1 + t2 ≥ ∣N∣→ ∃n. n ∈ N ∧ n ∈ Correct
As the assertion is non-temporal, we have∣Correct∣ > t1 ⊢c
N ⊆ N ∧ ∣N ∣ > t2 ∧ t1 + t2 ≥ ∣N∣⇒ ∃n. n ∈ N ∧ n ∈ Correct
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5.2 Composition
Lemma 1.
For all τ ∈ T (stack(c,S)) there exists τ ′ ∈ T (Si) such that τ ∣d⊇[i] = push(i, τ ′)
Proof. Induction on the transition steps of the network semantic (Figure 14) for τ :
The trace τ ′ on Si with state (σ′,ms′, f, r) is inductively build from the trace τ on stack(c,S) with
the state (σ,ms, f, r).
σ′ = λd. σ(i ∶∶ d) and
ms′ = {(n,n′, d,m) ∣ (n,n′, i ∶∶ d,m) ∈ms}
The induction hypothesis is strengthened with the fact∀d. σ(i ∶∶ d) = σ′(d)
that is the state of the substack i of S is the same as the state of Si.
On every step j of τ on (σ,ms, f, r):
(1) If the step is not in substack i that is d(τ(j)) /⊇ [i], no step ( step) is taken for τ ′.
(2) If the step is in substack i that is τ(j) = (n, r, i ∶∶ d, o, e, s, s′, ors, ois), a corresponding step(n, r, d, o, e, s∣d⊇[i], s′∣d⊇[i], ors, ois) can be applied to (σ′,ms′, f ′, r′). Note that all the elements
except d and the states of the two events are the same. The state s∣d⊇[i] is a projection over s for
locations that are an extension of [i].
Corollary 2.
For all c, Si and m ∈M(stack(c,Si), there exists m′ ∈M(Si) such that m∣d⊇[i] = push(i,m′)
Proof. Immediate from Definition 12 and Corollary 2.
Lemma 2. For all m, A[] and i,
m ⊧ A[] →
push(i,m) ⊧ push(i,A[])
Proof. Immediate from induction on the structure of A[].
Definition 16 (Expanding a Model).
ext((τ, j, I), i) , {(τ ′′, j′′, I) ∣∃τ ′. ∀j. d(τ ′(j)) /⊇ [i] ∧ τ ′′ ∈ interleave(τ, τ ′) ∧ τ ′′(j′′) = τ(j)}
We assume that events of a trace are unique. Uniqueness of events can be simply provided by
the semantics with separate counters in nodes.
Lemma 3.
For all m, i, m′ and I[i],
m ⊧ I[i] ∧
m′ ∈ extend(i,m)→
m′ ⊧ restrict(d = [i],I[i]).
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Proof.
Let
(1) I[i] = A[i]
We assume that
(2) m ⊧ A[i]
(3) m′ ∈ extend(i,m)
We show that
m′ ⊧ restrict(d = [i],A[i])
From Definition 8 (the definition of extend), on [3], there exists τ , τ ′ and I such that
(4) m = (τ,0, I)
(5) m′ = (τ ′′,0, I)
(6) ∀j. d(τ ′(j)) /⊇ [i]
(7) τ ′′ ∈ interleave(τ, τ ′)
From [5], we need to show that(τ ′′,0, I) ⊧ restrict(d = [i],A[i])
From Definition 3 (layering of assertions), we need to show that(τ ′′,0, I) ⊧ (d = [i]→ restrict(d = [i],A[i]))
From Definition 6 (the definition of the models relation), we need to show that(τ ′′, k′′, I) ⊧ (d = [i]→ restrict(d = [i],A[i])) forall k′′ ≥ 0
By [7], let j′′ be the index where the element at index 0 of τ appears i.e.
(8) τ ′′(j′′) = τ(0)
We consider two cases:
Case:
(9) k′′ < j′′
From [7], [9], [8], and [6],
(10) d(τ ′′(k′′)) ≠ [i]
Therefore, the following assertion is trivially holds(τ ′′, k′′, I) ⊧ (d = [i]→ restrict(d = [i],A[i]))
Case:
(11) k′′ ≥ j′′
From Definition 16 (the definition of ext), on [6], [7] and [8],
(12) (τ ′′, j′′, I) ∈ ext(i, (τ,0, I))
From [12] and [4],
(13) (τ ′′, j′′, I) ∈ ext(i,m)
By Lemma 35 on [2], [13]
(14) (τ ′′, j′′, I) ⊧ restrict(d = [i],A[i])
From Definition 3 (layering of assertions) on [14]
(15) (τ ′′, j′′, I) ⊧ (d = [i]→ restrict(d = [i],A[i]))
From Definition 6 (the definition of the models relation) on [15]
(16) (τ ′′, k′′, I) ⊧ (d = [i]→ restrict(d = [i],A[i]))
forall k′′ ≥ j′′
From [16] and [11]
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(τ ′′, k′′, I) ⊧ (d = [i]→ restrict(d = [i],A[i]))
Lemma 35.
For all m, i, m′ and A[i],
m ⊧ A[i] ∧
m′ ∈ ext(i,m) →
m′ ⊧ restrict(d = [i],A[i])
Proof.
Immediate from Lemma 36.
Lemma 36. For all m, i, A[i], and m′,
if m′ ∈ ext(i,m), then
m ⊧ A[i] ↔ m′ ⊧ restrict(d = [i],A[i])
Proof.
We assume that
(1) m′ ∈ ext(i,m)
From Definition 16 (the definition of ext), on [1], we have
(2) m = (τ, j, I)
(3) m′ = (τ ′′, j′′, I)
(4) ∀j. d(τ ′(j)) /⊇ [i]
(5) τ ′′ ∈ interleave(τ, τ ′)
(6) τ ′′(j′′) = τ(j)
We show that
m ⊧ A[i]
if and only if
m′ ⊧ restrict(d ⊇ [i],A[i])
Induction on the structure of A[i]
Case n = t1 ∧ d = d′ ∧ o = t2 ∧ e = t3 d′ ⊇ [i]:
The forward direction:
We assume that
(7) m ⊧ n = t1 ∧ d = d′ ∧ o = t2 ∧ e = t3 d′ ⊇ [i]
We show that
m′ ⊧ restrict(d ⊇ [i],n = t1 ∧ d = d′ ∧ o = t2 ∧ e = t3)
From Definition 6 (the definition of the models relation),
on [2] and [7]
(8) m ⊧ t1 ∶ v1
(9) m ⊧ t2 ∶ v2
(10) m ⊧ t3 ∶ v3
(11) n(τ(j)) = v1
(12) d(τ(j)) = d′ d′ ⊇ [i]
(13) o(τ(j)) = v2
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(14) e(τ(j)) = v3
From [2], [3] and [6] on [11], [12], [13] and [14]
(15) m′ ⊧ t1 ∶ v1
(16) m′ ⊧ t2 ∶ v2
(17) m′ ⊧ t3 ∶ v3
(18) n(τ ′′(j′′) = v1
(19) d(τ ′′(j′′)) = d′ d′ ⊇ [i]
(20) o(τ ′′(j′′)) = v2
(21) e(τ ′′(j′′)) = v3
From Definition 6 (the definition of the models relation),
on [15] to [21]
(22) m′ ⊧ (n = n ∧ d = d′ ∧ o = o ∧ e = e) d′ ⊇ [i]
From Definition 3, (layering of assertions)
(23) restrict(d ⊇ [i],n = n ∧ d = d′ ∧ o = o ∧ e = e) =
n = n ∧ d = d′ ∧ o = o ∧ e = e
From [22], [23]
m′ ⊧ restrict(d = [i],n = n ∧ d = d′ ∧ o = o ∧ e = e)
The backward direction is similar.
Case A[i]1 ∧A[i]2 :
Immediate from the induction hypothesis.
Case ¬A[i]:
Forward direction Immediate from the backward
direction of the induction hypothesis and vice versa.
Case A[i]:
The forward direction:
We assume that
(24) m ⊧ A[i]
We show that
m′ ⊧ restrict(d = [i],A[i])
From Definition 3 (layering of assertions), we show that
m′ ⊧ (d = [i]→ restrict(d = [i],A[i]))
From Definition 6 (the definition of the models relation),
on [3], we show that(τ ′′, k′′, I) ⊧ (d = [i]→ restrict(d = [i],A[i]))
forall k′′ ≥ j′′
From Definition 6 (the definition of the models relation),
on [2] and [24]
(25) (τ, k, I) ⊧ A[i] forall k ≥ j
For all k′′, such that
(26) k′′ ≥ j′′
We consider two cases:
Case:
(27) d(τ ′′(k′′)) ≠ [i]
The assertion is trivially true.
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(τ ′′, k′′, I) ⊧ (d = [i]→ restrict(d = [i],A[i]))
Case:
(28) d(τ ′′( k′′)) = [i]
We need to show that(τ ′′, k′′, I) ⊧ restrict(d = [i],A[i])
From [5], [4], and [6] on [28] and [26],
there exists k, such that
(29) k ≥ j
(30) τ ′′(k′′) = τk
From [25] and [29]
(31) (τ, k, I) ⊧ A[i]
From [4], [5] and [30],
(32) (τ ′′, k′′, I) ∈ ext(i, (τ, k, I))
By the induction hypothesis on [31] and [32],(τ ′′, k′′, I) ⊧ restrict(d = [i],A[i])
The backward direction is similar.
Other cases are similar.
Theorem 1 (Composition).
For all S, c, and Si,S = stack(c,Si) ∧⊧Si I[]i→⊧S lower(i,I[]i )
Proof.
We assume that
(1) S = stack(c,Si)
(2) ⊧Si I[]i
We show thatS ⊧ lower(i,I[]i )
From Definition 4 on [2]
(3) ∀m′ ∈M(Si). m′ ⊧ I[]i
By Lemma 2 on [3]
(4) ∀m′ ∈M(Si). push(i,m′) ⊧ push(i,I[]i )
By Corollary 2
(5) ∀m ∈M(S). ∃m′ ∈M(Si).
m∣d⊇[i] = push(i,m′)
From [5] and [4]
(6) ∀m ∈M(S). m∣d⊇[i] ⊧ push(i,I[]i )
We have
(7) ∀m ∈M(S). m ∈ extend(i,m∣d⊇[i])
By Lemma 3 on [6] and [7], we have
(8) ∀m ∈M(S). m ⊧ restrict(d = [i],push(i,I[]i ))
From Definition 1 on [8], we have
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(9) ∀m ∈M(S). m ⊧ lower(i,I[]i )
From Definition 4 on [8], we have
(10) ⊧S lower(i,I[]i )
Corollary 1 (Composition Soundness).
For all S, c, and Si,S = stack(c,Si) ∧⊧Si I[]i ∧
lower(i,I[]i ) ⊢c A→⊧S A.
Proof.
We assume that
(1) S = stack(c,Si)
(2) ⊧Si I[]i
(3) lower(i,I[]i ) ⊢c A
We show that⊧S A
From Theorem 1 on [2], we have
(4) ⊧S lower(i,I[]i )
From Corollary 2 on [4] and [3], we have⊧S A
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5.3 Component Verification
5.3.1 Stubborn Links
Theorem 4. (SL1: Stubborn delivery)
If a correct node n sends a message m to a correct node n′, then n′ delivers m infinitely often.
⊢SLC n ∈ Correct ∧ n′ ∈ Correct→(n ● ⊺ ↓ sendsl(n′,m))⇒ ◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliversl(n,m))
Proof.
The proof idea: upon a stubborn link send
request for a message m, m is added to the
sent set. The periodic section of SLC, reissues
a send request for every message in the sent set.
The periodic function executes infinitely often.
Thus, send requests are infinitely often issued
for every messages in the send set. By the fair-
loss property of the basic link, if a message is
infinitely sent, then it will be infinitely often
delivered. If a basic deliver indication is issued,
then a stubborn link deliver indication is issued
and then eventually executed.
We assume
(1) Γ = n ∈ Correct;n′ ∈ Correct
We prove that
Γ ⊢SLC (n ● ⊺ ↓ sendsl(n′,m))⇒
◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliversl(n,m))
By rule IR,
(2) Γ ⊢SLC (n ● ⊺ ↓ sendsl(n′,m))⇒(self ∧ ⟨n′,m⟩ ∈ s′(n))
By rule InvS′′ with S = λs. ⟨n′,m⟩ ∈ s,
(3) Γ ⊢SLC (self ∧ ⟨n′,m⟩ ∈ s′(n))⇒
ˆ(self⇒ ⟨n′,m⟩ ∈ s(n))
From [2] and [3],
(4) Γ ⊢SLC (n ● ⊺ ↓ sendsl(n′,m))⇒
ˆ(self⇒ ⟨n′,m⟩ ∈ s(n))
By rule APerSA with:
S = λs. ⟨n′,m⟩ ∈ s andA = n ● (0, sendl(n′,m)) ∈ ors ∧ self on [1], we have
(5) Γ ⊢SLC n ∈ Correct→(self⇒ ⟨n′,m⟩ ∈ s(n)) ⇒
◇(n ● (0, sendl(n′,m)) ∈ ors ∧ self)
From [4] and [5], we have
(6) Γ ⊢SLC (n ● ⊺ ↓ sendsl(n′,m)) ⇒
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◇(n ● (0, sendl(n′,m)) ∈ ors ∧ self)
From rule OR,
(7) Γ ⊢SLC (n ● (0, sendl(n,m)) ∈ ors ∧ self)⇒◇(n ● 0 ↓ sendl(n,m))
From [6] and [7],
(8) Γ ⊢SLC (n ● ⊺ ↓ sendsl(n′,m))⇒
◇◇(n ● 0 ↓ sendl(n,m))
From Lemma 87 on [8],
(9) Γ ⊢SLC (n ● ⊺ ↓ sendsl(n′,m))⇒
◇(n ● 0 ↓ sendl(n,m))
By rule FLoss on [1] and [9],
(10) Γ ⊢SLC (n ● ⊺ ↓ sendsl(n′,m))⇒
◇(n′ ● 0 ↓ deliverl(n,m))
From rule IIOI,
(11) Γ ⊢SLC (n′ ● 0 ↓ deliverl(n,m))⇒◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ deliversl(n,m))
From [10] and [11],
(12) Γ ⊢SLC (n ● ⊺ ↓ sendsl(n′,m))⇒
◇◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ deliversl(n,m))
From Lemma 87 and [12]
Γ ⊢SLC (n ● ⊺ ↓ sendsl(n′,m))⇒
◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ deliversl(n,m))
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Theorem 5. (SL2: No-forge)
If a node n delivers a message m with sender n′, then m was previously sent to n by n′.
⊢SLC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliversl(n′,m))  (n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendsl(n,m))
Proof.
The proof idea: If a stubborn link delivery event
is executed, it is issued by a previous basic link
delivery event. By the no-forge property of
basic links, we know that any basic link delivery
event is preceded by a basic link send event. A
basic link send event is only issued by a previous
stubborn link send event.
By rule OI′,
(1) ⊢SLC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliversl(n′,m))⇒x(n ● deliversl(n′,m) ∈ ois ∧ self)
By rule InvL,
(2) ⊢SLC (n ● deliversl(n′,m) ∈ ois ∧ self)⇒(n ● 0 ↑ deliverl(n′,m))
By using [1] and [2],⊢SLC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliversl(n′,m))⇒x(n ● 0 ↑ deliverl(n′,m))
That is,
(3) ⊢SLC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliversl(n′,m))  (n ● 0 ↑ deliverl(n′,m))
By rule NForge,
(4) ⊢SLC (n ● 0 ↑ deliverl(n′,m))  (n′ ● 0 ↓ sendl(n,m))
By Lemma 88 on [3], [4],
(5) ⊢SLC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliversl(n′,m))  (n′ ● 0 ↓ sendl(n,m))
By rule OR′,
(6) ⊢SLC (n′ ● 0 ↓ sendl(n,m))⇒x(n′ ● (0, sendl(n,m)) ∈ ors ∧ self)
By rule InvL,
(7) ⊢SLC (n′ ● (0, sendl(n,m)) ∈ ors ∧ self)⇒(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendsl(n,m))
From [6] and [7],⊢SLC (n′ ● 0 ↓ sendl(n,m))⇒x(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendsl(n,m))
That is,
(8) ⊢SLC (n′ ● 0 ↓ sendl(n,m))  (n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendsl(n,m))
From [5] and [8],⊢SLC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliversl(n′,m))  
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(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendsl(n,m))
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5.3.2 Perfect Links
Definition 17.
Lowering the properties of the stubborn link.
Γ = SL′1,SL′2
SL′1 = lower(0,SL1) =
n ∈ Correct ∧ n′ ∈ Correct→(n ● 0 ↓ sendsl(n′,m))⇒
◇(n′ ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n,m))
SL′2 = lower(0,SL2) =(n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′,m))  (n′ ● 0 ↓ sendsl(n,m))
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Theorem 6. (PL1: Reliable delivery)
If a correct node n sends a message m to a correct node n′, then n′ will eventually deliver m.
Γ ⊢PLC
n ∈ Correct ∧ n′ ∈ Correct→(n ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n′,m) (n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n,m))
where
Γ is defined in Definition 17.
Proof.
The proof idea: As a sendpl event is executed
at the sender, a sendsl event is issued and even-
tually executes. Thus, by the stubborn link,
a deliversl event eventually executes at the re-
ceiver. At the deliversl event, either the sender
and counter pair is already in the current state
or not. (1) If it is not, a deliverpl event is issued
that eventually executes. This is the desired
conclusion. (2) If the counter is already in the
current state, a deliversl event with the same
sender and counter (with potentially a differ-
ent message) has executed in the past that has
issued a deliverpl event that will eventually exe-
cute. There cannot be two deliversl events from
the same sender with the same counter. Thus,
the two deliversl events are the same and carry
the same message. Thus, the deliverpl event that
will be executed is with the sent message.
We assumeA1 = n ∈ Correct ∧ n′ ∈ Correct
Γ′ = Γ;A1
We prove that
Γ′ ⊢PLC (n ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n′,m) (n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n,m))
By rule IR, the definition of request and rule OR, there exists c such that
(1) Γ′ ⊢PLC n ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n′,m)⇒
self ∧ n ● (0, sendsl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩)) ∈ ors ∧◇(n ● 0 ↓ sendsl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩))
From SL′1 and Axiom 1,
(2) Γ′ ⊢PLC n ● 0 ↓ sendsl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩)⇒◇(n′ ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n, ⟨c,m⟩))
By rule Lemma 89 on [1] and [2],
(3) Γ′ ⊢PLC (n ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n′,m))⇒
77
self ∧ n ● (0, sendsl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩)) ∈ ors ∧◇(n′ ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n, ⟨c,m⟩))
By rule Lemma 99 on [3] and Lemma 38,
Γ′ ⊢PLC n ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n′,m)⇒
self ∧ n ● (0, sendsl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩)) ∈ ors ∧◇[◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n,m)) ∨∃m. x[self ∧ (0, sendsl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩)) ∈ ors ∧◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n,m))]]
that is
Γ′ ⊢PLC n ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n′,m)⇒
self ∧ n ● (0, sendsl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩)) ∈ ors ∧(◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n,m)) ∨∃m. xˆ[self ∧ n ● (0, sendsl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩)) ∈ ors ∧◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n,m))] ∨∃m. [self ∧ n ● (0, sendsl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩)) ∈ ors ∧◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n,m))] ∨∃m. ◇ˆ[self ∧ n ● (0, sendsl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩)) ∈ ors ∧◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n,m))])
By Lemma 37
Γ′ ⊢PLC n ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n′,m)⇒
self ∧ n ● (0, sendsl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩)) ∈ ors ∧(◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n,m)) ∨∃m. [self ∧ n ● (0, sendsl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩)) ∈ ors ∧◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n,m))])
Thus,
Γ′ ⊢PLC n ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n′,m)⇒◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n,m))
Lemma 37.
Γ′ ⊢PLC self ∧ n ● (0, sendsl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩)) ∈ ors ⇒
ˆ¬[self ∧ n ● (0, sendsl(n′, ⟨c,m′⟩)) ∈ ors]
ˆ¬[self ∧ n ● (0, sendsl(n′, ⟨c,m′⟩)) ∈ ors]
Proof.
By the rule InvL
(1) Γ′ ⊢PLC self ∧ n ● (0, sendsl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩)) ∈ ors⇒
counter(s′(n)) = c
By the rule InvS
(2) Γ′ ⊢PLC self ∧ counter(s(n)) ≥ c⇒(self⇒ counter(s(n)) ≥ c)
By the rule ASA on [1] and [2],
(3) Γ′ ⊢PLC n ● self ∧ (0, sendsl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩)) ∈ ors⇒
ˆ(self→ counter(s(n)) ≥ c)
By the rule InvL
(4) Γ′ ⊢PLC self ∧ counter(s(n)) ≥ c⇒¬(n ● (0, sendsl(n′, ⟨c,m′⟩)) ∈ ors)
From [3] and [4]
Γ′ ⊢PLC self ∧ n ● (0, sendsl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩)) ∈ ors⇒
ˆ(self→ ¬(n ● (0, sendsl(n′, ⟨c,m′⟩)) ∈ ors))
that is
Γ′ ⊢PLC self ∧ n ● (0, sendsl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩)) ∈ ors⇒
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ˆ¬(self ∧ n ● (0, sendsl(n′, ⟨c,m′⟩)) ∈ ors)
The proof of the second conjunct is similar.
Lemma 38.
Γ′ ⊢PLC(n′ ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n, ⟨c,m⟩))⇒◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n,m)) ∨∃m. x[(n ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m)) ∧◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n,m))]
Proof.
Immediate from considering two cases (n,m) /∈ received(s(n′)) and (n,m) ∈ received(s(n′)) and
Lemma 39 and Lemma 40.
Lemma 39.
Γ′ ⊢PLC (n′ ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n, ⟨c,m⟩)) ∧ ⟨n, c⟩ /∈ received(s(n′))⇒◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n,m))
Proof.
Immediate from rule II and rule OI.
Lemma 40.
Γ′ ⊢PLC self ∧ n = n′ ∧ ⟨n, c⟩ ∈ received(s(n′))⇒∃m. x[n ● (0, sendsl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩)) ∈ ors ∧ self ∧◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n,m))]
Proof.
By Lemma 41
(1) Γ′ ⊢PLC ⟨n, c⟩ ∈ received(s(n′)) ∧ self⇒∃m. x[n′ ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n, ⟨c,m⟩) ∧ deliverpl(n,m) ∈ ois]
By SL′2
(2) Γ′ ⊢PLC n′ ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n, ⟨c,m⟩)⇒x(n ● 0 ↓ sendsl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩))
By rule OR′,
(3) Γ′ ⊢PLC (n ● 0 ↓ sendsl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩))⇒x(n ● (0, sendsl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩)) ∈ ors ∧ self)
By the Lemma 89 on [2], and [3],
(4) Γ′ ⊢PLC n′ ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n, ⟨c,m⟩)⇒x(n ● (0, sendsl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩)) ∈ ors ∧ self)
By rule OI,
(5) Γ′ ⊢PLC (n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n,m) ∈ ois)⇒◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n,m))
By [1], [4], [5],
Γ′ ⊢PLC self ∧ ⟨n,m⟩ ∈ received(s(n′)) ⇒ ∃m. x[x(n ● (0, sendsl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩)) ∈ ors ∧ self) ∧◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n,m))]
that is
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Γ′ ⊢PLC self ∧ (n,m) ∈ received(s(n′))⇒ ∃m. x[n ● (0, sendsl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩)) ∈ ors ∧ self ∧◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑
deliverpl(n,m))]
Lemma 41.
Γ′ ⊢PLC self ∧ ⟨n, c⟩ ∈ received(s(n′))⇒∃m. x[n′ ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n, ⟨c,m⟩) ∧ deliverpl(n,m) ∈ ois]
Proof.
We use rule InvSA with
n instantiated to n′,
S instantiated to λs. ⟨n, c⟩ ∈ received(s) andA instantiated to ∃m. n′ ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n, ⟨c,m⟩) ∧ deliverpl(n,m) ∈ ois
From the definition of PLC
initPLC = λn. ⟨0,∅⟩
Thus(n,m) /∈ received(initPLC(n))
Thus
(1) ¬S(initPLC(n))
From the definition of request, we have
(2) o = ↓ ∧ d = ⊺ ∧
requestc(n, s(n), e) = (s′(n),ois,ors) ∧⟨n, c⟩ /∈ received(s(n)) ∧ ⟨n, c⟩ ∈ received(s′(n))→∃m. n′ ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n, ⟨c,m⟩) ∧ deliverpl(n,m) ∈ ois
and similarly for indication and periodic.
By rule InvSA on [1] and [2],
Γ′ ⊢PLC self ∧ (n,m) ∈ received(s(n′))⇒∃m. x[n′ ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n, ⟨c,m⟩) ∧ deliverpl(n,m) ∈ ois]
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Theorem 7. (PL2: No-duplication)
If a message is sent at most once, it will be delivered at most once.
Γ ⊢PLC [n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m)⇒ ˆ¬(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m))]→[n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m)⇒ ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))]
where
Γ is defined in Definition 17.
Proof.
Proof idea: If there is a perfect-link delivery
event, there is a stubborn link delivery event
before it. That stubborn link delivery event is
the event that issues one perfect-link delivery
event and there is no event before or after it that
issues a perfect-link delivery event (Lemma 42).
Therefore, no perfect-link delivery event other
than the current one can be executed.
We assumeA1 = n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m)⇒ ˆ¬(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m))
Γ′ = Γ;A1
and prove
Γ′ ⊢PLC n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m)⇒ ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))
By rule OI′,
(1) Γ′ ⊢PLC n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m)⇒x(n = n ∧ deliverpl(n′,m) ∈ ois ∧ self)
By rule InvL,
(2) Γ′ ⊢PLC self ∧ n = n ∧ deliverpl(n′,m) ∈ ois⇒
self ∧ n = n ∧ occ(ois,deliverpl(n′,m)) = 1]
By Lemma 99 on [1] and [2],
(3) Γ′ ⊢PLC n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m)⇒x(self ∧ n = n ∧ occ(ois,deliverpl(n′,m)) = 1])
From Lemma 42,
(4) Γ′ ⊢PLC s [n = n ∧ deliverpl(n′,m) ∈ ois⇒
ˆ(n = n→ deliverpl(n′,m) /∈ ois) ∧
ˆ(n = n→ deliverpl(n′,m) /∈ ois)]
By rule SInv on [4],
(5) Γ′ ⊢PLC self ∧ n = n ∧ deliverpl(n′,m) ∈ ois⇒
ˆ(self ∧ n = n→ deliverpl(n′,m) /∈ ois) ∧
ˆ(self ∧ n = n→ deliverpl(n′,m) /∈ ois)
From [3] and [5],
(6) Γ′ ⊢PLC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))⇒x(occ(ois,deliverpl(n′,m)) = 1] ∧
ˆ(self ∧ n = n→ deliverpl(n′,m) /∈ ois) ∧
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ˆ(self ∧ n = n→ deliverpl(n′,m) /∈ ois))
From rule UniOI,
(7) Γ′ ⊢PLC (occ(ois,deliverpl(n′,m)) ≤ 1 ∧
ˆ(self ∧ n = n→ deliverpl(n′,m) /∈ ois) ∧
ˆ(self ∧ n = n→ deliverpl(n′,m) /∈ ois))⇒
n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m)⇒ ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))
From [6] and [7],
Γ′ ⊢PLC n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m)⇒x[n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m)⇒ ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))]
which leads to
Γ′ ⊢PLC n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m)⇒
n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m)⇒ ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))
which leads to
Γ′ ⊢PLC n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m)⇒
ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))
Lemma 42.
At every nodes, a perfect-link delivery event for a message is issued at most once.
Γ′ ⊢PLC s [(n = n ∧ deliverpl(n′,m) ∈ ois)⇒
ˆ(n = n→ deliverpl(n′,m) /∈ ois) ∧
ˆ(n = n→ deliverpl(n′,m) /∈ ois)]
Proof.
Proof idea: A perfect-link delivery event is only
issued in the execution of a stubborn link de-
livery event. In the execution of this event, the
sender and counter pair is recorded and kept
in the received set. In the future events, the
received set and the past execution of the stub-
born link delivery event prevents issuance of
any perfect-link delivery event (Lemma 43).
By rule InvLSe, there exists c such that
Γ′ ⊢PLC s [(n = n ∧ deliverpl(n′,m) ∈ ois)⇒(n′, c) ∈ received(s′(n)) ∧ n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩)]
Thus, by Lemma 90,
(1) Γ′ ⊢PLC s [(n = n ∧ deliverpl(n′,m) ∈ ois)⇒(n′, c) ∈ received(s′(n)) ∧x(n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩))]
By Lemma 43,
(2) Γ′ ⊢PLC s [(n′, c) ∈ received(s(n)) ∧x(n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩))⇒
n = n→ deliverpl(n′,m) /∈ ois]
By rule InvSSe,
(3) Γ′ ⊢PLC s [(n′, c) ∈ received(s(n))⇒
82
(n′, c) ∈ received(s(n))]
By Lemma 107,
(4) Γ′ ⊢PLC s [x(n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩))⇒
(x(n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩)))]
From [3] an [4]
(5) Γ′ ⊢PLC s [(n′, c) ∈ received(s(n)) ∧x(n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩))⇒
((n′, c) ∈ received(s(n)) ∧x(n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩)))]
By Lemma 100 on [5] and [2],
(6) Γ′ ⊢PLC s [(n′, c) ∈ received(s(n)) ∧x(n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩))⇒
(n = n→ deliverpl(n′,m) /∈ ois)]
By rule ASASe on [1] and [6],
(7) Γ′ ⊢PLC s [n = n ∧ deliverpl(n′,m) ∈ ois⇒
ˆ((n = n→ deliverpl(n′,m) /∈ ois))]
that is
(8) Γ′ ⊢PLC s [n = n ∧ deliverpl(n′,m) ∈ ois⇒
ˆ(n = n→ deliverpl(n′,m) /∈ ois)]
By Lemma 108 on [8],
(9) Γ′ ⊢PLC s [n = n ∧ deliverpl(n′,m) ∈ ois⇒
ˆ(n = n→ deliverpl(n′,m) /∈ ois)] ∧
ˆ(n = n→ deliverpl(n′,m) /∈ ois)]
Lemma 43.
Γ′ ⊢PLC s [(n′, c) ∈ received(s(n)) ∧x(n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩))⇒
n = n→ deliverpl(n′,m) /∈ ois]
Proof.
Proof idea: A perfect-link delivery event is only
issued in the execution of a stubborn link de-
livery event. A stubborn link delivery event
is executed in the past. Any other stubborn
link delivery event with the same sender and
message has the same counter (Lemma 44). On
any stubborn link delivery event, if the pair
of the sender and the counter are already in
the delivered set, the indication function of the
protocol does not issue a perfect-link delivery
event. Thus, no perfect-link delivery event with
the same sender and message is issued.
We use rule InvSe.
The request and periodic obligations are trivial by rule IR and rule Pe.
For the indication obligation, we have to prove that
Γ′ ⊢PLC s [∀i, e. i ↑ e⇒(n′, c,m) ∈ received(s(n))→
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n = n→ deliverpl(n′,m) /∈ ois
That is
Γ′ ⊢PLC s [∀i, e. n ● i ↑ e ∧ (n′, c) ∈ received(s(n)) ∧ x(n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩))⇒
deliverpl(n′,m) /∈ ois
By rule IISe,
Γ′ ⊢PLC s [n ● i ↑ e⇒∃n′, c,m. i = 0 ∧ e = deliversl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩)
Thus, we show that
Γ′ ⊢PLC s [∀n′′, c′,m′.
n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′′, (c′,m′)) ∧ (n′, c) ∈ received(s(n)) ∧ x(n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩))⇒
deliverpl(n′,m) /∈ ois
We consider two cases whether (n′′ = n′ ∧ m′ =m):
If ¬(n′′ = n′ ∧ m′ =m), the result is immediate from the rule IISe.
Thus, we show that
Γ′ ⊢PLC s [n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′, ⟨c′,m⟩) ∧ (n′, c) ∈ received(s(n)) ∧ x(n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩))⇒
deliverpl(n′,m) /∈ ois
By Lemma 44, we need to show that
Γ′ ⊢PLC s [n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩) ∧ (n′, c) ∈ received(s(n))⇒
deliverpl(n′,m) /∈ ois
That is immediate from rule IISe.
Lemma 44.
Every two stubborn link delivery events with the same sender and message have the same counter.
Γ′ ⊢PLC s [(n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩) ∧x(n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′, ⟨c′,m⟩)))⇒
c = c′]
Proof.
Proof idea: The execution of any stubborn link
delivery event is preceded by a stubborn link
send event. The send event is preceded by its
issuance. A stubborn link send event is only
issued by a perfect-link send event. Therefore,
from the fact that there are two stubborn link
delivery events, we have that in the past there
has been two perfect-link send events. How-
ever, the assumption is that there is at most
one perfect-link send event. Therefore, the two
events are the same and they send the same
counter. Thus, the counters of the two stub-
born link delivery events are the same.
By SL′2,
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(1) Γ′ ⊢PLC n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩)⇒x(n′ ● 0 ↓ sendsl(n, ⟨c,m⟩))
By rule OR′
(2) Γ′ ⊢PLC n′ ● 0 ↓ sendsl(n, ⟨c,m⟩)⇒x(n′ ● (0, sendsl(n, ⟨c,m⟩)) ∈ ors ∧ self)
By the rule InvL,
(3) Γ′ ⊢PLC (n′ ● (0, sendsl(n, ⟨c,m⟩)) ∈ ors ∧ self)⇒(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m)) ∧ counter(s′(n)) = c
By Lemma 89 and Lemma 99 on [1], [2] and [3],
(4) Γ′ ⊢PLC n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩)⇒x(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m)) ∧ counter(s′(n)) = c
By rule SInv on [4],
(5) Γ′ ⊢PLC s [n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩)⇒x(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m)) ∧ counter(s′(n)) = c]
Similarly, we can derive
(6) Γ′ ⊢PLC s [n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′, ⟨c′,m⟩)⇒x(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m)) ∧ counter(s′(n)) = c′]
Thus, from [5] and [6], we need to show that
Γ′ ⊢PLC s [(x((n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m)) ∧ counter(s′(n)) = c) ∧xx((n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m)) ∧ counter(s′(n)) = c′))⇒
c = c′]
That is
Γ′ ⊢PLC s [(x((n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m)) ∧ counter(s′(n)) = c) ∧x((n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m)) ∧ counter(s′(n)) = c′))⇒
c = c′]
By Lemma 105, there are two cases that are similar.
Γ′ ⊢PLC s [x((n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m)) ∧ counter(s′(n)) = c ∧x((n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m)) ∧ counter(s′(n)) = c′))⇒
c = c′]
By assumption A1, we need to prove
Γ′ ⊢PLC s [x(ˆ¬(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m)) ∧ counter(s′(n)) = c ∧x((n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m)) ∧ counter(s′(n)) = c′))⇒
c = c′]
By Lemma 106, we need to prove
Γ′ ⊢PLC s [x(counter(s′(n)) = c ∧(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m)) ∧ counter(s′(n)) = c′)]⇒
c = c′]
that is trivial.
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Theorem 8. (PL3: No-forge)
If a node n delivers a message m with sender n′, then m was previously sent to n by node n′.
Γ ⊢PLC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))  (n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m))
where
Γ is defined in Definition 17.
Proof.
By rule OI′,
(1) Γ ⊢PLC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))⇒x(n ● deliverpl(n′,m) ∈ ois ∧ self)
By rule InvL,
(2) Γ ⊢PLC (n ● deliverpl(n′,m) ∈ ois ∧ self)⇒∃c. (n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩))
By Lemma 99 on [1] and [2],
Γ ⊢PLC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))⇒∃c. x(n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩))
that is
(3) Γ ⊢PLC n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m)  ∃c. (n ● 0 ↑ deliversl(n′, ⟨c,m⟩))
By rule OR′,
(4) Γ ⊢PLC ∀c. (n′ ● 0 ↓ sendsl(n, ⟨c,m⟩))⇒x(n′ ● (0, sendsl(n, ⟨c,m⟩)) ∈ ors ∧ self)
By rule InvL
(5) Γ ⊢PLC ∀c. n′ ● (0, sendsl(n, ⟨c,m⟩)) ∈ ors ∧ self⇒(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n, ⟨c,m⟩))
By Lemma 99 on [4] and [5]
(6) Γ ⊢PLC ∀c. (n′ ● 0 ↓ sendsl(n, ⟨c,m⟩))  (n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m))
From Lemma 88 on [3], SL′2 and [6],
Γ ⊢PLC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))  (n′ ● ⊺ ↓ sendpl(n,m))
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5.3.3 Best-Effort Broadcast
Definition 18.
Γ = PL′1; PL′2; PL′3
PL′1 = lower(0,PL1) =∀n,n′,m.
n ∈ Correct ∧ n′ ∈ Correct→(n ● 0 ↓ sendpl(n′,m) (n′ ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,m))
PL′2 = lower(0,PL2) =[n′ ● 0 ↓ sendpl(n,m)⇒ ˆ¬(n′ ● 0 ↓ sendpl(n,m))]→[n ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n′,m)⇒ ˆ¬(n ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))]]
PL′3 = lower(0,PL3) =(n ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))  (n′ ● 0 ↓ sendpl(n,m))
87
Theorem 9. (BEB1: Validity)
If a correct node broadcasts a message m, then every correct node eventually delivers m.
Γ ⊢BEBC ∀n,n′,m.
n ∈ Correct ∧ n′ ∈ Correct→[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m)) (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))]
where
Γ is defined in Definition 18.
Proof.
The proof idea: The assumption is that the
nodes n and n′ are both correct. Upon the
execution of a broadcastbeb of a message m from
n to n′, the component sends m to every node
using the perfect link subcomponent. By the
reliable delivery property of the perfect link, as
both the sender n and receiver n′ are correct, m
is eventually delivered to n′. Upon the delivery
of m by the perfect link, the component issues
the delivery of m that eventually executes.
We assume
(1) Γ′ = Γ;n ∈ Correct;n′ ∈ Correct
We prove
Γ′ ⊢ (n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m))⇒◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))
By rule IROR, and the definition of request,
(2) Γ′ ⊢BEBC (n ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m))⇒◇(n ● 0 ↓ sendpl(n′,m))
From PL1 and [1],
Γ′ ⊢BEBC (n ● 0 ↓ sendpl(n′,m)) (n′ ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,m))
That is,
(3) Γ′ ⊢BEBC (n ● 0 ↓ sendpl(n′,m))⇒◇(n′ ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,m))
By rule IIOI,
(4) Γ′ ⊢BEBC (n′ ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,m))⇒◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverbeb(n,m))
By Lemma 89 on [2], [3] and [4],
Γ′ ⊢BEBC (n ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m)⇒◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverbeb(n,m))
That is,
Γ′ ⊢BEBC (n ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m) (n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverbeb(n,m))
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Theorem 10. (BEB2: No-duplication)
If a message is broadcast at most once, it will be delivered at most once.
Γ ⊢BEBC [(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m)) ⇒ ˆ¬(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m))]→[(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))⇒ ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))]
where
Γ is defined in Definition 18.
Proof.
The proof idea: We assume that a message is
broadcast at most once. By the definition of
BEBC, a message is sent by the perfect link
subcomponent plc once, only when a broad-
cast request is processed. Thus, BEBC sends
the message to every node at most once by plc.
Thus, by the no-duplication property of plc, the
message is delivered to every node at most once
by plc. By the definition of BEBC, a delivery
is issued only when a delivery indication is re-
ceived from plc. Thus, BEBC issues delivery at
every node at most once.
We assume
(1) Γ′ = Γ; [n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m)⇒ ˆ¬(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m))]
We want to prove
Γ′ ⊢BEBC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))⇒ ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))
From [1],
(2) Γ′ ⊢BEBC n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m)⇒
ˆ¬(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m))
By Lemma 108 on [2],
(3) Γ′ ⊢BEBC n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m)⇒
ˆ¬(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m)) ∧
ˆ¬(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m))
By rule InvL,
(4) Γ′ ⊢BEBC (n′ ● (0, sendp(n,m)) ∈ ors ∧ self)⇒(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m))
The contra-positive of [4] is
(5) Γ′ ⊢BEBC ¬(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m))⇒¬(n′ ● (0, sendp(n,m)) ∈ ors ∧ self)
From [3], and [5]
(6) Γ′ ⊢BEBC n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m)⇒
ˆ¬(n′ ● (0, sendp(n,m)) ∈ ors ∧ self) ∧
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ˆ¬(n′ ● (0, sendp(n,m)) ∈ ors ∧ self)
that is
(7) Γ′ ⊢BEBC n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m)⇒
ˆ(n′ ● self→ (0, sendp(n,m)) /∈ ors) ∧
ˆ(n′ ● self→ (0, sendp(n,m)) /∈ ors)
By rule OR′
(8) Γ′ ⊢BEBC (n′ ● 0 ↓ sendpl(n,m))⇒x(n′ ● (0, sendpl(n,m)) ∈ ors ∧ self)
By rule InvL with A =(n′ ● (0, sendpl(n,m)) ∈ ors)→ (n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m)) ∧ occ(ors, (0, sendp(n,m))) = 1
(9) Γ′ ⊢BEBC self ∧ (n′ ● (0, sendpl(n,m)) ∈ ors)⇒(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m)) ∧ occ(ors, (0, sendp(n,m))) = 1
From [8] and [9],
(10) Γ′ ⊢BEBC (n′ ● 0 ↓ sendpl(n,m))⇒x[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m)) ∧ occ(ors, (0, sendp(n,m))) = 1]
From [10] and [7],
(11) Γ′ ⊢BEBC (n′ ● 0 ↓ sendpl(n,m))⇒x[
occ(ors, (0, sendp(n,m))) = 1 ∧
ˆ(n′ ● self→ (0, sendp(n,m)) /∈ ors) ∧
ˆ(n′ ● self→ (0, sendp(n,m)) /∈ ors)]
By rule UniOR on [11]
(12) Γ′ ⊢BEBC (n′ ● 0 ↓ sendpl(n,m))⇒x[(n′ ● 0 ↓ sendpl(n,m))⇒
ˆ¬(n′ ● 0 ↓ sendpl(n,m))]
By Lemma 109 on [12]
(13) Γ′ ⊢BEBC (n′ ● 0 ↓ sendpl(n,m))⇒
ˆ¬(n′ ● 0 ↓ sendpl(n,m))
By PL′2 on [13],
(14) Γ′ ⊢BEB n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m)⇒
ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))
By Lemma 108 on [14],
(15) Γ′ ⊢BEB (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))⇒
ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m)) ∧
ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))
By rule InvL,
(16) Γ′ ⊢BEBC (n ● (deliverbeb(n′,m)) ∈ ois ∧ self)⇒ (n ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))
The contra-positive of [16] is
(17) Γ′ ⊢BEBC ¬(n ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))⇒ ¬(n ● (deliverbeb(n′,m)) ∈ ois ∧ self)
From [15], and [17],
(18) Γ′ ⊢BEB (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))⇒
ˆ¬(n ● (deliverbeb(n′,m)) ∈ ois ∧ self) ∧
ˆ¬(n ● (deliverbeb(n′,m)) ∈ ois ∧ self)
that is
(19) Γ′ ⊢BEB (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))⇒
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ˆ(n ● self→ (deliverbeb(n′,m) /∈ ois) ∧
ˆ(n ● self→ (deliverbeb(n′,m) /∈ ois)
By rule OR′
(20) Γ′ ⊢BEBC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))⇒x(n ● (0,deliverbeb(n′,m)) ∈ ois ∧ self)
By rule InvL with A =(n ● (0,deliverbeb(n′,m)) ∈ ois)→ (n′ ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n′,m)) ∧ occ(ois, (0,deliverbeb(n′,m))) = 1
(21) Γ′ ⊢BEBC self ∧ (n ● (0,deliverbeb(n′,m)) ∈ ois)⇒(n′ ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n′,m)) ∧ occ(ois, (0,deliverbeb(n′,m))) = 1
From [20] and [21],
(22) Γ′ ⊢BEBC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))⇒x[(n′ ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n′,m)) ∧ occ(ois, (0,deliverbeb(n′,m))) = 1]
From [22] and [19],
(23) Γ′ ⊢BEBC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))⇒x[
occ(ois, (0,deliverbeb(n′,m))) = 1 ∧
ˆ(n ● self→ (deliverbeb(n′,m) /∈ ois) ∧
ˆ(n ● self→ (deliverbeb(n′,m) /∈ ois)]
By rule UniOI on [23],
(24) Γ′ ⊢BEBC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))⇒x[(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))⇒
ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))]
By Lemma 109 on [24]
Γ′ ⊢BEBC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))⇒
ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))
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Theorem 11. (BEB3: No-forge)
If a node delivers a message m with sender n′, then m was previously broadcast by node n′.
Γ ⊢BEBC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))  (n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m))
where
Γ is defined in Definition 18.
Proof.
The proof idea: If a best-effort broadcast de-
livery event is executed, it is previously issued.
The component issues a best-effort broadcast
delivery event only when a delivery event from
the perfect link is processed. By the no-forge
property of the perfect link, every delivery in-
dication is preceded by a corresponding send
event. The component issues a perfect link send
request only when a broadcast request is pro-
cessed.
By rule OI′,
(1) Γ ⊢BEBC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))⇒x(n ● deliverbeb(n′,m) ∈ ois ∧ self)
By rule InvL
(2) Γ ⊢BEBC (n ● deliverbeb(n′,m) ∈ ois ∧ self)⇒ (n ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))
From [1] and [2]
Γ ⊢BEBC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))⇒x(n ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))
that is,
(3) Γ ⊢BEBC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))  (n ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))
From PL3
(4) Γ ⊢BEBC (n ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))  (n′ ● 0 ↓ sendpl(n,m))
By rule OR′,
(5) Γ ⊢BEBC (n′ ● 0 ↓ sendpl(n,m))⇒x(n′ ● (0, sendpl(n,m)) ∈ ors ∧ self)
By rule InvL
(6) Γ ⊢BEBC (n′ ● (0, sendpl(n,m)) ∈ ors ∧ self)⇒ (n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m))
From [5] and [6]
Γ ⊢BEBC (n′ ● 0 ↓ sendpl(n,m))⇒x(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m))
that is
(7) Γ ⊢BEBC n′ ● 0 ↓ sendpl(n,m))  (n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m))
From Lemma 88 on [3], [4] and [7],
Γ ⊢BEBC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))  (n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcastbeb(m))
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5.3.4 Uniform Reliable Broadcast
Definition 19.
Γ = ∣Correct∣ > N/2;
BEB′1; BEB′2; BEB′3
BEB′1 = lower(0,BEB1) =
n ∈ Correct ∧ n′ ∈ Correct→(n′ ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(m)) (n ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))
BEB′2 = lower(0,BEB2) =[n′ ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(n,m)⇒
ˆ¬(n′ ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(n,m))]→[n ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m)⇒
ˆ¬(n ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))]
BEB′3 = lower(0,BEB3) =(n ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))  (n′ ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(m))
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Theorem 12. (URB1: Validity)
If a correct node n broadcasts a message m, then n itself eventually delivers m.
Γ ⊢URBC ∀n. n ∈ Correct→(n ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n,m))
where
Γ is defined in Definition 19.
Proof.
The proof idea: Upon a broadcast request for a message m by a node n, the request function
broadcasts m using the best-effort broadcast subcomponent bebc. By the validity property of
bebc, as n is correct, bebc will eventually deliver m to every correct node. Upon delivery of a
message from bebc, the indication function checks whether the message is in the pending set. If it
does not find the message in the pending set, it rebroadcasts the message using bebc. Otherwise,
the node has already broadcast the message. Therefore, every correct node broadcasts m using
bebc. Therefore, by the validity of bebc, bebc eventually delivers m from all correct nodes to the
node n. Upon delivery of a message from bebc, the indication function adds the sender to the set
of nodes that have acknowledged the message. Thus, at node n, the identifiers of all the correct
nodes will eventually be in the acknowledged set for m. This acknowledgement set never shrinks.
On the next execution of the periodic function either m is in the delivered set or not. If it is not
in the delivered set, since acknowledgement from all the correct nodes has been received and the
correct nodes are a majority, the delivery condition is satisfied and the delivery event for m is
issued.
Otherwise, if m is not in the delivered set, the delivery of m is previously issued. This delivery
cannot be before the original request, based on the following two invariants. First, the counter
of a node monotonically increases. Second, the counter of every message in the pending set is
less than or equal to the counter of the node. Based on the two invariants, if the delivery of m
happens before its broadcast request, the counter of n should have decreased from the former to
the latter.
We assume
(1) Γ′ = Γ;n ∈ Correct
We prove that
Γ ⊢URBC (n ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n,m))
By rule IRSe and ORSe,
(2) Γ ⊢URBC s (n ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m))⇒∃c. count(s(n)) = c ∧◇(n ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,n, c + 1⟩)
By Lemma 45 on [2] and [1]
(3) Γ ⊢URBC s (n ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m))⇒∃c. count(s(n)) = c ∧◇[x(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n,m)) ∧c + 1 ≤ count(s(n)) ∨◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n,m))]
By Lemma 112 on [3] and simplification
Γ ⊢URBC s (n ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m))⇒
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◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n,m)) ∨[∃c. count(s(n)) = c ∧x(c + 1 ≤ count(s(n)))]
that is
Γ ⊢URBC s (n ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m))⇒◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n,m)) ∨[∃c. count(s(n)) = c ∧ c + 1 ≤ count(s(n))]
that is
Γ ⊢URBC s (n ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m))⇒◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n,m))
that by rule SInv is
Γ ⊢URBC (n ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n,m))
Lemma 45.
Γ ⊢URBC s n ∈ Correct ∧ n′ ∈ Correct→
n ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,ns, c⟩)⇒x(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(ns,m)) ∧c ≤ count(s(n′)) ∨◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(ns,m))
Proof.
Immediate from Lemma 46 and Lemma 48.
Lemma 46.
Γ ⊢URBC s n ∈ Correct ∧ n′ ∈ Correct→
n ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,ns, c⟩)⇒◇∣ack(s(n′))(⟨m,ns, c⟩)∣ > ∣N∣/2
Proof.
We assume that
(1) Γ′ = Γ; n ∈ Correct; n′ ∈ Correct
We show that
Γ ⊢URBC s n ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,ns, c⟩)⇒◇∣ack(s(n′))(⟨m,ns, c⟩)∣ > ∣N∣/2
By Definition 19 (BEB′1) on [1] and rule InvS,
(2) Γ′ ⊢URBC s ∀n′. n′ ∈ Correct→(n ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,ns, c⟩))⇒◇(n′ ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n, ⟨m,ns, c⟩))
By Lemma 47
(3) Γ′ ⊢URBC s ∀n′, n′′.(n′ ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′′, ⟨m,ns, c⟩))⇒x(n′ ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,ns, c⟩)) ∨◇(n′ ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,ns, c⟩))
By Definition 19 (BEB′1) and rule InvS,
(4) Γ′ ⊢URBC s ∀n,n′. n ∈ Correct ∧ n′ ∈ Correct→
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(n ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,ns, c⟩))⇒◇(n′ ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n, ⟨m,ns, c⟩))
From [3] and [4]
Γ′ ⊢URBC s ∀n,n′, n′′. n ∈ Correct ∧ n′ ∈ Correct→(n ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′′, ⟨m,ns, c⟩))⇒x◇(n′ ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n, ⟨m,ns, c⟩)) ∨◇◇(n′ ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n, ⟨m,ns, c⟩))
that by Lemma 112, Lemma 86 and Lemma 87 is
(5) Γ′ ⊢URBC s ∀n,n′, n′′. n ∈ Correct ∧ n′ ∈ Correct→(n ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′′, ⟨m,ns, c⟩))⇒x(n′ ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n, ⟨m,ns, c⟩)) ∨◇(n′ ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n, ⟨m,ns, c⟩))
From [2] and [5]
(6) Γ′ ⊢URBC s ∀n′. n′ ∈ Correct→(n ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,ns, c⟩))⇒ ◇[∀n′′. n′′ ∈ Correct→x(n′′ ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′, ⟨m,ns, c⟩)) ∨◇(n′′ ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′, ⟨m,ns, c⟩))]
that is
(7) Γ′ ⊢URBC s ∀n′. n′ ∈ Correct ∧ n′′ ∈ Correct→(n ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,ns, c⟩))⇒ ◇[x(n′′ ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′, ⟨m,ns, c⟩)) ∨◇(n′′ ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′, ⟨m,ns, c⟩))]
that by Lemma 112, Lemma 86 and Lemma 87 is
(8) Γ′ ⊢URBC s ∀n′. n′ ∈ Correct ∧ n′′ ∈ Correct→(n ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,ns, c⟩))⇒x(n′′ ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′, ⟨m,ns, c⟩)) ∨◇(n′′ ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′, ⟨m,ns, c⟩))
By rule IISe,
(9) Γ′ ⊢URBC s ∀n,n′.(n ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′, ⟨m,ns, c⟩))⇒
n′ ∈ ack(s′(n))(⟨m,ns, c⟩)
By rule InvSSe′′,
(10) Γ′ ⊢URBC s ∀n,n′.
n′ ∈ ack(s′(n))(⟨m,ns, c⟩)⇒
ˆn′ ∈ ack(s(n))(⟨m,ns, c⟩)
From [9] and [10]
(11) Γ′ ⊢URBC s ∀n,n′.(n ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′, ⟨m,ns, c⟩))⇒
ˆn′ ∈ ack(s(n))(⟨m,ns, c⟩)
From [8] and [11]
Γ′ ⊢URBC s ∀n′, n′′. n′ ∈ Correct ∧ n′′ ∈ Correct→(n ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,ns, c⟩))⇒xˆn′ ∈ ack(s(n′′))(⟨m,ns, c⟩) ∨◇ˆn′ ∈ ack(s(n′′))(⟨m,ns, c⟩)
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that is
(12) Γ′ ⊢URBC s ∀n′, n′′. n′ ∈ Correct ∧ n′′ ∈ Correct→(n ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,ns, c⟩))⇒◇n′ ∈ ack(s(n′′))(⟨m,ns, c⟩)
From [12] and [1] (instantiating n′′ with n′ and renaming n′ to n′′),
(13) Γ′ ⊢URBC s ∀n′′. n′′ ∈ Correct→(n ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,ns, c⟩))⇒◇n′′ ∈ ack(s(n′))(⟨m,ns, c⟩)
that is
(14) Γ′ ⊢URBC s (n ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,ns, c⟩))⇒◇∀n′′. n′′ ∈ Correct→ n′′ ∈ ack(s(n′))(⟨m,ns, c⟩)
that is
(15) Γ′ ⊢URBC s (n ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,ns, c⟩))⇒◇Correct ⊆ ack(s(n′))(⟨m,ns, c⟩)
By Definition 19 (a majority of correct nodes) on [1]
Γ′ ⊢URBC s (n ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,ns, c⟩))⇒◇∣ack(s(n′))(⟨m,ns, c⟩)∣ > ∣N∣/2
Lemma 47.
Γ ⊢URBC s(n ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′′, ⟨m,n′, c⟩))⇒x(n ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩)) ∨◇(n ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩))
Proof.
By rule InvSA with
S = λs. ⟨m,n′, c⟩ ∈ pending(s)A = (0,broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩)) ∈ ors
(1) Γ ⊢URBC s ⟨m,n′, c⟩ ∈ pending(s(n))⇒xˆ(n ● (0,broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩)) ∈ ors)
By rule ORSe
(2) Γ ⊢URBC s n ● (0,broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩)) ∈ ors ⇒◇(n ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩))
By Lemma 80 and Lemma 112 on [1] and [2]
(3) Γ ⊢URBC s ⟨m,n′, c⟩ ∈ pending(s(n))⇒x(n ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩)) ∨◇(n ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩))
By rule IIORSe,
(4) Γ ⊢URBC (n ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n, ⟨m,n′, c⟩)) ∧ ⟨m,n′, c⟩ /∈ pending(s(n))⇒◇(n ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩))
From [3] and [4]
(5) Γ ⊢URBC s [⟨m,n′, c⟩ ∈ pending(s(n))] ∨[(n ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n, ⟨m,n′, c⟩)) ∧ ⟨m,n′, c⟩ /∈ pending(s(n))]⇒x(n ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩)) ∨
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◇(n ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩))
that (after adding a conjunct) is
(6) Γ ⊢URBC s [(n ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n, ⟨m,n′, c⟩)) ∧ ⟨m,n′, c⟩ ∈ pending(s(n))] ∨[(n ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n, ⟨m,n′, c⟩)) ∧ ⟨m,n′, c⟩ /∈ pending(s(n))]⇒x(n ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩)) ∨◇(n ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩))
that (after folding distribution of or over and) is
(7) Γ ⊢URBC s [(n ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n, ⟨m,n′, c⟩))] ∧[⟨m,n′, c⟩ ∈ pending(s(n)) ∨ ⟨m,n′, c⟩ /∈ pending(s(n))]⇒x(n ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩)) ∨◇(n ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩))
that is
(8) Γ ⊢URBC s (n ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n, ⟨m,n′, c⟩))⇒x(n ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩)) ∨◇(n ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩))
Lemma 48.
Γ ⊢URBC s n ∈ Correct→◇∣ack(s(n))(⟨m,n′, c⟩)∣ > ∣N∣/2⇒x(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′,m)) ∧c ≤ count(s(n)) ∨◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′,m))
Proof.
We assume that
(1) Γ′ = Γ; n ∈ Correct
We show that
Γ′ ⊢URBC s ◇∣ack(s(n))(⟨m,n′, c⟩)∣ > ∣N∣/2⇒x(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′,m)) ∨◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′,m))
We consider two cases: ⟨m,ns, c⟩ ∈ delivered(s(n)) and ⟨m,ns, c⟩ /∈ delivered(s(n)).
By Lemma 49 on
(2) Γ ⊢URBC s ⟨m,n′, c⟩ ∈ delivered(s(n))⇒x(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′,m) ∧c ≤ count(s(n))) ∨◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′,m))
By rule PeOISe
(3) Γ ⊢URBC s n ● ⊺  per ∧⟨m,ns, c⟩ ∈ pending(s(n))∧∣ack(s(n))(⟨m,ns, c⟩)∣ > ∣N∣/2 ∧⟨m,ns, c⟩ /∈ delivered(s(n))⇒
◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n,m))
By rule InvSSe′
(4) Γ ⊢URBC s ack(s(n))(⟨m,ns, c⟩ ≠ ∅⇒ ⟨m,ns, c⟩ ∈ pending(s(n))
From [3] and [4]
(5) Γ ⊢URBC s n ● ⊺  per ∧∣ack(s(n))(⟨m,ns, c⟩)∣ > ∣N∣/2 ∧ ⟨m,ns, c⟩ /∈ delivered(s(n))⇒
98
◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n,m))
By rule APerSe on [1]
(6) Γ ⊢URBC s ◇(n ● ⊺  per)
From [6]
(7) Γ′ ⊢URBC s ∣ack(s(n))(⟨m,n′, c⟩)∣ > ∣N∣/2⇒◇[n ● ⊺  per ∧ ∣ack(s(n))(⟨m,n′, c⟩)∣ > ∣N∣/2]
By Lemma 87 on [7]
(8) Γ′ ⊢URBC s ◇∣ack(s(n))(⟨m,n′, c⟩)∣ > ∣N∣/2⇒◇[n ● ⊺  per ∧ ∣ack(s(n))(⟨m,n′, c⟩)∣ > ∣N∣/2]
From [8]
(9) Γ′ ⊢URBC s ◇∣ack(s(n))(⟨m,n′, c⟩)∣ > ∣N∣/2⇒◇⟨m,n′, c⟩ ∈ delivered(s(n)) ∨[n ● ⊺  per ∧ ∣ack(s(n))(⟨m,n′, c⟩)∣ > ∣N∣/2 ∧ ⟨m,n′, c⟩ /∈ delivered(s(n))]
From [9], [2] and [5]
(10) Γ′ ⊢URBC s ◇∣ack(s(n))(⟨m,n′, c⟩)∣ > ∣N∣/2⇒◇x(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′,m) ∧c ≤ count(s(n))) ∨◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n,m))
By Lemma 112 and Lemma 87 on [10]
Γ′ ⊢URBC s ◇∣ack(s(n))(⟨m,n′, c⟩)∣ > ∣N∣/2⇒x(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′,m)) ∧c ≤ count(s(n)) ∨◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n,m))
Lemma 49.
Γ ⊢URBC s ⟨m,ns, c⟩ ∈ delivered(s(n))⇒[◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(ns,m)) ∨x(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(ns,m) ∧c ≤ count(s(n)))]
Proof.
By rule InvSASe with
n instantiated to n,
S instantiated to λs. ⟨m,ns, c⟩ ∈ delivered(s) andA instantiated to deliverurb(⟨n,m⟩)) ∈ ois ∧ ⟨m,ns, c⟩ ∈ pending(s(n))
(1) Γ ⊢URBC s ⟨m,ns, c⟩ ∈ delivered(s(n))⇒x[n ● deliverurb(⟨ns,m⟩)) ∈ ois ∧ ⟨m,ns, c⟩ ∈ pending(s(n))]
By rule OISe,
(2) Γ′ ⊢URBC s (n ● deliverurb(ns,m) ∈ ois)⇒◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(ns,m))
From [1] and [2],
(3) Γ ⊢URBC s ⟨m,ns, c⟩ ∈ delivered(s(n))⇒x[⟨m,ns, c⟩ ∈ pending(s(n)) ∧◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(ns,m))]
By rule InvSSe′
(4) Γ ⊢URBC s ⟨m,ns, c⟩ ∈ pending(s(n))⇒ c ≤ count(s(n))
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From [3] and [4],
(5) Γ ⊢URBC s ⟨m,ns, c⟩ ∈ delivered(s(n))⇒x[c ≤ count(s(n)) ∧◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(ns,m))]
By rule InvSSe
(6) Γ ⊢URBC s c ≤ count(s(n))⇒ (c ≤ count(s(n)))
From [5] and [6],
(7) Γ ⊢URBC s ⟨m,ns, c⟩ ∈ delivered(s(n))⇒x[(c ≤ count(s(n))) ∧◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(ns,m))]
By Lemma 115 and Lemma 112 on [7],
Γ ⊢URBC s ⟨m,ns, c⟩ ∈ delivered(s(n))⇒[◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(ns,m) ∧c ≤ count(s(n))) ∨x(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(ns,m) ∧c ≤ count(s(n)))]
that is
Γ ⊢URBC s ⟨m,ns, c⟩ ∈ delivered(s(n))⇒[◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(ns,m)) ∨x(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(ns,m) ∧c ≤ count(s(n)))]
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Theorem 13. (URB2: No-duplication)
If a message is broadcast at most once, it will be delivered at most once.
Γ ⊢URBC [n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)⇒ ˆ¬(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m))]→[(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′,m))⇒ ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′,m))]
where
Γ is defined in Definition 19.
Proof.
The proof idea: The uniform reliable broadcast
for a message m by a node n is executed at most
once. When a uniform reliable broadcast is exe-
cuted, a best-effort broadcast request is issued.
As m is broadcast from n at most once, it is
broadcast with a unique counter c. By the defi-
nition of the component, a best-effort broadcast
is issued only when a uniform reliable broad-
cast or a best-effort delivery is executed. By
the no-forge property of best-effort broadcast,
a best-effort delivery is executed only if the exe-
cution of a corresponding best-effort broadcast
precedes it. Thus by a mutual induction, every
best-effort delivery for m is executed with the
initial unique counter c. A message is added to
the pending set only when a best-effort delivery
is executed. Thus, the message m from n is
added to the pending set only with the initial
unique counter c. The periodic function issues
a uniform reliable delivery for a message only
when it is in the pending set and not delivered
before. When it issues a uniform reliable deliv-
ery for a message, it is added to the delivered
set. Thus, if a uniform reliable delivery for m
from n is issued at a node, it will not be issued
again. Thus, a uniform reliable delivery for m
from n is executed at a node at most once.
We assume
(1) Γ′ = Γ;
n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)⇒ ˆ¬(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m))
and prove
Γ′ ⊢URBC n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′,m)⇒ ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′,m))
By rule OI′
(2) Γ ⊢URBC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′,m))⇒x(n ● deliverurb(n′,m) ∈ ois ∧ self)
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From Lemma 57 and Lemma 108,
(3) Γ′ ⊢URBC s [n ● deliverurb(n′,m) ∈ ois⇒
occ(ois,deliverurb(n′,m)) ≤ 1 ∧
ˆ¬(n ● deliverurb(n′,m) ∈ ois) ∧
ˆ¬(n ● deliverurb(n′,m) ∈ ois)]
From rule UniOISe,
(4) Γ′ ⊢URBC s (occ(ois,deliverurb(n′,m)) ≤ 1 ∧
ˆ(n = n→ deliverurb(n′,m) /∈ ois)∧
ˆ(n = n→ deliverurb(n′,m) /∈ ois))⇒
n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′,m)⇒
ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′,m))
From [3] and [4]
Γ′ ⊢URBC s n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′,m)⇒x[
n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′,m)⇒
ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′,m)]
That is,
Γ′ ⊢URBC s n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′,m)⇒
ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′,m)
By rule SInv
Γ′ ⊢URBC n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′,m)⇒
ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′,m)
Lemma 50.
Γ′ ⊢URBC s [∀n,n′, n′′,m, c.
(n ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′′, ⟨m,n′, c⟩))→x[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1]]
Proof.
Using Lemma 111 withA =s [∀n′, n′′,m, c.(n′′ ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩))→x[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1]A′ =s [∀n,n′, n′′,m, c.(n ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′′, ⟨m,n′, c⟩))→x[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1]]
and then Lemma 51 and Lemma 52.
Lemma 51.
Γ′ ⊢URBC s [ˆ[∀n,n′, n′′,m, c.(n ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′′, ⟨m,n′, c⟩))→x[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1]]
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→[∀n′, n′′,m, c.(n′′ ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩))→x[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1]]]
Proof.
Let
(1) Γ′′ = Γ′;
s [ˆ[∀n,n′, n′′,m, c.(n ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′′, ⟨m,n′, c⟩))→x[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1]]]
We prove that
Γ′′ ⊢URBC s [∀n′, n′′,m, c.(n′′ ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩))→x[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1]]
From [1]
(2) Γ′′ ⊢URBC s [ˆ[∀n,n′, n′′,m, c.(n ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′′, ⟨m,n′, c⟩))→x[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1]]]
By rule OISe′,
(3) Γ′′ ⊢URBC s [(n′′ ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩))→xˆ(n′′ ● (0,broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩)) ∈ ors)]
By rule InvLSe,
(4) Γ′′ ⊢URBC s [(n′′ ● broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩) ∈ ois)⇒[(n′′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′′)) = c − 1 ∧ n′′ = n′] ∨∃n′′′. (n′′ ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′′′, ⟨m,n′, c⟩))]
From [4],
(5) Γ′′ ⊢URBC s [xˆ(n′′ ● broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩) ∈ ois)⇒xˆ[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1] ∨xˆ∃n′′′. (n′′ ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′′′, ⟨m,n′, c⟩))]
From [5] and [2]
(6) Γ′′ ⊢URBC s [xˆ(n′′ ● broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩) ∈ ois)⇒xˆ[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1] ∨xˆx[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1]]
that is
(7) Γ′′ ⊢URBC s [xˆ(n′′ ● broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩) ∈ ois)⇒xˆ[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1]
From [3] and [7]
(8) Γ′′ ⊢URBC s [(n′′ ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩))→xˆ[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1]
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Thus,
Γ′′ ⊢URBC s [(n′′ ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩))→x[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1]
Lemma 52.
Γ′ ⊢URBC s [ˆ[∀n′, n′′,m, c.(n′′ ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩))→x[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1]]→[∀n,n′, n′′,m, c.(n ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′′, ⟨m,n′, c⟩))→x[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1]]]
Proof.
Let
(1) Γ′′ = Γ′;
s [ˆ[∀n′, n′′,m, c.(n′′ ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩))→x[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1]]]
We prove that
Γ′′ ⊢URBC s [∀n,n′, n′′,m, c.(n ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′′, ⟨m,n′, c⟩))→x[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1]]
From [1]
(2) Γ′′ ⊢URBC s [∀n′, n′′,m, c.
ˆ(n′′ ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩))→x[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1]]
From Γ, BEB3 and rule SInv, we have
(3) Γ′′ ⊢URBC s [∀n,n′, n′′,m, c.(n ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′′, ⟨m,n′, c⟩))⇒xˆ(n′′ ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩))
From [3] and [2]
(4) Γ′′ ⊢URBC s [∀n,n′, n′′,m, c.(n ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′′, ⟨m,n′, c⟩))→xˆx[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1]]
that is
(5) Γ′′ ⊢URBC s [∀n,n′, n′′,m, c.(n ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′′, ⟨m,n′, c⟩))→x[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1]]
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Lemma 53.
Γ′ ⊢URBC s [∀n,n′,m, c.⟨m,n′, c⟩ ∈ pending(s(n))⇒x[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1]]
Proof.
By rule InvSASe
(1) Γ′ ⊢URBC s [⟨m,n′, c⟩ ∈ pending(s(n))⇒ xˆ[((n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1 ∧ n′ = n) ∨(n ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′′, ⟨m,n′, c⟩))]]
By Lemma 50,
(2) Γ′ ⊢URBC s [∀n,n′, n′′,m, c.(n ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′′, ⟨m,n′, c⟩))⇒x[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1]]
From [1] and [2]
(3) Γ′ ⊢URBC s [⟨m,n′, c⟩ ∈ pending(s(n))⇒ xˆ[((n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1) ∨x[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1]]]
thus
(4) Γ′ ⊢URBC s [⟨m,n′, c⟩ ∈ pending(s(n))⇒x[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1]]
Lemma 54.
Γ′ ⊢URBC s [∀n, c, c′. c ≠ c′ →⟨m,n′, c⟩ ∈ pending(s(n))⇒
 ⟨m,n′, c′⟩ /∈ pending(s(n)) ∧
⟨m,n′, c′⟩ /∈ pending(s(n))]
Proof.
We show the contra-positive of the first conjunct.
Γ′ ⊢URBC s [c ≠ c′ →x⟨m,n′, c′⟩ ∈ pending(s(n))⇒¬⟨m,n′, c⟩ /∈ pending(s(n))]
By Lemma 53,
(1) Γ′ ⊢URBC s [∀n,n′, n′′,m, c.⟨m,n′, c⟩ ∈ pending(s(n))⇒x[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1]]
From [1],
(2) Γ′ ⊢URBC s [x⟨m,n′, c′⟩ ∈ pending(s(n))⇒xx[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c′ − 1]]
that is
(3) Γ′ ⊢URBC s [x⟨m,n′, c′⟩ ∈ pending(s(n))⇒x[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c′ − 1]]
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From the definition of Γ′,
(4) Γ′ ⊢URBC s [(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m))⇒
ˆ¬(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m))]
From [4] and Lemma 108
(5) Γ′ ⊢URBC s [(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c′ − 1⇒
ˆ¬(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧
ˆ¬(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m))]
thus
(6) Γ′ ⊢URBC s [c ≠ c′ →(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c′ − 1⇒
¬[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1] ∧
¬[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1]]
From [3] and [6]
(7) Γ′ ⊢URBC s [c ≠ c′ →x⟨m,n′, c′⟩ ∈ pending(s(n))⇒x[¬[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1] ∧
¬[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1]]]
thus
(8) Γ′ ⊢URBC s [c ≠ c′ →x⟨m,n′, c′⟩ ∈ pending(s(n))⇒
¬[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1]]
From the contra-positive of [1]
(9) Γ′ ⊢URBC s [¬[(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m)) ∧ count(s(n′)) = c − 1]⇒¬⟨m,n′, c⟩ ∈ pending(s(n))]
From [8] and [9]
(10) Γ′ ⊢URBC s [c ≠ c′ →x⟨m,n′, c′⟩ ∈ pending(s(n))⇒¬⟨m,n′, c⟩ /∈ pending(s(n))]
Proof of the second conjunct is similar.
Lemma 55.
Γ′ ⊢URBC s [∀n,n′,m, c.
occ(pending(s(n), ⟨m,n′, c⟩) ≤ 1]
Proof.
By rule InvSSe′,
(1) Γ′ ⊢URBC s ∀n,m, c.⟨m,n, c⟩ ∈ pending(s(n))⇒
c ≤ count(s(n))
From the definition of request and [1]
(2) Γ′ ⊢URBC s [∀n′,m, c.
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(s′(n),ois,ors) = requestc(n, s(n), e) ∧ occ(pending(s(n), ⟨m,n′, c⟩) ≤ 1⇒
occ(pending(s′(n), ⟨m,n′, c⟩) ≤ 1]
By rule InvUSSe′
Γ′ ⊢URBC s [∀n,n′,m, c.
occ(pending(s(n), ⟨m,n′, c⟩) ≤ 1]
The request case is from [2]. The indication and periodic cases are trivial.
Lemma 56.
Γ′ ⊢URBC s [∀n,n′,m
 ∣{⟨m,n′⟩ ∣ ∃c. ⟨m,n′, c⟩ ∈ pending(s(n))}∣ ≤ 1]
Proof.
Immediate from Lemma 54 and Lemma 55.
Lemma 57.
The uniform-reliable broadcast delivery event is issued at most once at every node.
Γ′ ⊢URBC s [n ● deliverurb(n′,m) ∈ ois⇒
occ(ois,deliverurb(n′,m)) ≤ 1 ∧
ˆ¬(n ● deliverurb(n′,m) ∈ ois)]
Proof.
By rule InvLSe
(1) Γ′ ⊢URBC s [(n ● deliverurb(n′,m) ∈ ois)⇒(s′(n),ois,ors) = periodicc(n, s(n))]
From the definition of periodic and Lemma 56
(2) Γ′ ⊢URBC s [(s′(n),ois,ors) = periodicc(n, s(n))⇒
occ(ois,deliverurb(n′,m)) ≤ 1]
From [1] and [2]
Γ′ ⊢URBC s [(n ● deliverurb(n′,m) ∈ ois)⇒
occ(ois,deliverurb(n′,m)) ≤ 1]
We show the contra-positive of
(3) Γ′ ⊢URBC s [n ● deliverurb(n′,m) ∈ ois⇒
ˆ¬(n ● deliverurb(n′,m) ∈ ois)]
that is
(4) Γ′ ⊢URBC s [xˆ(n ● deliverurb(n′,m) ∈ ois)⇒¬(n ● deliverurb(n′,m) ∈ ois)]
By rule InvLSe
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(5) Γ′ ⊢URBC s [(n ● deliverurb(n′,m) ∈ ois)⇒∃c. ⟨m,n′, c⟩ ∈ pending(s(n)) ∧⟨m,n′, c⟩ /∈ delivered(s(n)) ∧⟨m,n′, c⟩ ∈ delivered(s′(n))]
From the contra-positive of [5] is
(6) Γ′ ⊢URBC s [∀c. ⟨m,n′, c⟩ /∈ pending(s(n)) ∨⟨m,n′, c⟩ ∈ delivered(s(n))]⇒¬(n ● deliverurb(n′,m) ∈ ois)]
By rule InvSSe′′
(7) Γ′ ⊢URBC s [⟨m,n′, c⟩ ∈ delivered(s′(n))⇒
ˆ⟨m,n′, c⟩ ∈ delivered(s(n))]
From [5] and [7]
(8) Γ′ ⊢URBC s [(n ● deliverurb(n′,m) ∈ ois)]⇒∃c. ⟨m,n′, c⟩ ∈ pending(s(n)) ∧
ˆ⟨m,n′, c⟩ ∈ delivered(s(n))]
From [8]
(9) Γ′ ⊢URBC s [xˆ(n ● deliverurb(n′,m) ∈ ois)⇒xˆ[∃c. ⟨m,n′, c⟩ ∈ pending(s(n)) ∧
ˆ⟨m,n′, c⟩ ∈ delivered(s(n))]]
From [9] and Lemma 54
(10) Γ′ ⊢URBC s [xˆ(n ● deliverurb(n′,m) ∈ ois)⇒xˆ[∃c. ∀c′. c ≠ c′ → ⟨m,n′, c′⟩ /∈ pending(s(n)) ∧
ˆ⟨m,n′, c⟩ ∈ delivered(s(n))]]
thus
(11) Γ′ ⊢URBC s [xˆ(n ● deliverurb(n′,m) ∈ ois)⇒∃c. ∀c′. c ≠ c′ →⟨m,n′, c′⟩ /∈ pending(s(n)) ∧ ⟨m,n′, c⟩ ∈ delivered(s(n))]
From [11] and [6]
(12) Γ′ ⊢URBC s [xˆ(n ● deliverurb(n′,m) ∈ ois)⇒¬(n ● deliverurb(n′,m) ∈ ois)]
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Theorem 14. (URB3: No-forge)
If a node delivers a message m with sender n′, then m was previously broadcast by node n′.
Γ ⊢URBC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′,m))  (n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m))
where
Γ is defined in Definition 19.
Proof.
The proof idea: A uniform-reliable delivery
event is issued only in the periodic function.
The periodic function only issues messages from
the pending set. As shown in the proof of the
no-forge property, any message that is put in
the pending set is previously broadcast by the
uniform-reliable broadcast.
By rule OISe′,
(1) Γ ⊢URBC s (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′,m))⇒x(n ● deliverurb(n′,m) ∈ ois)
By rule InvLSe
(2) Γ ⊢URBC s (n ● deliverurb(n′,m) ∈ ois)⇒ ∃c. ⟨m,n′, c⟩ ∈ pending(s(n))
By Lemma 53
(3) Γ′ ⊢URBC s ⟨m,n′, c⟩ ∈ pending(s(n))⇒x(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m))
From [1], [2] and [3]
(4) Γ ⊢URBC s (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′,m))⇒x(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m))
From [4], and rule SInv,
Γ ⊢URBC (n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(n′,m))⇒x(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ broadcasturb(m))
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Theorem 15. (URB4: Uniform Agreement)
If a message m is delivered by some node (whether correct or faulty),
then m is eventually (in the past or future) delivered by every correct node.
Γ ⊢URBC ∀n,n′, ns. n ∈ Correct→(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(ns,m))⇒◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(ns,m)) ∨x(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(ns,m))
where
Γ is defined in Definition 19.
Proof.
The proof idea: A node has delivered the message. The protocol delivers a message only in the
periodic function when acknowledgement from a majority of nodes is received for the message.
As a majority of nodes are correct, there is at least one correct node in the acknowledging set. A
node is added to the acknowledging set only if a message is received (via best-effort broadcast)
from it. By the no-forge property of the best-effort broadcast, the node should have broadcast
the message. Thus, a correct node has broadcast the message. By the validity property of the
best-effort broadcast, every correct node delivers the message. When a message is delivered (via
best-effort broadcast), if it is not already in the pending set, it is rebroadcast. If it is already in
the pending set, it is already broadcast. Thus, every correct node eventually (in the past or future)
broadcasts the message. Thus, by the validity property of the best-effort broadcast, the message
is delivered to every correct node from every correct node (via best-effort broadcast). When a
message is delivered (via the best-effort broadcast), the sender is added to the acknowledgement
set and always remains in it. Thus, eventually forever, every correct node will have every correct
node in its acknowledgement set for the message. As at least a majority of nodes are correct, the
size of this set is more than half of the number of the nodes. As the periodic function is infinitely
often called, it will be eventually called when the size of the acknowledgement set for the message
is more than half of the number of the nodes. The protocol maintains the invariant that every
message that is in an acknowledgement set is in the pending set. When the periodic function
iterates the pending set, if the message is not in the delivered set, as its acknowledgement set is
already large enough, it is delivered. On the other hand, if it is in the delivered set, it is already
delivered. Thus, the message is eventually (in the past or future) delivered at every correct node.
We assume that
(1) Γ′ = Γ;n ∈ Correct
We show that
Γ ⊢URBC (n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(ns,m))⇒◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(ns,m)) ∨x(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(ns,m))
By rule OISe′,
(2) Γ ⊢URBC s (n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(ns,m))⇒x(n′ ● deliverurb(ns,m) ∈ ois)
By rule InvLSe
(3) Γ ⊢URBC s (n′ ● deliverurb(ns,m) ∈ ois)⇒∃c. ∣ack(s(n′))(⟨m,ns, c⟩)∣ > ∣N∣/2
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By Lemma 58
(4) Γ ⊢URBC s ack(s(n′))(⟨m,ns, c⟩) ⊆ N
It is obvious that
(5) Γ ⊢URBC s ∣N∣/2 + ∣N∣/2 ≥ ∣N∣
By rule Quorum on Definition 19 (correct majority), [4] and [5] on [3]
(6) Γ ⊢URBC s (n′ ● deliverurb(ns,m) ∈ ois)⇒∃c, n′′. n′′ ∈ Correct ∧ n′′ ∈ ack(s(n′))(⟨m,ns, c⟩)
By Lemma 99 on [2] and [6]
(7) Γ ⊢URBC s (n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(ns,m))⇒x∃c, n′′. n′′ ∈ Correct ∧ n′′ ∈ ack(s(n′))(⟨m,ns, c⟩)
By rule InvSASe with
S = n′′ ∈ ack(s(n′))(⟨m,ns, c⟩)A = n′ ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′′, ⟨m,ns, c⟩)
(8) Γ ⊢URBC s (n′′ ∈ ack(s(n′))(⟨m,ns, c⟩))⇒x(n′ ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′′, ⟨m,ns, c⟩))
By Definition 19 (BEB′3) and rule SInv,
(9) Γ ⊢URBC s (n′ ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(n′′, ⟨m,ns, c⟩))⇒x(n′′ ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,ns, c⟩))
By Lemma 88 on [8] and [9],
(10) Γ ⊢URBC s (n′′ ∈ ack(s(n′))(⟨m,ns, c⟩))⇒x(n′′ ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,ns, c⟩))
By Lemma 88 on [7] and [10],
(11) Γ ⊢URBC s (n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(ns,m))⇒x∃c, n′′. n′′ ∈ Correct ∧ (n′′ ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,ns, c⟩))
By Lemma 45 on [11] and [1], and then Lemma 112
(12) Γ ⊢URBC s (n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(ns,m))⇒◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(ns,m)) ∨x(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(ns,m))
By rule SInv on [12]
Γ ⊢URBC (n′ ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(ns,m))⇒◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(ns,m)) ∨x(n ● ⊺ ↑ deliverurb(ns,m))
Lemma 58.
Γ ⊢URBC s ack(s(n))(⟨m,ns, c⟩) ⊆ N
Proof.
We show that
Γ ⊢URBC s ∀n. n ∈ ack(s(n))(⟨m,ns, c⟩)⇒ n ∈ N
By rule InvSASe
(1) Γ ⊢URBC s n ∈ ack(s(n))(⟨m,ns, c⟩)⇒x(n ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(ns, ⟨m,n′, c⟩))
By Definition 19 (BEB′3)
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(2) Γ ⊢URBC s (n ● 0 ↑ deliverbeb(ns, ⟨m,n′, c⟩))⇒x(ns ● 0 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨m,n′, c⟩)))
By Lemma 88 on [1], [2] and rule Node,
(3) Γ ⊢URBC s n ∈ ack(s(n))(⟨m,ns, c⟩)⇒xn ∈ N
that is (n is rigid.)
Γ ⊢URBC s n ∈ ack(s(n))(⟨m,ns, c⟩)⇒ n ∈ N
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5.3.5 Eventually Perfect Failure Detector
Theorem 16. (EPFD1: Strong Completeness)
Every incorrect node is eventually permanently suspected by every correct node.∀n,n′. n ∈ Correct ∧ ¬n′ ∈ Correct→◇[(n ● ⊺ ↑ suspect(n′)) ∧¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ restore(n′))].
Proof.
By the rule APer, the periodic handler of an incorrect node n′ is executed only finitely often.
So the periodic handler of n′ is eventually never executed. By the rule InvL, only the periodic
handler sends heartbeat messages. Therefore, n′ will eventually never send heartbeat messages.
By the rule NForge, a message is received only if it is sent. Thus, no node will eventually receive
heartbeat messages from n′. By the rule InvL, the node n′ is added to the active set of the node
n only when n receives a heartbeat message from n′. Therefore, eventually after a round r, the
node n′ will be absent in active(r) of the node n. Therefore, in round r + 1, the periodic handler
of n issues a suspect event for n′, if n′ is not in the failed set. If it is in the failed set, it is
already suspected and not restored since. From round r + 1, the node n′ will be never restored.
This is because by the rule InvL, the restore indication for n′ is issued only when it is found in
the active set.
Theorem 17. (EPFD2: Eventual Strong Accuracy)
Eventually no correct node is suspected by any correct node.∀n,n′. n ∈ Correct ∧ n′ ∈ Correct→
¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ suspect(n′)) ∨◇[(n ● ⊺ ↑ restore(n′)) ∧¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ suspect(n′))].
Proof.
In the periodic handler, every correct node n′ sends a heartbeat message to every node in every
round r. By the rule GST, after the round global stabilization time (GST), every correct node
n delivers every message set to it in the same round. On the receipt of the heartbeat message,
the indication handler adds the sender n′ to the active set of n. By the rule RSeq, the periodic
event per of round r + 1 is executed after the indication events ↓ of round r. By the rule InvS,
the node n′ remains in the active set of n. When the periodic event per of round r + 1 executes,
the node n finds n′ in active set. The node n restores n′ if it is suspected before and does not
suspect n′. By the rule InvL, suspecting nodes is only issued in the periodic handler. In the
periodic handler, the node n′ is always found in the active set and hence is never suspected again.
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5.3.6 Eventual Leader Elector
Theorem 18. (ELE1 (Eventual Leadership)
Eventually every correct process trusts the same correct process.∃l. l ∈ Correct ∧[n ∈ Correct→◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ trust(l) ∧ ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ trust(l′)))].
Proof.
Immediate from the two properties EPFD1 and EPFD2. Eventually every node will have every
incorrect node in the suspected set and every correct node not in the suspected set: the suspected
set will be the set of incorrect nodes. The periodic event after the latest such event applies the
maxRank funciton to the set of correct nodes and deterministically chooses the leader.
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5.3.7 Epoch Consensus
Definition 20.
Γ = ∣Correct∣ > N/2;
PL′1,PL′2,PL′3,BEB′1; BEB′2; BEB′3
PL′1 = lower(0,PL1) =
n ∈ Correct ∧ n′ ∈ Correct→(n ● 0 ↓ sendpl(n′,m) 
n ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,m))
PL′2 = lower(0,PL2) =[n′ ● 0 ↓ sendpl(n,m)⇒
ˆ¬(n′ ● 0 ↓ sendpl(n,m))]→[n ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n′,m)⇒
ˆ¬(n ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))]
PL′3 = lower(0,PL3) =(n ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))  (n′ ● 0 ↓ sendpl(n,m))
BEB′1 = lower(1,BEB1) =
n ∈ Correct ∧ n′ ∈ Correct→(n′ ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(m)) (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))
BEB′2 = lower(1,BEB2) =[n′ ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(m)⇒
ˆ¬(n′ ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(m))]→[n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m)⇒
ˆ¬(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))]
BEB′3 = lower(1,BEB3) =(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))  (n′ ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(m))
Cons =(n ● ⊺ ↓ epochec(ts, nl))⇒(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ epochec(ts, n′l))⇒
nl = n′l
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Theorem 19. (EC1: Validity)
If a node decides the value v, then v was proposed by the current leader nl or is passed to a node
during initialization.
Γ ⊢ECC(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))⇒x(nl ● ⊺ ↓ proposeec(v))
where
Γ is defined in Definition 20.
Proof.
We assume
(1) Γ′ = Γ; v ≠ 
We show
Γ′ ⊢ECC (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))⇒x(nl ● ⊺ ↓ proposeec(v))
By Lemma 59,
(2) Γ′ ⊢ECC s (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))⇒x(wval(s(nl)) = v ∧ v ≠ )
By InvSASe with,
n instantiated to nl,
S instantiated to λs. wval(s) ≠  andA instantiated to wval(s′(nl)) = prop(s(nl)) ∨ ∃n′. ( ,wval(s′(nl))) = states(s′(nl))(n′)
(3) Γ ⊢ECC s wval(s(nl)) ≠ ⇒xˆ(wval(s′(nl)) = prop(s(nl)) ∨ ∃n′. ( ,wval(s′(nl))) = states(s′(nl))(n′))
From [2] and [3] and Lemma 99 and Lemma 86
(4) Γ′ ⊢ECC s (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))⇒xˆ(v = prop(s(nl)) ∨ ∃n′. ( , v) = states(s′(nl))(n′)) ∧ v ≠ )
By PostPre on [5]
(5) Γ′ ⊢ECC s (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))⇒xˆ(v = prop(s(nl)) ∨ ◯∃n′. ( , v) = states(s(nl))(n′)) ∧ v ≠ )
By InvSASe with,
n instantiated to nl,
S instantiated to λs. prop(s) = v ∧ prop(s) ≠  andA instantiated to proposeec(v)
(6) Γ ⊢ECC s prop(s(nl)) = v ∧ prop(s(nl)) ≠ ⇒xˆ(nl ● ⊺ ↓ proposeec(v))
From [5], [6] and Lemma 60,
(7) Γ′ ⊢ECC s (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))⇒xˆ(x(nl ● ⊺ ↓ proposeec(v)) ∨ ◯ [∃n′. x(nl ● ⊺ ↓ proposeec(v)))]
By Lemma 86 and Lemma 121 on [7]
(8) Γ′ ⊢ECC s (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))⇒
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x(nl ● ⊺ ↓ proposeec(v))
Lemma 59.
Γ ⊢ECC s (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))⇒x[∣states(s(nl))∣ > ∣N∣/2 ∧wval(s(nl)) = v ∧ v ≠  ∧
highest(states(s(nl))) ≠ → wval(s(nl)) = highest(states(s(nl)))]
By OISe′,
(9) Γ′ ⊢ECC s (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))⇒xˆ(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v) ∈ ois)
By InvLSe,
(10) Γ′ ⊢ECC s (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v) ∈ ois)⇒(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Decided(⟨ts, v⟩)))
From Γ′′ and BEB′3, we have,
(11) Γ′ ⊢ECC (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Decided(⟨ts, v⟩)))⇒x(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Decided(⟨ts, v⟩)))
By ORSe′,
(12) Γ′ ⊢ECC s (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Decided(⟨ts, v⟩)))⇒xˆ(nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(Decided(⟨ts, v⟩))) ∈ ors)
From [10], [11], and [12] and SInv
(13) Γ′ ⊢ECC s (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v) ∈ ois)⇒xˆ(nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(Decided(⟨ts, v⟩))) ∈ ors)
By InvLSe
(14) Γ′ ⊢ECC s (nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(Decided(⟨ts, v⟩))) ∈ ors)⇒(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,Accepted(ts))) ∧(wval(s(nl)) = v)
From Γ′, PL′3 and SInv, we have,
(15) Γ′ ⊢ECC (nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,Accepted(ts)))⇒x(n ● 0 ↓ sendpl(nl,Accepted(ts)))
By ORSe′,
(16) Γ′ ⊢ECC s (n ● 0 ↓ sendpl(nl,Accepted(ts)))⇒xˆ(nl ● (0, sendpl(nl,Accepted(ts))) ∈ ors)
By InvLSe
(17) Γ′ ⊢ECC (n ● 0 ↓ sendpl(nl,Accepted(ts)) ∈ ors)⇒∃v′. (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Accept(⟨ts, v′⟩)))
From Γ′, BEB′3 and SInv, we have,
(18) Γ′ ⊢ECC (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Accept(⟨ts, v′⟩)))⇒x(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept(⟨ts, v′⟩)))
By ORSe′,
(19) Γ′ ⊢ECC s (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept(⟨ts, v′⟩)))⇒xˆ(nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(Accept(⟨ts, v′⟩))) ∈ ors)
By InvLSe
(20) Γ′ ⊢ECC s (nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(Accept(⟨ts, v′⟩))) ∈ ors)⇒∣states(s′(nl))∣ > ∣N∣/2 ∧wval(s′(nl)) = v′ ∧ v′ ≠ ∧
highest(states(s′(nl))) ≠ → wval(s′(nl)) = highest(states(s′(nl)))
By Lemma 88, Lemma 99 and Lemma 86 on [14] and [13] to [20]
(21) Γ′ ⊢ECC s (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))⇒xˆ[(wval(s′(nl)) = v) ∧
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xˆ[∣states(s′(nl))∣ > ∣N∣/2 ∧wval(s′(nl)) = v′ ∧ v′ ≠ ∧
highest(states(s′(nl))) ≠ → wval(s′(nl)) = highest(states(s′(nl)))]]
By InvSSe′′
(22) Γ′ ⊢ECC wval(s′(nl)) = v′ ∧ v′ ≠ ⇒
ˆwval(s(nl)) = v′
From [21] and [22]
(23) Γ′ ⊢ECC s (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))⇒xˆ[(wval(s(nl)) = v) ∧xˆ[∣states(s′(nl))∣ > ∣N∣/2 ∧wval(s′(nl)) = v′ ∧ v′ ≠ ∧
highest(states(s′(nl))) ≠ → wval(s′(nl)) = highest(states(s′(nl)))] ∧xˆˆwval(s(nl)) = v′]
that is
Γ′ ⊢ECC s (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))⇒xˆ[(wval(s(nl)) = v) ∧xˆ[∣states(s′(nl))∣ > ∣N∣/2 ∧wval(s′(nl)) = v′ ∧ v′ ≠ ∧
highest(states(s′(nl))) ≠ → wval(s′(nl)) = highest(states(s′(nl)))] ∧
wval(s(nl)) = v′]
that is
Γ′ ⊢ECC s (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))⇒xˆ[v = v′ ∧xˆ[∣states(s′(nl))∣ > ∣N∣/2 ∧wval(s′(nl)) = v′ ∧ v′ ≠ ∧
highest(states(s′(nl))) ≠ → wval(s′(nl)) = highest(states(s′(nl)))]]
that is
Γ′ ⊢ECC s (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))⇒xˆ[xˆ[∣states(s′(nl))∣ > ∣N∣/2 ∧wval(s′(nl)) = v ∧ v ≠ ∧
highest(states(s′(nl))) ≠ → wval(s′(nl)) = highest(states(s′(nl)))]]
that by Lemma 86 is
(24) Γ′ ⊢ECC s (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))⇒xˆ[∣states(s′(nl))∣ > ∣N∣/2 ∧wval(s′(nl)) = v ∧ v ≠ ∧
highest(states(s′(nl))) ≠ → wval(s′(nl)) = highest(states(s′(nl)))]
By PostPre and Lemma 121
(25) Γ′ ⊢ECC s (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))⇒x[∣states(s(nl))∣ > ∣N∣/2 ∧wval(s(nl)) = v ∧ v ≠ ∧
highest(states(s′(nl))) ≠ → wval(s(nl)) = highest(states(s(nl)))]
Lemma 60.
Γ ⊢ECC s [(val(s(n)) = v) ∨(states(s(nl))(n′) = ( , v))]⇒x(nl ● ⊺ ↓ proposeec(v))
Proof.
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By Lemma 110 on Lemma 61 and Lemma 62.
Lemma 61.
Γ ⊢ECC s
ˆ[(states(s(nl))(n′) = ( , v))→x(nl ● ⊺ ↓ proposeec(v))]⇒(val(s(n)) = v)⇒x(nl ● ⊺ ↓ proposeec(v))
Proof.
By InvSASe with,
n instantiated to n,
S instantiated to λs. val(s) = v andA instantiated to proposeec(v)
(1) Γ′ ⊢ECC s (val(s(n)) = v)⇒xˆ(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Accept(⟨ts, v⟩)))
From Γ′ and BEB′3, we have,
(2) Γ′ ⊢ECC (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Accept(⟨ts, v⟩)))⇒x(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept(⟨ts, v⟩)))
By Lemma 99 and Lemma 86 on [1] and [2] and SInv
(3) Γ′ ⊢ECC s (val(s(n)) = v)⇒x(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept(⟨ts, v⟩)))
By ORSe′,
(4) Γ′ ⊢ECC s (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept(⟨ts, v⟩)))⇒xˆ(nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(Accept(⟨ts, v⟩))) ∈ ors)
By InvLSe,
(5) Γ′ ⊢ECC s (nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(Accept(⟨ts, v⟩))) ∈ ors)⇒(v = prop(s(nl)) ∧ v ≠ ) ∨∃n′. ( , v) = states(s(nl))(n′)
By InvSASe with,
n instantiated to nl,
S instantiated to λs. prop(s) = v ∧ prop(s) ≠  andA instantiated to proposeec(v)
(6) Γ ⊢ECC s prop(s(nl)) = v ∧ prop(s(nl)) ≠ ⇒xˆ(nl ● ⊺ ↓ proposeec(v))
By Lemma 88, Lemma 99 and Lemma 86 on [3] to [6]
(7) Γ′ ⊢ECC s (val(s(n)) = v)⇒ xˆ[(nl ● ⊺ ↓ proposeec(v)) ∨∃n′. ( , v) = states(s(nl))(n′)]
After adding a premise,
(8) Γ′ ⊢ECC s ˆ[(states(s(nl))(n′) = ( , v))→x(nl ● ⊺ ↓ proposeec(v))]⇒(val(s(n)) = v)⇒xˆ(nl ● ⊺ ↓ proposeec(v)) ∨xˆ∃n′. ( , v) = states(s(nl))(n′)
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After applying the premise in the conclusion,
that is replacing(states(s(nl))(n′) = ( , v))
withx(nl ● ⊺ ↓ proposeec(v))
we have
(9) Γ′ ⊢ECC s ˆ[(states(s(nl))(n′) = ( , v))→x(nl ● ⊺ ↓ proposeec(v))]⇒(val(s(n)) = v)⇒xˆ(nl ● ⊺ ↓ proposeec(v)) ∨xˆx(nl ● ⊺ ↓ proposeec(v))
that is
(10) Γ′ ⊢ECC s ˆ[(states(s(nl))(n′) = ( , v))→x(nl ● ⊺ ↓ proposeec(v))]⇒(val(s(n)) = v)⇒x(nl ● ⊺ ↓ proposeec(v))
Lemma 62.
Γ ⊢ECC s
ˆ[(val(s(n)) = v)→x(nl ● ⊺ ↓ proposeec(v))]⇒(states(s(nl))(n′) = ( , v))⇒x(nl ● ⊺ ↓ proposeec(v))
Proof.
By InvSASe with,
n instantiated to nl,
S instantiated to λs. states(s)(n′) = (vts, v) andA instantiated to (nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,State⟨vts, v⟩)
(1) Γ ⊢ECC s states(s(nl))(n′) = (vts, v)⇒xˆ(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n′,State⟨vts, v⟩)
From Γ′ and PL3 we have,
(2) Γ ⊢ECC s (nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n′,State⟨vts, v⟩)⇒x(n′ ● 0 ↓ sendpl(nl,State⟨vts, v⟩)
By Lemma 99 and Lemma 86 on [1] and [2] and SInv
(3) Γ ⊢ECC s states(s(nl))(n′) = (vts, v)⇒x(n′ ● 0 ↓ sendpl(nl,State⟨vts, v⟩)
By ORSe’ on [3],
(4) Γ ⊢ECC s (n′ ● 0 ↓ sendpl(nl,State⟨vts, v⟩))⇒xˆ(n′ ● (0, sendpl(nl,State⟨vts, v⟩)) ∈ ors)
By InvLSe,
(5) Γ ⊢ECC s (n′ ● (0, sendpl(nl,State⟨vts, v⟩)) ∈ ors)⇒
val(s(n′)) = v
By Lemma 88, Lemma 99 and Lemma 86 on [3] to [5]
(6) Γ ⊢ECC s states(s(nl))(n′) = (vts, v)⇒
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xˆval(s(n′)) = v
After adding a premise,
(7) Γ′ ⊢ECC s ˆ[(val(s(n)) = v)→x(nl ● ⊺ ↓ proposeec(v))]⇒
states(s(nl))(n′) = (vts, v)⇒xˆval(s(n′)) = v
After applying the premise in the conclusion,
(8) Γ′ ⊢ECC s ˆ[(val(s(n)) = v)→x(nl ● ⊺ ↓ proposeec(v))]⇒
states(s(nl))(n′) = (vts, v)⇒x(nl ● ⊺ ↓ proposeec(v))
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Theorem 20. (EC2: Uniform Agreement)
No two nodes decide differently.
Γ ⊢ECC(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))⇒(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v′))⇒
v = v′
where
Γ is defined in Definition 20.
Proof.
We prove the equivalent formula
(1) Γ ⊢ECCx(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v)) ∧(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v′))⇒
v = v′
By OI′,
(2) Γ′ ⊢ECC (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v)) ⇒xˆ(n ● decideec(v) ∈ ois ∧ self)
By InvL,
(3) Γ′ ⊢ECC (self ∧ n ● decideec(v) ∈ ois)⇒∃ts, nl. (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Decided(ts, v)))
From [2] and [3], we have
(4) Γ ⊢ECC [x(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v)) ∧(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v′))]⇒∃ts1, nl1, ts2, nl2.x(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl1,Decided(ts1, v))) ∧x(n′ ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl2,Decided(ts2, v′)))
Without loss of generality, we assume that
(5) Γ ⊢ECC ts1 ≤ ts2
From Lemma 63 on [5], we have
(6) Γ ⊢ECC (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl1,Decided(ts1, v)))⇒
[(n′ ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl2,Decided(ts2, v′)))→ v′ = v] ∧
[(n′ ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl2,Decided(ts2, v′)))→ v′ = v]
From [4] and [6], we have
(7) Γ ⊢ECC [x(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v)) ∧(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v′))]⇒
v = v′
Lemma 63.
Γ ⊢ECC ts2 ≥ ts1 →(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Decided(ts1, v)))⇒
[(n′ ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Decided(ts2, v′)))→ v′ = v] ∧
[(n′ ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Decided(ts2, v′)))→ v′ = v]
where
Γ is defined in Definition 20.
Proof.
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Immediate from Lemma 64 and Lemma 68.
Lemma 64.
Γ ⊢ECC(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Decided(ts, v)))  ∃n′. (n′ ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Accept(ts, v)))
where
Γ is defined in Definition 20.
Proof.
By BEB′3,
(1) Γ ⊢ECC (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Decided(ts, v)))⇒x(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Decided(ts, v)))
By OR′,
(2) Γ ⊢ECC (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Decided(ts, v)))⇒x(nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(Decided(ts, v))) ∈ ors ∧ self)
By InvL,
(3) Γ ⊢ECC (nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(Decided(ts, v))) ∈ ors ∧ self)⇒∃n′. (nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n′,Accepted(ts)))
By PL′3,
(4) Γ ⊢ECC (nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n′,Accepted(ts)))⇒x(n′ ● 0 ↓ sendpl(nl,Accepted(ts)))
By OR′,
(5) Γ ⊢ECC (n′ ● 0 ↓ sendpl(nl,Accepted(ts)))⇒x(n′ ● (0, sendpl(nl,Accepted(ts))) ∈ ors ∧ self)
By InvL,
(6) Γ ⊢ECC (n′ ● (0, sendpl(nl,Accepted(ts, v))) ∈ ors ∧ self)⇒∃v′, n′l. (n′ ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(n′l,Accept(ts, v′)))
From [1]-[6]
(7) Γ ⊢ECC (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Decided(ts, v)))⇒∃v′, n′, n′l. x(n′ ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(n′l,Accept(ts, v′)))
From [7], Lemma 65 and Lemma 66
(8) Γ ⊢ECC (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Decided(ts, v)))  ∃n′. (n′ ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Accept(ts, v)))
Lemma 65.
Γ ⊢ECC(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Decided(ts, v)))⇒(n′l ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept(ts, v′)))⇒
nl = n′l
where
Γ is defined in Definition 20.
Proof.
By a chain use of OR′, InvL, BEB′3, and PL′3,
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(1) Γ ⊢ECC(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Decided(ts, v)))⇒∃n. x(n ● ⊺ ↓ epochec(ts, n))
(2) Γ ⊢ECC(n′l ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept(ts, v′)))⇒∃n. x(n ● ⊺ ↓ epochec(ts, n))
From Definition 20,
(3) Γ ⊢ECC (n ● ⊺ ↓ epochec(ts, nl))⇒
ts ≠ 
From [1], [2], [3]
(4) Γ ⊢ECC (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Decided(ts, v)))⇒
ts ≠ 
(5) Γ ⊢ECC (n′l ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept(ts, v′)))⇒
ts ≠ 
By IR,
(6) Γ ⊢ECC(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Decided(ts, v)))⇒
ts = ets(s(nl))
(7) Γ ⊢ECC(n′l ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept(ts, v′)))⇒
ts = ets(s(n′l))
By InvSA,
(8) Γ ⊢ECC
ets(s(nl)) = ts ∧ ts ≠  ∧ self⇒x(nl ● ⊺ ↓ epoch(nl, ts))
From Definition 20,
(9) Γ ⊢ECC(n ● ⊺ ↓ epochec(ts, nl))⇒(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ epochec(ts, n′l))⇒
nl = n′l
From [4]-[9]
Γ ⊢ECC(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Decided(ts, v)))⇒(n′l ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept(ts, v′)))⇒
nl = n′l
Lemma 66.
Γ ⊢ECC(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Decided(ts, v)))⇒(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept(ts, v′)))⇒
v = v′
where
Γ is defined in Definition 20.
Proof.
By InvL,
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(1) Γ ⊢ECC(nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(Accept(ts, v))) ∈ ors) ∧ self⇒
v = wval(s′(nl))(ts) ∧ v ≠ 
By InvS,
(2) Γ ⊢ECC
wval(s(n))(ts) = v ∧ v ≠  ∧ self⇒
(self⇒ wval(s(n))(ts) = v)
By ASA on [1] and [2],
(3) Γ ⊢ECC(nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(Accept(ts, v))) ∈ ors) ∧ self⇒
ˆ(self→ wval(s(nl))(ts) = v)
By InvL,
(4) Γ ⊢ECC(nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(Decided(ts, v′))) ∈ ors) ∧ self⇒
v′ = wval(s(nl))(ts)
From [3] and [4], we have
(5) Γ ⊢ECC(nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(Accept(ts, v))) ∈ ors) ∧ self⇒(nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(Decided(ts, v′))) ∈ ors) ∧ self⇒
v = v′
By OR′,
(6) Γ ⊢ECC (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Decided(ts, v)))⇒x(nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(Decided(ts, v))) ∈ ors ∧ self)
By OR′,
(7) Γ ⊢ECC (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept(ts, v′)))⇒x(nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(Accept(ts, v))) ∈ ors ∧ self)
From [5], [6], and [7], we have
(8) Γ ⊢ECC(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Decided(ts, v)))⇒(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept(ts, v′)))⇒
v = v′
Lemma 67.
Γ ⊢ECC(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Decided(ts, v)))⇒
[(nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(Accept(ts, v′))) ∈ ors ∧ self)→ v′ = v] ∧
[(nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(Accept(ts, v′))) ∈ ors ∧ self)→ v′ = v]
where
Γ is defined in Definition 20.
Proof.
By Lemma 64,
Γ ⊢ECC(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Decided(ts, v)))  ∃n′. (nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(Accept(ts, v))) ∈ ors ∧ self)
Thus, we show the equivalent formula
Γ ⊢ECC
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(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Accept(ts, v)))⇒(n′ ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Accept(ts, v′)))⇒
v′ = v
The rest of the proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 65 and Lemma 66.
Lemma 68.
Γ ⊢ECC ts2 ≥ ts1 →(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Decided(ts1, v)))⇒
[(n′ ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Accept(ts2, v′)))→ v′ = v] ∧
[(n′ ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Accept(ts2, v′)))→ v′ = v]
where
Γ is defined in Definition 20.
Proof.
Proof by induction on ts2 starting from ts1.
(1) Base Case: ts2 = ts1
Immediate from Lemma 67.
(2) Inductive Case:
We assume that
(3) Γ ⊢ECC ∀ts. ts1 ≤ ts < ts2 →(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Decided(ts1, v)))⇒
[(n′ ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Accept(ts, v′)))→ v′ = v] ∧
[(n′ ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Accept(ts, v′)))→ v′ = v]
We show that
Γ ⊢ECC(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Decided(ts1, v)))⇒
[(n′ ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Accept(ts2, v′)))→ v′ = v] ∧
[(n′ ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Accept(ts2, v′)))→ v′ = v]
By BEB′3,
(4) Γ ⊢ECC (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Accept(ts2, v′)))⇒x(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept(ts2, v′)))
By OR′,
(5) Γ ⊢ECC (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept(ts2, v′)))⇒x(nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(Accept(ts2, v′))) ∈ ors ∧ self)
From [4] and [5], we need to show that
Γ ⊢ECC(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Decided(ts1, v)))⇒
[(nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(Accept(ts2, v′))) ∈ ors ∧ self)→ v′ = v] ∧
[(nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(Accept(ts2, v′))) ∈ ors ∧ self)→ v′ = v]
From [3], we need to show that
Γ ⊢ECC(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Decided(ts1, v))) ∧∀ts. ts1 ≤ ts < ts2 →
[(n′ ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Accept(ts, v′)))→ v′ = v] ∧
[(n′ ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Accept(ts, v′)))→ v′ = v]⇒
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[(nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(Accept(ts2, v′))) ∈ ors ∧ self)→ v′ = v] ∧
[(nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(Accept(ts2, v′))) ∈ ors ∧ self)→ v′ = v]
We can show that
(6) Γ ⊢ECC(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Decided(ts, v)))⇒∃N. ∣N ∣ > ∣N∣/2 ∧ ∀n′. n′ ∈ N →x(valts(s′(n′)) = ts ∧ val(s′(n′)) = v ∧ ts > rts(s(n′))
By InvLSe, we have
(7) Γ ⊢ECC(nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(Accept(ts2, v′))) ∈ ors ∧ self)⇒∣states(s′(nl))∣ > ∣N∣/2 ∧wval(s′(nl))(ts2) = v′ ∧ v′ ≠  ∧
highest(states(s′(nl))) ≠ → wval(s′(nl))(ts2) = highest(states(s′(nl)))
We have (from the two intersecting sets)
(8) Γ ⊢ECC∀N. ∣N ∣ > ∣N∣/2 ∧∀n′. n′ ∈ N →x(valts(s′(n′)) = ts1 ∧ val(s′(n′)) = v ∧ ts > rts(s(n′))) ∧∣states(s′(nl))∣ > ∣N∣/2⇒∃n′. n′ ∈ dom(states(s′(nl)))∧x(valts(s′(n′)) = ts1∧val(s′(n′)) = v∧ts1 > rts(s(n′)))
By InvSA, then OI′ and InvL
(9) Γ ⊢ECC
self ∧ states(s′(nl))(n′) = ⟨tsn′ , vn′⟩ ∧ ets(s(nl)) = ts2 ⇒x[(n′ ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Prepare(ts2))) ∧
valts(s(n′)) = tsn′ ∧ val(s(n′)) = vn′ ∧ rts(s′(n′)) = ts2]
By InvS′′
(10) Γ ⊢ECC(self ∧ rts(s′(n′)) ≥ ts2)⇒ ˆ(self→ rts(s(n′)) ≥ ts2)
From [10], we have
(11) Γ ⊢ECC
ts1 ≤ ts2 →x(valts(s′(n′)) = ts1 ∧ val(s′(n′)) = v ∧ ts1 > rts(s(n′))) ∧x(valts(s(n′)) = tsn′ ∧ val(s(n′)) = vn′ ∧ rts(s′(n′)) = ts2)⇒x[(valts(s(n′)) = tsn′ ∧ val(s(n′)) = vn′ ∧ rts(s′(n′)) = ts2)x(valts(s′(n′)) = ts1 ∧ val(s′(n′)) = v ∧ ts1 > rts(s(n′))
Thus, we have
(12) Γ ⊢ECC(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Decided(ts, v))) ∧∀ts. ts1 ≤ ts < ts2 →
[(n′ ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Accept(ts, v′)))→ v′ = v] ∧
[(n′ ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Accept(ts, v′)))→ v′ = v]⇒(nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(Accept(ts2, v′))) ∈ ors ∧ self)⇒∃ts, n′. states(s′(nl))(n′) = ⟨ts, v⟩ ∧ ts1 ≤ ts < ts2 ∧
highest(states(s′(nl))) = v′ = v
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Theorem 21. (EC3: Integrity)
Every node decides at most once.
Γ ⊢ECC (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))⇒
ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v′))
where
Γ is defined in Definition 20.
Proof.
By InvL,
(1) Γ′ ⊢ECC n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v)⇒
deciced(s(n)) = false ∧ decided(s′(n)) = true
By InvSSe,
(2) Γ′ ⊢ECC decided(s(nl)) = true⇒
(decided(s(nl)) = true)
By [1] and [2],
(3) Γ′ ⊢ECC n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v)⇒
decided(s′(n)) = true
By PostPre on [3],
(4) Γ′ ⊢ECC n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v)⇒
◯decided(s(n)) = true
That is,
(5) Γ′ ⊢ECC n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v)⇒
ˆdecided(s(n)) = true
The contra-positive of [1] and changing v to v′,
(6) Γ′ ⊢ECC ¬(deciced(s(n)) = false ∧ decided(s′(n)) = true)⇒¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v′))
That is,
(7) Γ′ ⊢ECC (deciced(s(n)) = true)⇒¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v′))
From [5] and [7]
(8) Γ′ ⊢ECC n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v)⇒
ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v′))
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Theorem 22. (EC4: Termination)
If a correct node proposes and an epoch is started with that node as the leader, then every correct
node eventually decides a value.
Γ ⊢ECC nl ∈ Correct→∣Correct∣ > ∣N∣/2 ∧ n ∈ Correct→x(n ● ⊺ ↓ proposeec(v))⇒(n ● ⊺ ↓ epochec(n, ts))⇒∀n′. n′ ∈ Correct→x◇∃v′. (n′ ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v′))
where
Γ is defined in Definition 20.
Proof.
By IROR,
(1) Γ ⊢ECC (nl ● ⊺ ↓ epochec(n, ts)) ∧ n = nl ⇒◇(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Prepare(ts)))
By BEB′1 on [1],
(2) Γ ⊢ECC ∀n. n ∈ Correct→ (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Prepare(ts)))⇒◇(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Prepare(ts)))
By IIOR,
(3) Γ ⊢ECC ∀n. n ∈ Correct→ (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Prepare(ts)) ∧ ts > rts(s(n)))⇒◇(n ● 0 ↓ sendpl(nl,State⟨ts, vts, val⟩))
By PL′1 on [3] and using the Lemma 89,
(4) Γ ⊢ECC ∀n. n ∈ Correct→ (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Prepare(ts)) ∧ ts > rts(s(n)))⇒◇(nl ● 0 ↓ deliverpl(nl,State⟨ts, vts, val⟩))
By II,
(5) Γ ⊢ECC (nl ● 0 ↓ deliverpl(nl,State⟨ts, vts, val⟩) ∧ ets(s(nl)) = ts)⇒
self ∧ ⟨vts, val⟩ ∈ states(s′(nl))(n)
By InvS,
(6) Γ ⊢ECC self ∧ ⟨vts, val⟩ ∈ states(s′(nl))(n)⇒(self⇒ ⟨vts, val⟩ ∈ states(s′(nl))(n))
From [2] and [6] to [4],
(7) Γ ⊢ECC ∀n. n ∈ Correct→ (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Prepare(ts)))⇒◇[(nl ● 0 ↓ deliverpl(n,State⟨ts, vts, val⟩)∧) ∧
self⇒ ⟨vts, val⟩ ∈ states(s′(nl))(n)]
Thus, there exists n′ such that
(8) Γ ⊢ECC (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Prepare(ts)))⇒◇[(nl ● 0 ↓ deliverpl(n′,State⟨ts, vts, val⟩)) ∧
self⇒ ∀n. n ∈ Correct→ ⟨vts, val⟩ ∈ states(s′(nl))(n)]
That is,
(9) Γ ⊢ECC (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Prepare(ts)))⇒◇[(nl ● 0 ↓ deliverpl(n′,State⟨ts, vts, val⟩)) ∧
self⇒ (∣states(s′(nl))∣ ≥ ∣Correct∣)]
By Definition 20 (a majority of correct nodes) on [9],
(10) Γ ⊢ECC (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Prepare(ts)))⇒◇[(nl ● 0 ↓ deliverpl(n′,State⟨ts, vts, val⟩)) ∧
self⇒ (∣states(s′(nl))∣ ≥ ∣N∣/2)]
Thus, as the deliver event is a self event
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(11) Γ ⊢ECC (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Prepare(ts)))⇒◇[(nl ● 0 ↓ deliverpl(n′,State⟨ts, vts, val⟩)) ∧∣states(s′(nl))∣ ≥ ∣N∣/2]
By Lemma 69 on [11]
(12) Γ ⊢ECC (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Prepare(ts)))⇒◇[◇(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨t, v⟩))∨x(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨t, v⟩))]
By Lemma 112 on [12]
(13) Γ ⊢ECC (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Prepare(ts)))⇒x(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨t, v⟩))∨◇(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨t, v⟩))
From [1] to [3] and [13],
(14) Γ ⊢ECC (nl ● ⊺ ↓ epochec(n, ts)) ∧ n = nl ⇒◇[x(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨t, v⟩))∨◇(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨t, v⟩))]
By Lemma 112 on [15],
(15) Γ ⊢ECC (nl ● ⊺ ↓ epochec(n, ts)) ∧ n = nl ⇒x(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨t, v⟩))∨◇(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨t, v⟩))
By BEB′1 on [15],
(16) Γ ⊢ECC ∀n. n ∈ Correct→ (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨t, v⟩)⇒x◇(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(Accept⟨t, v⟩))∨◇◇(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(Accept⟨t, v⟩))
By Lemma 112 and Lemma 87 on [16],
(17) Γ ⊢ECC ∀n. n ∈ Correct→ (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨t, v⟩)⇒x(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(Accept⟨t, v⟩))∨◇(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(Accept⟨t, v⟩))
By IIOR,
(18) Γ ⊢ECC (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(Accept⟨t, v⟩) ∧ t > rts(s(n)))⇒◇(n ● 0 ↓ sendpl(nl,Accepted⟨t⟩))
From [17], [18] and PL′1,
(19) Γ ⊢ECC ∀n. n ∈ Correct→ (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨t, v⟩)⇒x◇(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,Accepted⟨t⟩))∨◇◇(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,Accepted⟨t⟩))
By Lemma 112, Lemma 87 on [19] and [1],
(20) Γ ⊢ECC ∀n. n ∈ Correct→ (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨t, v⟩)⇒x(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,Accepted⟨t⟩))∨◇(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,Accepted⟨t⟩))
By II,
(21) Γ ⊢ECC (nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,Accepted⟨t⟩)) ∧ ets(s(nl)) = t⇒
self ∧ (n ∈ accepted(s′(nl)))
By InvS,
(22) Γ ⊢ECC self ∧ (n ∈ accepted(s′(nl)))⇒
self⇒ (n ∈ accepted(s′(nl)))
From [20] to [22], and Lemma 112,
(23) Γ ⊢ECC ∀n. n ∈ Correct→ (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨t, v⟩)⇒x◇[(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,Accepted⟨t⟩)) ∧
self⇒ (n ∈ accepted(s′(nl)))]
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There exists n′ such that
(24) Γ ⊢ECC (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨t, v⟩)⇒x◇[(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n′,Accepted⟨t⟩)) ∧
self⇒ ∀n. n ∈ Correct→ n ∈ accepted(s′(nl))]
That is,
(25) Γ ⊢ECC (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨t, v⟩)⇒x◇[(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n′,Accepted⟨t⟩)) ∧
self⇒ ∀n. Correct ⊆ accepted(s′(nl))]
By Definition 20 (a majority of correct nodes) on [25],
(26) Γ ⊢ECC (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨t, v⟩)⇒x◇[(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n′,Accepted⟨t⟩))∧
self⇒ ∣accepted(s′(nl))∣ > ∣N∣/2
Thus, as the deliver event is a self event
(27) Γ ⊢ECC (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨t, v⟩)⇒x◇[(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n′,Accepted⟨t⟩))∧∣accepted(s′(nl))∣ > ∣N∣/2
By InvL,
(28) Γ ⊢ECC (nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n′,Accepted⟨t⟩))∧∣accepted(s′(nl))∣ > ∣N∣/2 ∧ ets(s(nl)) = t⇒◇(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Decided⟨v⟩))]
From [27], [28] and Lemma 112
(29) Γ ⊢ECC (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨t, v⟩)⇒x(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Decided⟨v⟩))∨◇(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Decided⟨v⟩))
By BEB′1,
(30) Γ ⊢ECC ∀n. n ∈ Correct→ (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Decided⟨v⟩))⇒◇(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Decided⟨v⟩))
From [29], [30], Lemma 87, and Lemma 112
(31) Γ ⊢ECC ∀n. n ∈ Correct→ (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨t, v⟩)⇒x(nl ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Decided⟨v⟩))∨◇(nl ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Decided⟨v⟩))
By IIOI
(32) Γ ⊢ECC (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,Decided⟨v⟩)) ∧ decided(s(n)) = false⇒◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))
From [31] and [32],
(33) Γ ⊢ECC ∀n. n ∈ Correct→ (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨t, v⟩)⇒x◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))∨◇◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))
By Lemma 112 and Lemma 87 on [33],
(34) Γ ⊢ECC ∀n. n ∈ Correct→ (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨t, v⟩)⇒x(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))∨◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))
From [15] and [34],
(35) Γ ⊢ECC ∀n. n ∈ Correct→ (nl ● ⊺ ↓ epochec(n, ts)) ∧ n = nl ⇒x[x(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))∨◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))]∨◇[x(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))∨◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))]
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By Lemma 112, Lemma 87 and Lemma 86 on [15],
(36) Γ ⊢ECC ∀n. n ∈ Correct→ (nl ● ⊺ ↓ epochec(n, ts)) ∧ n = nl ⇒x(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))∨◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))
That is,
(37) Γ ⊢ECC nl ∈ Correct→∣Correct∣ > ∣N∣/2 ∧ n ∈ Correct→(nl ● ⊺ ↓ epochec(nl, ts))⇒∀n′. n′ ∈ Correct→x◇∃v′. (n′ ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v′))
Lemma 69.
Γ ⊢ECC [(nl ● 0 ↓ deliverpl(n,State⟨ts, vts, val⟩)) ∧(∣states(s′(nl))∣ ≥ ∣N∣/2)]⇒x(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨t, v⟩)) ∨◇(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨t, v⟩))
Proof.
There are two cases, the first case is wval(s(nl)) = .
By InvL
(1) Γ ⊢ECC [(nl ● 0 ↓ deliverpl(n,State⟨ts, vts, val⟩)∧(∣states(s′(nl))∣ ≥ ∣N∣/2) ∧wval(s(nl)) = ]⇒
self ∧ (nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(Accept⟨ts,wval(s′(nl))(ts)⟩) ∈ ors
By OR
(2) Γ ⊢ECC self ∧ (nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(Accept⟨v⟩) ∈ ors)⇒◇ˆ(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨ts,wval(s′(nl))(ts)⟩)
From [1] and [2],
(3) Γ ⊢ECC [(nl ● 0 ↓ deliverpl(n,State⟨ts, vts, val⟩)∧(∣states(s′(nl))∣ ≥ ∣N∣/2) ∧wval(s(nl)) = ]⇒◇ˆ(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨ts,wval(s′(nl))(ts)⟩)
That is,
(4) Γ ⊢ECC [(nl ● 0 ↓ deliverpl(n,State⟨ts, vts, val⟩)∧(∣states(s′(nl))∣ ≥ ∣N∣/2) ∧wval(s(nl)) = ]⇒◇(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨ts,wval(s′(nl))(ts)⟩)
The second case is wval(s(nl))(ts) = v ∧ v ≠ , by InvSA with,
S instantiated to wval(s(nl))(ts) ≠ 
A instantiated to (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨ts,wval(s′(nl))(ts)⟩)
(5) Γ ⊢ECC self ∧wval(s(nl))(ts) ∧ v ≠ ⇒xˆ(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨ts,wval(s′(nl))(ts)⟩)
That is,
(6) Γ ⊢ECC [(nl ● 0 ↓ deliverpl(n,State⟨ts, vts, val⟩)∧(∣states(s′(nl))∣ ≥ ∣N∣/2) ∧wval(s(nl)) = v ∧ v ≠ ]⇒xˆ(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨ts,wval(s′(nl))(ts)⟩)
From [4] and [6],
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(7) Γ ⊢ECC [(nl ● 0 ↓ deliverpl(n,State⟨ts, vts, val⟩)∧(∣states(s′(nl))∣ ≥ ∣N∣/2) ∧wval(s(nl)) = ]∨[(nl ● 0 ↓ deliverpl(n,State⟨ts, vts, val⟩)∧(∣states(s′(nl))∣ ≥ ∣N∣/2) ∧wval(s(nl)) = v ∧ v ≠ ]⇒◇(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨ts,wval(s′(nl))(ts)⟩)∨xˆ(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨ts,wval(s′(nl))(ts)⟩)
That is,
(8) Γ ⊢ECC [(nl ● 0 ↓ deliverpl(n,State⟨ts, vts, val⟩)∧(∣states(s′(nl))∣ ≥ ∣N∣/2)]∧[wval(s(nl)) =  ∨wval(s(nl)) ≠ ]⇒◇(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨ts,wval(s′(nl))(ts)⟩)∨xˆ(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨ts,wval(s′(nl))(ts)⟩)
That is,
(9) Γ ⊢ECC [(nl ● 0 ↓ deliverpl(n,State⟨ts, vts, val⟩)∧(∣states(s′(nl))∣ ≥ ∣N∣/2)⇒◇(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨ts,wval(s′(nl))(ts)⟩)∨xˆ(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(Accept⟨ts,wval(s′(nl))(ts)⟩)
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5.3.8 Epoch Change
Definition 21.
Γ =
PL′1,PL′2,PL′3,BEB′1; BEB′2; BEB′3; ELE′1
PL′1 = lower(0,PL1) =
n ∈ Correct ∧ n′ ∈ Correct→(n ● 0 ↓ sendpl(n′,m) 
n ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,m))
PL′2 = lower(0,PL2) =[n′ ● 0 ↓ sendpl(n,m)⇒
ˆ¬(n′ ● 0 ↓ sendpl(n,m))]→[n ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n′,m)⇒
ˆ¬(n ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))]
PL′3 = lower(0,PL3) =(n ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n′,m))  (n′ ● 0 ↓ sendpl(n,m))
BEB′1 = lower(1,BEB1) =
n ∈ Correct ∧ n′ ∈ Correct→(n′ ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(m)) (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))
BEB′2 = lower(1,BEB2) =[n′ ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(n,m)⇒
ˆ¬(n′ ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(n,m))]→[n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m)⇒
ˆ¬(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))]
BEB′3 = lower(1,BEB3) =(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(n′,m))  (n′ ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(m))
The property of the eventual leader detector subcomponent:
Eventually every correct process trusts the same correct process.
ELE′1 = lower(2,ELE1) =∃l. l ∈ Correct ∧[n ∈ Correct→◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ trust(l) ∧ ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ trust(l′)))]
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Theorem 23. (ECH1: Monotonicity)
If a correct process starts an epoch (ts, nl) and later starts an epoch (ts′, n′l), then ts′ > ts.
⊢ECH n ∈ Correct→(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl))⇒
ˆ(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l)→ ts′ > ts)
Proof.
By OI,
(1) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl) ∈ ois ∧ self)⇒◇ˆ(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl))
By OI′,
(2) Γ ⊢ECH n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl)⇒xˆ(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl) ∈ ois ∧ self)
By InvL,
(3) Γ ⊢ECH n ● startEpochech(ts, nl) ∈ ois ∧ self⇒
lastts(s′(n)) = ts ∧ ts > lastts(s(n))
That is,
(4) Γ ⊢ECH n ● startEpochech(ts, nl) ∈ ois ∧ self⇒
lastts(s′(n)) = ts
By InvL,
(5) Γ ⊢ECH n ● startEpochech(ts′, n′l) ∈ ois ∧ lastts(s(n)) = ts ∧ self⇒
ts′ > ts
That is,
(6) Γ ⊢ECH lastts(s(n)) = ts ∧ self⇒(self ∧ n ● startEpochech(ts′, n′l) ∈ ois⇒ ts′ > ts)
That is,
(7) Γ ⊢ECH lastts(s(n)) = ts ∧ self⇒(self⇒ (n ● startEpochech(ts′, n′l) ∈ ois⇒ ts′ > ts))
From [4] and [7] and ASA,
(8) Γ ⊢ECH n ● startEpochech(ts, nl) ∈ ois ∧ self⇒
ˆ(self→ (n ● startEpochech(ts′, n′l) ∈ ois⇒ ts′ > ts))
That is,
(9) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl) ∈ ois ∧ self)⇒◯(self→ (n ● startEpochech(ts′, n′l) ∈ ois⇒ ts′ > ts))
That is,
(10) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl) ∈ ois ∧ self)⇒◯ (self ∧ n ● startEpochech(ts′, n′l) ∈ ois⇒ ts′ > ts)
From [10] and ExeOrderOR,
(11) Γ ⊢ECH n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl)⇒◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l)⇒ ts′ > ts)
That is,
(12) Γ ⊢ECH n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl)⇒
ˆ(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l)→ ts′ > ts)
135
Theorem 24. (ECH2: Consistency)
If a correct process starts an epoch (ts, nl) and another correct process starts an epoch (ts, n′l),
then nl = n′l.
⊢ECH n ∈ Correct ∧ n′ ∈ Correct→(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl))⇒(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, n′l)⇒ nl = n′l)
Proof.
By OI′,
(1) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl))⇒xˆ(n ● startEpochech(ts, nl) ∈ ois ∧ self)
By InvL,
(2) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● startEpochech(ts, nl) ∈ ois ∧ self)⇒(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl, ⟨NewEpoch, ts⟩))
By BEB3,
(3) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl, ⟨NewEpoch, ts⟩))x(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨NewEpoch, ts⟩))
From [1] to [3],
(4) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl))⇒xˆx(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨NewEpoch, ts⟩))
That is,
(5) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl))⇒xˆ(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨NewEpoch, ts⟩))
By OR′,
(6) Γ ⊢ECH (nl ● ↓ broadcastbeb(⟨NewEpoch, ts⟩))⇒xˆ(nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(NewEpoch, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ ts(s′(nl)) = ts ∧ self)
From [5] and [6],
(7) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl))⇒xˆxˆ(nl ● broadcastbeb(NewEpoch, ts) ∈ ors ∧ ts(s′(nl)) = ts ∧ self)
By InvUSSe′ and S(s(nl)) ∶ ts(s(nl)) mod N = rank(nl),
(8) Γ ⊢ECH  [ts(s(nl)) mod N = rank(nl)]
By PostPre on [8],
(9) Γ ⊢ECH  [ts(s′(nl)) mod N = rank(nl)]
From [8] and [9],
(10) Γ ⊢ECH  [ts(s(nl)) mod N = ts(s′(nl)) mod N = rank(nl)]
From [7] and [10]
(11) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl))⇒xˆxˆ[ts(s′(nl)) = ts ∧ ts mod N = rank(nl)]
That is,
(12) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl))⇒
[ts(s′(nl)) = ts ∧ ts mod N = rank(nl)]
Similarly, we can say,
(13) Γ ⊢ECH (n′ ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, n′l))⇒
136
[ts(s′(n′l)) = ts ∧ ts mod N = rank(n′l)]
From [12] and [13]
(14) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl))∧(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, n′l))⇒
[ts mod N = rank(nl) ∧ ts mod N = rank(n′l)]
From [14] and the uniqueness of rank function we can easily say,
(15) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl))∧(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, n′l))⇒ (nl = n′l)p
That is,
(16) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl))⇒((n′ ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, n′l))⇒ nl = n′l)
137
Theorem 25. (ECH3: Eventual leadership)
There is a timestamp ts and a correct process nl such that eventually every correct process starts
an epoch with ts and nl and does not start another epoch afterwards.
⊢ECH ∃ts, nl. nl ∈ Correct ∧[n ∈ Correct→◇[(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl)) ∧
ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l))]]
Proof.
From ELE1,
(1) Γ ⊢ECH ∃nl. nl ∈ Correct∧[n ∈ Correct→◇[(n ● 2 ↑ trusteld(nl)) ∧ ˆ¬(n ● 2 ↑ trusteld(n′l))]]
By II,
(2) Γ ⊢ECH n ● 2 ↑ trusteld(nl)⇒
trusted(s′(n)) = nl ∧ self
By InvL,
(3) Γ ⊢ECH trusted(s(n)) ≠ trusted(s′(n))⇒
n ● 2 ↑ trusteld(n′l)
The contrapositive of [3],
(4) Γ ⊢ECH ¬ (n ● 2 ↑ trusteld(n′l))⇒¬ (trusted(s(n)) ≠ trusted(s′(n)))
That is,
(5) Γ ⊢ECH ¬ (n ● 2 ↑ trusteld(n′l))⇒(trusted(s(n)) = trusted(s′(n)))
From [1], [2] and [5],
(6) Γ ⊢ECH ∃nl. nl ∈ Correct∧[n ∈ Correct→◇[((n ● 2 ↑ trusteld(nl)) ∧ trusted(s′(n)) = nl ∧ self)∧
ˆ(trusted(s(n)) = trusted(s′(n)))]]
By PostPre on [6],
(7) Γ ⊢ECH ∃nl. nl ∈ Correct∧[n ∈ Correct→◇[(n ● 2 ↑ trusteld(nl)) ∧ trusted(s′(n)) = nl∧◯ (trusted(s(n)) = nl ∧ self)∧
ˆ(trusted(s(n)) = trusted(s′(n)))]]
From [7],
(8) Γ ⊢ECH ∃nl. nl ∈ Correct∧[n ∈ Correct→◇[(n ● 2 ↑ trusteld(nl)) ∧ trusted(s′(n)) = nl∧
ˆ(trusted(s(n)) = trusted(s′(n)) = nl ∧ self)]]
By instantiating n to nl,
(9) Γ ⊢ECH ∃nl. nl ∈ Correct∧[n ∈ Correct→◇[(nl ● 2 ↑ trusteld(nl)) ∧ trusted(s′(nl)) = nl∧
ˆ(trusted(s(nl)) = trusted(s′(nl)) = nl ∧ self)]]
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From [8], [9] and Lemma 127,
(10) Γ ⊢ECH ∃nl. nl ∈ Correct∧[n ∈ Correct→◇[◇x[(n ● 2 ↑ trusteld(nl)) ∧ trusted(s′(nl)) = nl∧
ˆ(trusted(s(nl)) = trusted(s′(nl)) = nl ∧ self)]∧(n ● 2 ↑ trusteld(nl)) ∧ trusted(s′(n)) = nl∧
ˆ(trusted(s(n)) = trusted(s′(n)) = nl ∧ self)]]
By IR,
(11) Γ ⊢ECH (nl ● 2 ↑ trusteld(nl))⇒
nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(NewEpoch(t))) ∈ ors ∧ self
By OR and BEB1,
(12) Γ ⊢ECH n ∈ Correct→
nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(NewEpoch(t))) ∈ ors ∧ self⇒◇(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t)))
From [11] and [12],
(13) Γ ⊢ECH n ∈ Correct→(nl ● 2 ↑ trusteld(nl))⇒◇(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t)))
From [10] and [13],
(14) Γ ⊢ECH ∃nl. nl ∈ Correct∧[n ∈ Correct→◇[◇x◇(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t)))∧(n ● 2 ↑ trusteld(nl)) ∧ trusted(s′(n)) = nl∧
ˆ(trusted(s(n)) = trusted(s′(n)) = nl ∧ self)]]
That is (node n can deliver NewEpoch message before or after receiving trust event),
(15) Γ ⊢ECH ∃nl. nl ∈ Correct∧[n ∈ Correct→◇[[x(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t)))∨◇(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t)))]∧[(n ● 2 ↑ trusteld(nl)) ∧ trusted(s′(n)) = nl∧
ˆ(trusted(s(n)) = trusted(s′(n)) = nl ∧ self)]]
That is,
(16) Γ ⊢ECH ∃nl. nl ∈ Correct∧[n ∈ Correct→◇[[x(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t)))∧(n ● 2 ↑ trusteld(nl)) ∧ trusted(s′(n)) = nl∧
ˆ(trusted(s(n)) = trusted(s′(n)) = nl ∧ self)]∨[◇ˆ(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t)))∧(n ● 2 ↑ trusteld(nl)) ∧ trusted(s′(n)) = nl∧
ˆ(trusted(s(n)) = trusted(s′(n)) = nl ∧ self)]]]
That is,
(17) Γ ⊢ECH ∃nl. nl ∈ Correct∧[n ∈ Correct→◇[x[(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t)))∧◇ˆ(trusted(s(n)) = nl ∧ self)]∨◇ˆ[(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t)))∧
(trusted(s′(n)) = nl ∧ self)]]]
By Lemma 70 and Lemma 71 on [17],
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(18) Γ ⊢ECH ∃l. l ∈ Correct∧[n ∈ Correct→◇[x[◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpoch(ts, nl)∧
ˆ nk(s(n))(nl) = true ∧ trusted(s(n)) = nl)]∨◇[◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpoch(ts, nl)∧
ˆ nk(s(n))(nl) = true ∧ trusted(s(n)) = nl)]]]
That is,
(19) Γ ⊢ECH ∃l. l ∈ Correct∧[n ∈ Correct→◇[(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpoch(ts, l)∧
ˆ nk(s(n))(nl) = true ∧ trusted(s(n)) = nl)]]
By Lemma 72 on [19],
(20) Γ ⊢ECH ∃l. l ∈ Correct∧[n ∈ Correct→◇[◇[(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpoch(ts, l) ∧¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpoch(ts′, l′)]]]
That is,
(21) Γ ⊢ECH ∃l. l ∈ Correct∧[n ∈ Correct→◇((n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpoch(ts, l) ∧¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpoch(ts′, l′)))]
Lemma 70.
Γ ⊢ECH ∃l. l ∈ Correct ∧[n ∈ Correct→(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t))) ∧◇[trusted(s(n)) ≠ nl ∧ trusted(s′(n)) = nl ∧ ˆ trusted(s(n)) = nl]⇒◇ˆ(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl) ∧ ˆ nk(s(n))(nl) = true ∧ trusted(s(n)) = nl)]
Proof.
By InvL
(1) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t)))∧
trusted(s(n)) ≠ nl ⇒
self ∧ n ● (0, sendpl(nl,Nack(lts))) ∈ ois
By OR
(2) Γ ⊢ECH self ∧ n ● (0, sendpl(nl,Nack(lts))) ∈ ois⇒◇ˆ(n ● 1 ↓ sendpl(nl,Nack(lts)))
From [1] and [2] and ◇ˆ trusted(s(n)) = nl from the premise,
(3) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t)))∧
trusted(s(n)) ≠ nl ∧ ◇ˆ trusted(s(n)) = nl ⇒◇ˆ(n ● 1 ↓ sendpl(nl,Nack(lts)))
By PL1 and correctness of nl and n,
(4) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● 1 ↓ sendpl(nl,Nack(lts)))⇒◇(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(nl,Nack(lts)))
By InvL,
(5) Γ ⊢ECH (nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(nl,Nack(lts)))⇒
self ∧ (nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(NewEpoch(lts′)) ∈ ors))
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By OR,
(6) Γ ⊢ECH self ∧ (nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(NewEpoch(lst′))) ∈ ors)⇒◇ˆ(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(NewEpoch(lst′)))
By BEB1 and correctness of nl and n,
(7) Γ ⊢ECH (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(NewEpoch(lst′)))⇒◇(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(lst′)))
From [3] to [7],
(8) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t)))∧
trusted(s(n)) ≠ nl ∧ ◇ˆ trusted(s(n)) = nl ⇒◇ˆ(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(lts′))) ∧ ◇ˆ trusted(s(n)) = nl
By Lemma 123 on [8],
(9) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t)))∧
trusted(s(n)) ≠ nl ∧ ◇ˆ trusted(s(n)) = nl ⇒◇ˆ[(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(lts′))) ∧ ◇ˆ trusted(s(n)) = nl]∨◇ˆ[(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(lts′))) ∧ trusted(s(n)) = nl]
By Lemma 124 on [9],
(10) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t)))∧
trusted(s(n)) ≠ nl ∧ ◇ˆ trusted(s(n)) = nl ⇒◇ˆ[(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(lts′))) ∧ trusted(s(n)) = nl]
By Lemma 71 and [9],
(11) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t)))∧
trusted(s(n)) ≠ nl ∧ ◇ˆ trusted(s(n)) = nl ⇒◇[◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl))∧
ˆ nk(s(n))(nl) = true ∧ trusted(s(n)) = nl)]
That is,
(12) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t)))∧
trusted(s(n)) ≠ nl ∧ ◇ˆ trusted(s(n)) = nl ⇒◇[(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl))∧
ˆ nk(s(nl))(nl) = true ∧ trusted(s(n)) = nl)]
Lemma 71.
Γ ⊢ECH ∃nl. nl ∈ Correct ∧[n ∈ Correct→(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t))) ∧ trusted(s(n)) = nl]⇒◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl) ∧ ˆ nk(s(n))(nl) = true ∧ trusted(s(n)) = nl)
Proof.
The First case is that nk(s(n))(nl) = false
By InvL,
(1) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t)))∧
 trusted(s(n)) = nl ∧ nk(s(n))(nl) = false⇒
self ∧ n ● (0, sendpl(nl,State(lts))) ∈ ors ∧
lastts(s(n)) = lts ∧ nk(s′(n))(nl) = true
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By InvS′′,
(2) Γ ⊢ECH self ∧ nk[s′(nl)] = true⇒ ˆ(self→ nk(s(n))(nl) = true)
By OR,
(3) Γ ⊢ECH self ∧ n ● (0, sendpl(nl,State(lts))) ∈ ois⇒◇ˆ(n ● 1 ↓ sendpl(nl,State(lts)))
By PL1 and correctness of nl and n,
(4) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● 1 ↓ sendpl(nl,State(lts)))⇒◇(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(nl,State(lts)))
From [1] to [4],
(5) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t)))∧
 trusted(s(n)) = nl ∧ nk(s(n))(nl) = false⇒◇ˆ(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(nl,State(lts)))∧
lastts(s(n)) = lts ∧ ˆnk(s(n))(nl) = true
By InvL,
(6) Γ ⊢ECH (nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(nl,State(lts)))⇒
self ∧ (nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(NewEpoch(lts′))) ∈ ors) ∧ lst′ > lst
By OR,
(7) Γ ⊢ECH self ∧ (nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(NewEpoch(lts′))) ∈ ors)⇒◇ˆ(nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(NewEpoch(lts′)))
By BEB1 and correctness of nl and n,
(8) Γ ⊢ECH (nl ● 1 ↓ broadcastbeb(NewEpoch(lts′)))⇒◇(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(lts′)))
From [6] to [8],
(9) Γ ⊢ECH (nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(nl,State(lts)))⇒◇ˆ(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(lts′))) ∧ lst′ > lst
From [5] and [9],
(10) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t)))∧
 trusted(s(n)) = nl ∧ nk(s(n))(nl) = false⇒◇(◇(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(lts′))) ∧ lst′ > lst)∧
lastts(s(n)) = lts ∧ ˆnk(s(n))(nl) = true
That is,
(11) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t)))∧
 trusted(s(n)) = nl ∧ nk(s(n))(nl) = false⇒◇ˆ[n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(lts′))∧
lst′ > lst ∧ nk(s′(n))(nl) = true ∧ trusted(s(n)) = nl]∧
lastts(s(n)) = lts ∧ ˆnk(s(n))(nl) = true
There are two possibilities for the value of lastts(s(n)) when a node receieves
deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(lts′)) event,
(12) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t)))∧
 trusted(s(n)) = nl ∧ nk(s(n))(nl) = false⇒◇ˆ[n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(lts′))∧
lst′ > lst ∧ nk(s′(n))(nl) = true ∧ trusted(s(n)) = nl∧(lastts(s(n)) = lst ∨ lastts(s(n)) ≠ lst)] ∧
 trusted(s(n)) = nllastts(s(n)) = lts ∧ ˆnk(s(n))(nl) = true
By Lemma 115,
(13) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t)))∧
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 trusted(s(n)) = nl ∧ nk(s(n))(nl) = false⇒[◇ˆ[(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(lts′))) ∧ nk(s(n))(nl) = true∧
lst′ > lst ∧ lastts(s(n)) = lst ∧ trusted(s(n)) = nl] ∨◇ˆ[(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(lts′))) ∧ nk(s(n))(nl) = true∧
lastts(s(n)) = lts′′ ∧ lts′′ ≠ lst ∧ trusted(s(n)) = nl]] ∧
 trusted(s(n)) = nl ∧ lastts(s(n)) = lts ∧ ˆnk(s(n))(nl) = true
By InvL
(14) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(lts′))) ∧ nk(s(n))(nl) = true∧
lts′ > lastts(s(n)) ∧ trusted(s(n)) = nl ⇒
self ∧ n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(lts′, nl) ∈ ois
By OI
(15) Γ ⊢ECH self ∧ n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(lts′, nl) ∈ ois⇒◇ˆ(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(lts′, nl))
From [14] and [15],
(16) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(lts′))) ∧ nk(s(n))(nl) = true∧
lts′ > lastts(s(n)) ∧ trusted(s(n)) = nl ⇒◇ˆ(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(lts′, nl))
By [13], [16] and removing unuseful parameters,
(17) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t)))∧
 trusted(s(n)) = nl ∧ nk(s(n))(nl) = false⇒[◇ˆ[◇ˆ(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(lts′, nl)]∨◇ˆ[lastts(s(n)) = lts′′ ∧ lts′′ ≠ lst ∧ ˆtrusted(s(n)) = nl] ∧
 trusted(s(n)) = nl ∧ lastts(s(n)) = lts ∧ ˆnk(s(n))(nl) = true]
That is,
(18) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t)))∧
 trusted(s(n)) = nl ∧ nk(s(n))(nl) = false⇒[◇ˆ[(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(lts′, nl)) ∧
 trusted(s(n)) = nl ∧ lastts(s(n)) = lts ∧ ˆnk(s(n))(nl) = true] ∨[◇ˆ[lastts(s(n)) = lts′′ ∧ lts′′ ≠ lst ∧ ˆtrusted(s(n)) = nl] ∧
 trusted(s(n)) = nl ∧ lastts(s(n)) = lts ∧ ˆnk(s(n))(nl) = true]]
By InvSAG,
(19) Γ ⊢ECH lastts(s(n)) ≠ lts′′ ∧ ◇(lastts(s(n)) = lts′′)⇒◇(n ● startEpochech(lts′′, n′l) ∈ ois ∧ self)
From [15], [19] and adding trusted(s(n)) = nl,
(20) Γ ⊢ECH lastts(s(n)) ≠ lts′′ ∧ ◇(lastts(s(n)) = lts′′) ∧trusted(s(n)) = nl ⇒◇ˆ(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(lts′′, nl))
From [18] and [20],
(21) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t)))∧
 trusted(s(n)) = nl ∧ nk(s(n))(nl) = false⇒[◇ˆ[(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(lts′, nl)) ∧
 trusted(s(n)) = nl ∧ lastts(s(n)) = lts ∧ ˆnk(s(n))(nl) = true] ∨[◇ˆ(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(lts′′, nl))] ∧
 trusted(s(n)) = nl ∧ lastts(s(n)) = lts ∧ ˆnk(s(n))(nl) = true]]
That is,
(22) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t)))∧
 trusted(s(n)) = nl ∧ nk(s(n))(nl) = false⇒◇ˆ[(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(lts′, nl)) ∧
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 trusted(s(n)) = nl ∧ ˆnk(s(n))(nl) = true]
The other case is that nk(s(n))(nl) = true,
By InvSA,
(23) Γ ⊢ECH nk(s(n))(nl) = true⇒xˆ(self ∧ n ● (0, sendpl(nl,State(lts))) ∈ ors ∧
lastts(s(n)) = lts ∧ nk(s′(n))(nl) = true ∧ trusted(s(n)) = nl)
From [23] and and adding premise,
(24) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t)))∧
 trusted(s(n)) = nl ∧ nk(s(n))(nl) = true⇒xˆ(self ∧ n ● (0, sendpl(nl,State(lts))) ∈ ors ∧
lastts(s(n)) = lts ∧ nk(s′(n))(nl) = true ∧ trusted(s(n)) = nl)
By doing the same reasoning we can say,
(25) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t)))∧
 trusted(s(n)) = nl ∧ nk(s(n))(nl) = true⇒xˆ[◇ˆ[(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(lts′, nl)) ∧
 trusted(s(n)) = nl ∧ ˆnk(s(n))(nl) = true]
Therefore, we can say,
(26) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t)))∧
 trusted(s(n)) = nl]⇒xˆ[◇ˆ[(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpochech(lts′, nl)) ∧
 trusted(s(n)) = nl ∧ ˆnk(s(n))(nl) = true]
Lemma 72.
Γ ⊢ECH ∃nl. nl ∈ Correct ∧[n ∈ Correct→(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpoch(ts, nl) ∧ ˆ nk(s(n))(nl) = true ∧ trusted(s(n)) = nl)⇒◇[(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpoch(ts′, l) ∧¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpoch(ts′′, l′)]
Proof.
By Lemma 73,
(1) Γ ⊢ECH n ∈ Correct→
nk(s(n))(nl) = true ∧ self⇒x◇[(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,State(lts)))∧
ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,State(lts)))∧
ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,State(lts)))]
By Lemma 126 and [1],
(2) Γ ⊢ECH n ∈ Correct→(nk(s(n))(nl) = true ∧ self)⇒◇ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,State(lts)))
By InvL,
(3) Γ ⊢ECH (nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(NewEpoch(t′))) ∈ ors ∧ self)⇒(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,State(lts′)))∨(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,Nack(lts′)))∨(nl ● 2 ↑ trusteld(n))
By InvL,
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(4) Γ ⊢ECH (nl ● 2 ↑ trusteld(n))⇒
trusted(s(nl)) ≠ trusted(s′(nl))
From [3] and [4],
(5) Γ ⊢ECH (nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(NewEpoch(t′))) ∈ ors ∧ self)⇒(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,State(lts′)))∨(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,Nack(lts′)))∨
trusted(s(nl)) ≠ trusted(s′(nl))
The contra-positive of [5],
(6) Γ ⊢ECH ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,State(lts′)))∧¬(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,Nack(lts′)))∧
trusted(s(nl)) = trusted(s′(nl))⇒¬(nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(NewEpoch(t′))) ∈ ors ∧ self)
That is,
(7) Γ ⊢ECH ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,State(lts′)))∧
¬(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,Nack(lts′)))∧
(trusted(s(nl)) = trusted(s′(nl)))⇒
¬(nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(NewEpoch(t′))) ∈ ors ∧ self)
By InvL,
(8) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● (0, sendpl(nl,Nack(lts′))) ∈ ors ∧ self)⇒
trusted(s(n)) ≠ nl
The contra-positive of [8],
(9) Γ ⊢ECH trusted(s(n)) = nl ⇒¬(n ● (0, sendpl(nl,Nack(lts′))) ∈ ors ∧ self)
That is,
(10) Γ ⊢ECH trusted(s(n)) = nl ⇒
¬(n ● (0, sendpl(nl,Nack(lts′))) ∈ ors ∧ self)
By ExeFEOR and PL′1
(11) Γ ⊢ECH trusted(s(n)) = nl ⇒◇¬(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,Nack(lts′)))
From [2] and adding a premise,
(12) Γ ⊢ECH n ∈ Correct→(nk(s(n))(nl) = true ∧ self) ∧(trusted(s(n)) = nl)⇒◇ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,State(lts))) ∧
(trusted(s(n)) = trusted(s′(n)) = nl) ∧
(trusted(s(n)) = nl)
From [12] and [11],
(13) Γ ⊢ECH n ∈ Correct→(nk(s(n))(nl) = true ∧ self) ∧(trusted(s(n)) = nl)⇒◇ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,State(lts))) ∧
(trusted(s(n)) = trusted(s′(n)) = nl) ∧◇¬(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(nl,Nack(lts′)))
That is,
(14) Γ ⊢ECH n ∈ Correct→(nk(s(n))(nl) = true ∧ self) ∧(trusted(s(n)) = nl)⇒◇[¬(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,State(lts))) ∧
(trusted(s(n)) = trusted(s′(n)) = nl) ∧
¬(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(nl,Nack(lts′)))]
[7] and [14],
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(15) Γ ⊢ECH n ∈ Correct→(nk(s(n))(nl) = true ∧ self) ∧(trusted(s(n)) = nl)⇒◇[¬(nl ● (1,broadcastbeb(NewEpoch(t′))) ∈ ors ∧ self]
By ExeFEOR and BEB′1
(16) Γ ⊢ECH n ∈ Correct→(nk(s(n))(nl) = true ∧ self) ∧(trusted(s(n)) = nl)⇒◇[◇¬(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t′))]
By InvL,
(17) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● startEpochech(t, n′)ois ∧ self)⇒(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t′)))
The contra-positive of [17],
(18) Γ ⊢ECH ¬(n ● 1 ↑ deliverbeb(nl,NewEpoch(t′)))⇒¬(n ● startEpochech(t, n′)ois ∧ self)
From [16] and [18],
(19) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpoch(ts, nl)∧
ˆ nk(s(n))[nl] = true ∧ trusted(s(n)) = nl)⇒(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpoch(ts, nl)∧◇¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpoch(ts′′, l′))
By Lemma 122,
(20) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpoch(ts, nl)∧
ˆ nk(s(n))[nl] = true ∧ trusted(s(n)) = nl)⇒◇[(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpoch(ts, nl)∧
¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ startEpoch(ts′′, l′))]
Lemma 73.
Γ ⊢ECH
n ∈ Correct→
nk(s(n))[nl] = true ∧ self⇒x◇[(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,State(lts))) ∧
ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,State(lts))) ∧
ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,State(lts)))]
By InvSASe with S ∶ nk(s(n))(nl) = true
(1) Γ ⊢ECH s nk(s(n))[nl] = true ∧ self⇒xˆ(n ● (0, sendpl(State(lts))) ∈ ors ∧ self ∧
lastts(s(n)) = lts ∧ nk(s(n))(nl) = false ∧
nk(s′(n))(nl) = true ∧ trusted(s(n)) = nl)
By InvSSe′′
(2) Γ ⊢ECH s nk(s′(n))(nl) = true⇒ ˆ(nk(s(n))(nl) = true)
By InvUSSe
(3) Γ ⊢ECH s nk(s(n))(nl) = true⇒ (nk(s(n))(nl) = true)
By Lemma 125,
(4) Γ ⊢ECH s nk(s(n))(nl) = false⇒ (nk(s(n))(nl) = false)
From [1], [2] [4] and PostPre,
(5) Γ ⊢ECH s nk(s(n))[nl] = true ∧ self⇒xˆ[n ● (0, sendpl(State(lts))) ∈ ors ∧ self ∧
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ˆ(nk(s′(n))(nl) = false) ∧
ˆ(nk(s(n))(nl) = true)]
By InvL,
(6) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● (0, sendpl(nl,State(lts))) ∈ ors ∧ self)⇒
nk(s′(n))(nl) = true
The contra-positive of [6],
(7) Γ ⊢ECH nk(s′(n))(nl) = false⇒¬(n ● (0, sendpl(nl,State(lts))) ∈ ors ∧ self)
That is,
(8) Γ ⊢ECH ˆnk(s′(n))(nl) = false⇒
ˆ(n ● (0, sendpl(nl,State(lts))) /∈ ors ∧ self)
By InvL,
(9) Γ ⊢ECH (n ● (0, sendpl(nl,State(lts))) ∈ ors ∧ self)⇒
nk(s(n))(nl) = false
The contra-positive of [9],
(10) Γ ⊢ECH nk(s(n))(nl) = true⇒¬(n ● (0, sendpl(nl,State(lts))) ∈ ors) ∧ self
That is,
(11) Γ ⊢ECH ˆ(nk(s(n))(nl) = true)⇒
ˆ(n ● (0, sendpl(nl,State(lts))) /∈ ors) ∧ self
From [5], [8], [11] and SInv,
(12) Γ ⊢ECH nk(s(n))(nl) = true ∧ self⇒xˆ[(n ● (0, sendpl(nl,State(lts))) ∈ ors) ∧ self∧
ˆ((n ● (0, sendpl(nl,State(lts))) /∈ ors) ∧ self)∧
ˆ((n ● (0, sendpl(nl,State(lts))) /∈ ors) ∧ self)]
By UniOR and PL′1,
(13) Γ ⊢ECH n ∈ Correct→
nk(s(n))(nl) = true ∧ self⇒x◇[(n ● 0 ↓ sendpl(nl,State(lts)))∧
ˆ¬(n ● 0 ↓ sendpl(nl,State(lts)))∧
ˆ¬(n ● 0 ↓ sendpl(nl,State(lts)))]
By PL′2,
(14) Γ ⊢ECH n ∈ Correct→
nk(s(n))(nl) = true ∧ self⇒x◇[(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,State(lts)))∧
ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,State(lts)))∧
ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ deliverpl(n,State(lts)))]
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5.3.9 Uniform Consensus
Definition 22.
Γ = ECH′1,ECH′2,ECH′3,EC′1,EC′2,EC′3,EC′4
ECH′1 = lower(0,ECH1) =
n ∈ Correct→(n ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl))⇒
ˆ(n ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l)→ ts′ > ts)
ECH′2 = lower(0,ECH2) =
n ∈ Correct ∧ n′ ∈ Correct→(n ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl))⇒(n′ ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts, n′l)⇒ nl = n′l)
ECH′3 = lower(0,ECH3) =∃ts, nl. nl ∈ Correct ∧[n ∈ Correct→◇[(n ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl)) ∧
ˆ¬(n ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l))]]
EC′1 = lower(1,EC1) =(n ● 1 ↑ decideec(v))⇒∃n′. x(n′ ● 1 ↓ proposeec(v))
EC′2 = lower(1,EC2) =
n ● 1 ↑ decideec(v) ∧◇(n′ ● 1 ↑ decideec(v′))⇒
v = v′
EC′3 = lower(1,EC3) =(n ● 1 ↑ decideec(v))⇒
ˆ¬(n ● 1 ↑ decideec(v′))
EC′4 = lower(1,EC4) =∣Correct∣ > ∣N∣/2 ∧ n ∈ Correct→(n ● 1 ↓ proposeec(v))⇒(n ● 1 ↓ epochec(n, ts)) ∧¬(n ● 1 ↓ epochec(n′, ts′))⇒∀n′. n′ ∈ Correct→x◇∃v′. (n′ ● 1 ↑ decideec(v′))
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Theorem 26 (UC1: Termination).
Every correct node eventually decides some value.
Γ ⊢UC ∣Correct∣ > ∣N∣/2 ∧ n ∈ Correct→[∀n′.n′ ∈ Correct→ ∃v. v ≠  ∧x(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ proposeuc(v))]⇒∃v. x◇(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v))
where Γ is defined in Definition 22.
Proof.
By IRSe,
(1) Γ′ ⊢UCC s (nl ● ⊺ ↓ proposeuc(v) ∧ v ≠ )⇒
prop(s′(nl)) ≠ 
By InvSSe,
(2) Γ′ ⊢UCC s prop(s(nl)) ≠ ⇒
(prop(s(nl)) ≠ )
From [1], [2] and PostPre,
(3) Γ′ ⊢UCC s (nl ● ⊺ ↓ proposeuc(v) ∧ v ≠ )⇒
ˆ(prop(s(nl)) ≠ )
By using the premise and [3],
(4) Γ′ ⊢UCC s ∣Correct∣ > ∣N∣/2 ∧ n ∈ Correct→[∀n′.n′ ∈ Correct→∃v. v ≠  ∧x(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ proposeuc(v))]⇒
ˆ(prop(s(n′)) ≠ )
By ECH′3 and instantiating n to nl,
(5) Γ′ ⊢UCC ∃ts, nl. nl ∈ Correct∧◇[(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl))∧
ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l))]
From [4] and [5],
(6) Γ′ ⊢UCC ∃ts, nl. nl ∈ Correct∧◇[(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl))∧
ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l))]∧◇xˆ(prop(s(nl)) ≠ )
That is,
(7) Γ′ ⊢UCC ∃ts, nl. nl ∈ Correct∧◇[(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl))∧[(prop(s(nl)) ≠ ) ∨◇(prop(s(nl)) ≠ )]∧
ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l))]
That is,
(8) Γ′ ⊢UCC ∃ts, nl. nl ∈ Correct∧◇[[(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl)) ∧ (prop(s(nl)) ≠ )∧
ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l))]∨[(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl)) ∧ (prop(s(nl)) = ) ∧ ◇ˆ(prop(s(nl)) ≠ )∧
ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l))]]
By InvSA,
(9) Γ′ ⊢UCC prop(s(nl)) ≠  ∧ self⇒xˆ(nl ● (1,proposeec(v)) ∈ ors ∧ self)
By using Lemma 74 and Lemma 74 on [8] and [9],
(10) Γ′ ⊢UCC ∃ts, nl. nl ∈ Correct∧
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[nl ∈ Correct→◇[xˆ(nl ● (1,proposeec(v)) ∈ ors ∧ self)∧(nl ● (1, epochec(nl, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ self)∧
¬(nl ● (1, epochec(n′l, ts′)) ∈ ors ∧ self)]]
That is,
(11) Γ′ ⊢UCC ∃ts, nl. nl ∈ Correct∧[nl ∈ Correct→◇xˆ[(nl ● (1,proposeec(v)) ∈ ors ∧ self)∧◇[(nl ● (1, epochec(nl, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ self)∧
¬(nl ● (1, epochec(n′l, ts′)) ∈ ors ∧ self)]]]
By [11] and ExeOrderOR and ExeFEOR,
(12) Γ′ ⊢UCC ∃ts, nl. nl ∈ Correct∧[nl ∈ Correct→◇xˆ[(nl ● ↓ proposeec(v))∧◇ˆ[(nl ● 1 ↓ epochec(nl, ts))∧ ◇¬(nl ● 1 ↓ epochec(n′l, ts′))]]]
by IR,
(13) Γ′ ⊢UCC (n ● ⊺ ↓ proposeuc(v))⇒(n ● (1,proposeec(v)) ∈ ors ∧ self)
By OR
(14) Γ′ ⊢UCC (n ● (1,proposeec(v)) ∈ ors ∧ self)⇒◇ˆ(n ● 1 ↓ proposeec(v))
From [13] and [14],
(15) Γ′ ⊢UCC (n ● ⊺ ↓ proposeuc(v))⇒◇ˆ(n ● 1 ↓ proposeec(v))
From the premise and [15] we know that,
(16) Γ′ ⊢UCC ∀n′.n′ ∈ Correct→ ∃v. x(n ● ⊺ ↓ proposeuc(v))⇒x◇ˆ(n ● 1 ↓ proposeec(v))
From [12] and [16],
(17) Γ′ ⊢UCC n ∈ Correct→∀n′.n′ ∈ Correct→ ∃v. x(n ● ⊺ ↓ proposeuc(v))⇒x◇ˆ(nl ● 1 ↓ proposeec(v))∧◇[(nl ● 1 ↓ epochec(nl, ts))∧ ¬(nl ● 1 ↓ epochec(n′l, ts′))]
From EC′4,
(18) Γ′ ⊢UCC ∣Correct∣ > ∣N∣/2 ∧ n ∈ Correct→(n ● 1 ↓ proposeec(v))⇒(n ● 1 ↓ epochec(n, ts)) ∧¬(n ● 1 ↓ epochec(n′, ts′))⇒∀n′. n′ ∈ Correct→x◇∃v′. (n′ ● 1 ↑ decideec(v′))
From [17] and [18],
(19) Γ′ ⊢UCC n ∈ Correct→∀n′.n′ ∈ Correct→ ∃v. x(n ● ⊺ ↓ proposeuc(v))⇒x◇[x◇∃v′. (n′ ● 1 ↑ decideec(v′))]
That is,
(20) Γ′ ⊢UCC n ∈ Correct→∀n′.n′ ∈ Correct→ ∃v. x(n ● ⊺ ↓ proposeuc(v))⇒x◇[∃v′. (n′ ● 1 ↑ decideec(v′))]
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Lemma 74.
Γ ⊢UC ∃ts, nl. nl ∈ Correct ∧◇[[(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl)) ∧ (prop(s(nl)) ≠ ) ∧
ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l))]⇒◇ˆxˆ[[(nl ● (1, epochec(nl, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ started(s′(nl)) = true ∧ self)] ∧
ˆ¬(nl ● (1, epochec(nl, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ self)]
By II,
(1) Γ′ ⊢UCC (nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl)) ∧ prop(s(nl)) ≠ ⇒[nl ● (1, epochec(nl, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ started(s′(nl)) = true ∧ self]
By usinng premise and [1],
(2) Γ′ ⊢UCC ∃ts, nl. nl ∈ Correct∧◇[[(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl)) ∧ (prop(s(nl)) ≠ )∧
ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l))]⇒◇[[nl ● (1, epochec(nl, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ started(s′(nl)) = true ∧ self]∧
ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l))]
By InvL,
(3) Γ′ ⊢UCC started(s(nl)) = true ∧ started(s′(nl)) = false⇒(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l))
The contra-positive of [3],
(4) Γ′ ⊢UCC ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l))⇒
started(s(nl)) = false ∨ started(s′(nl)) = true
From [2] and [4],
(5) Γ′ ⊢UCC ∃ts, nl. nl ∈ Correct∧◇[[(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl)) ∧ (prop(s(nl)) ≠ )∧
ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l))]⇒◇[[nl ● (1, epochec(nl, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ started(s′(nl)) = true ∧ self]∧
ˆ(started(s(nl)) = false ∨ started(s′(nl)) = true)]
By using induction and PostPre on [5] (considering the conjunction in started(s′(nl)) = true and
ˆ(started(s(nl)) = false ∨ started(s′(nl)) = true) for the base case of the induction),
(6) Γ′ ⊢UCC ∃ts, nl. nl ∈ Correct∧◇[[(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl)) ∧ (prop(s(nl)) ≠ )∧
ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l))]⇒◇[[nl ● (1, epochec(nl, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ started(s′(nl)) = true ∧ self]∧
ˆ(started(s′(nl)) = true)]
By InvL,
(7) Γ′ ⊢UCC (n ● (1, epochec(nl, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ n = nl ∧ self)⇒
started(s′(n)) ≠ started(s(n))
That is,
(8) Γ′ ⊢UCC (nl ● (1, epochec(nl, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ self)⇒
started(s′(nl)) ≠ started(s(nl))
The contra-pasitive of [8],
(9) Γ′ ⊢UCC started(s′(nl)) = started(s(nl))⇒¬(nl ● (1, epochec(nl, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ self)
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From [6] and [9]
(10) Γ′ ⊢UCC ∃ts, nl. nl ∈ Correct∧◇[[(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl)) ∧ (prop(s(n′)) ≠ )∧
ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l))]⇒◇[[nl ● (1, epochec(nl, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ started(s′(nl)) = true ∧ self]∧
ˆ¬(nl ● (1, epochec(nl, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ self)]
Lemma 75.
Γ ⊢UC ∃ts, nl. nl ∈ Correct ∧[(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl)) ∧ (prop(s(nl)) = ) ∧ ◇ˆ(prop(s(nl)) ≠ ) ∧
ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l))]⇒◇ˆxˆ[[(nl ● (1, epochec(nl, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ started(s′(nl)) = true ∧ self)] ∧
¬(nl ● (1, epochec(nl, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ self)]
By InvL,
(1) Γ′ ⊢UCC (n ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl)) ∧ prop(s(n)) =  ∧ n = nl ∧ self)⇒
started(s′(n)) = false
That is,
(2) Γ′ ⊢UCC (nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl)) ∧ prop(s(nl)) =  ∧ self)⇒
started(s′(nl)) = false
By using premise and [2],
(3) Γ′ ⊢UCC ∃ts, nl. nl ∈ Correct∧[(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl)) ∧ (prop(s(nl)) = ) ∧ ◇ˆ(prop(s(nl)) ≠ )∧
ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l))]⇒
started(s′(nl)) = false ∧ ◇ˆ(prop(s(nl)) ≠ )∧
ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l))]]
By InvL,
(4) Γ′ ⊢UCC started(s(nl)) = true ∧ started(s′(nl)) = false⇒(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l))
The contra-positive of [4],
(5) Γ′ ⊢UCC ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l))⇒
started(s(nl)) = false ∨ started(s′(nl)) = true
That is,
(6) Γ′ ⊢UCC ∃ts, nl. nl ∈ Correct∧[(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl)) ∧ (prop(s(nl)) = ) ∧ ◇ˆ(prop(s(nl)) ≠ )∧
ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l))]⇒
started(s′(nl)) = false ∧ ◇ˆ(prop(s(nl)) ≠ )∧
ˆ(started(s(nl)) = false ∨ started(s′(nl)) = true)]]
That is,
(7) Γ′ ⊢UCC ∃ts, nl. nl ∈ Correct∧[(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl)) ∧ (prop(s(nl)) = ) ∧ ◇ˆ(prop(s(nl)) ≠ )∧
ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l))]⇒◇ˆ[[[started(s(nl)) = false ∧ (prop(s(nl)) ≠ )]∨[started(s(nl)) = true ∧ (prop(s(nl)) ≠ )]]∧
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(started(s(nl)) = false ∨ started(s′(nl)) = true)]
By Pe,
(8) Γ′ ⊢UCC nl ∈ Correct ∧ prop(s(nl)) ≠  ∧ started(s(nl)) = false⇒(nl ● (1, epochec(nl, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ started(s′(nl)) = true ∧ self)
By InvSA,
(9) Γ′ ⊢UCC started(s(nl)) = true)⇒xˆ(nl ● (1, epochec(nl, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ started(s′(nl)) = true ∧ self)
From [7], [8] and [9],
(10) Γ′ ⊢UCC ∃ts, nl. nl ∈ Correct∧[(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl)) ∧ (prop(s(nl)) = ) ∧ ◇ˆ(prop(s(nl)) ≠ )∧
ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l))]⇒◇ˆ[[[(nl ● (1, epochec(nl, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ started(s′(nl)) = true ∧ self)]∨xˆ[(nl ● (1, epochec(nl, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ started(s′(nl)) = true ∧ self]]∧
(started(s(nl)) = false ∨ started(s′(nl)) = true)]
By using induction and PostPre on [10] (considering the conjunction for the base case of induction),
(11) Γ′ ⊢UCC ∃ts, nl. nl ∈ Correct∧[(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl)) ∧ (prop(s(nl)) = ) ∧ ◇ˆ(prop(s(nl)) ≠ )∧
ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l))]⇒◇ˆ[[[(nl ● (1, epochec(nl, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ started(s′(nl)) = true ∧ self)]∨xˆ[(nl ● (1, epochec(nl, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ started(s′(nl)) = true ∧ self]]∧
(started(s′(nl)) = true)]
By adding the premise again,
(12) Γ′ ⊢UCC ∃ts, nl. nl ∈ Correct∧[(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl)) ∧ (prop(s(nl)) = ) ∧ ◇ˆ(prop(s(nl)) ≠ )∧
ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l))]⇒◇ˆ[[[(nl ● (1, epochec(nl, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ started(s′(nl)) = true ∧ self)]∨xˆ[(nl ● (1, epochec(nl, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ started(s′(nl)) = true ∧ self]]∧
(started(s′(nl)) = true)∧ ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl))]
By InvL,
(13) Γ′ ⊢UCC (nl ● (1, epochec(nl, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ started(s(nl)) = true ∧ self)⇒(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl))
The contra-pasitive of [13],
(14) Γ′ ⊢UCC ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl))⇒¬(nl ● (1, epochec(nl, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ self) ∨ (started(s(nl)) = false)
By using [12] and [14]
(15) Γ′ ⊢UCC ∃ts, nl. nl ∈ Correct∧[(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl)) ∧ (prop(s(nl)) = ) ∧ ◇ˆ(prop(s(nl)) ≠ )∧
ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l))]⇒◇ˆxˆ[[[(nl ● (1, epochec(nl, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ started(s′(nl)) = true ∧ self)]∧
(started(s′(nl)) = true)∧
[¬(nl ● (1, epochec(nl, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ self) ∨ (started(s(nl)) = false)]]
That is,
(16) Γ′ ⊢UCC ∃ts, nl. nl ∈ Correct∧[(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts, nl)) ∧ (prop(s(nl)) = ) ∧ ◇ˆ(prop(s(nl)) ≠ )∧
ˆ¬(nl ● 0 ↑ startEpochech(ts′, n′l))]⇒◇ˆxˆ[[[(nl ● (1, epochec(nl, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ started(s′(nl)) = true ∧ self)]∧
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¬(nl ● (1, epochec(nl, ts)) ∈ ors ∧ self)]
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Theorem 27 (UC2: Validity).
If a node decides v, then v was proposed by some node.
Γ ⊢UC (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v))  ∃n′. (n ● ⊺ ↓ proposeuc(v))
where Γ is defined in Definition 22.
Proof.
By OI′,
(1) Γ′ ⊢UCC (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v))⇒xˆ(n ● decideuc(v) ∈ ois ∧ self)
By InvL,
(2) Γ′ ⊢UCC (n ● decideuc(v) ∈ ois ∧ self)⇒
n ● 1 ↑ decideec(v)
By EC′1
(3) Γ′ ⊢UCC (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideec(v))⇒∃n′. x(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ proposeec(v))
By OR′,
(4) Γ′ ⊢UCC (n′ ● ⊺ ↓ proposeec(v))⇒xˆ(n′ ● (1,proposeec(v)) ∈ ors ∧ self)
By InvL,
(5) Γ′ ⊢UCC (n′ ● (1,proposeec(v)) ∈ ors ∧ self)⇒(n′ ● 1 ↓ proposeuc(v))
From [1] to [5] and Lemma 86,
(6) Γ′ ⊢UCC (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v))⇒∃n′. x(n′ ● ⊺ ↓ proposeuc(v))
That is,
(7) Γ′ ⊢UCC (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v))  ∃n′. (n′ ● ⊺ ↓ proposeuc(v))
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Theorem 28 (UC3: Integrity).
No node decides twice.
Γ ⊢UC (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v))⇒ ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v′))
where Γ is defined in Definition 22.
Proof.
By OI′,
(1) Γ′ ⊢UCC (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v))⇒xˆ(n ● decideuc(v) ∈ ois ∧ self)
By InvL,
(2) Γ′ ⊢UCC (n ● decideuc(v) ∈ ois ∧ self)⇒(n ● 1 ↑ decideec(v))∧ occ(ois,decideuc(v)) ≤ 1
From [2],
(3) Γ′ ⊢UCC ¬(n ● 1 ↑ decideec(v))⇒(n = n ∧ self→ ¬(decideuc(v) ∈ ois))
From EC′3, we have
(4) Γ′ ⊢UCC (n ● 1 ↑ decideec(v))⇒
ˆ¬(n ● 1 ↑ decideec(v′))
By Lemma 108 on [4], we have
(5) Γ′ ⊢UCC (n ● 1 ↑ decideec(v))⇒
ˆ¬(n ● 1 ↑ decideec(v′)) ∧
ˆ¬(n ● 1 ↑ decideec(v′))
From [1]-[5], we have
(6) Γ′ ⊢UCC (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v))⇒ xˆ[
occ(ois,decideuc(v)) ≤ 1 ∧
ˆ(n = n ∧ self→ ¬(decideuc(v) ∈ ois)) ∧
ˆ(n = n ∧ self→ ¬(decideuc(v) ∈ ois))]
From UniOR on [6]
(7) Γ′ ⊢UCC (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v))⇒ xˆ[(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v))⇒
ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v)) ∧
ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v))]
By Lemma 109 on [7], we have
(8) Γ′ ⊢UCC (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v))⇒
ˆ¬(n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v))
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Theorem 29 (UC4: Uniform Agreement).
No two nodes decide differently.
Γ ⊢UC (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v)) ∧◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v′))⇒(v = v′)
where Γ is defined in Definition 22.
Proof.
By OI′,
(1) Γ′ ⊢UCC (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v))⇒xˆ(n ● decideuc(v) ∈ ois ∧ self)
By InvL,
(2) Γ′ ⊢UCC (n ● decideuc(v) ∈ ois ∧ self)⇒
n ● 1 ↑ decideec(v)
From [1] and [2],
(3) Γ′ ⊢UCC (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v))⇒xˆ(n ● 1 ↑ decideec(v))
From [3] and instantiating v to v′ and n to n′,
(4) Γ′ ⊢UCC (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v)) ∧◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v′)) ⇒xˆ(n ● 1 ↑ decideec(v)) ∧◇(xˆ(n′ ● 1 ↑ decideec(v′)))
By Lemma 112 on [4],
(5) Γ′ ⊢UCC (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v)) ∧◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v′)) ⇒xˆ(n ● 1 ↑ decideec(v))∧[x(n′ ● 1 ↑ decideec(v′)) ∨◇(n′ ● 1 ↑ decideec(v′))]
That is,
(6) Γ′ ⊢UCC (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v)) ∧◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v′)) ⇒[xˆ(n ● 1 ↑ decideec(v)) ∧x(n′ ● 1 ↑ decideec(v′))]∨[xˆ(n ● 1 ↑ decideec(v)) ∧◇(n′ ● 1 ↑ decideec(v′))]
By Lemma 105 on [6],
(7) Γ′ ⊢UCC (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v)) ∧◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v′)) ⇒x[(n ● 1 ↑ decideec(v)) ∧x(n′ ● 1 ↑ decideec(v′))]∨x[x(n ● 1 ↑ decideec(v)) ∧ (n′ ● 1 ↑ decideec(v′))]∨x[(n ● 1 ↑ decideec(v)) ∧◇(n′ ● 1 ↑ decideec(v′))]
By Lemma 119 on [7],
(8) Γ′ ⊢UCC (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v)) ∧◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v′)) ⇒x[◇(n ● 1 ↑ decideec(v)) ∧ (n′ ● 1 ↑ decideec(v′))]∨x[(n ● 1 ↑ decideec(v)) ∧◇(n′ ● 1 ↑ decideec(v′))]∨x[(n ● 1 ↑ decideec(v)) ∧◇(n′ ● 1 ↑ decideec(v′))]
By EC′2 and [8],
(9) Γ′ ⊢UCC (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v)) ∧◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v′)) ⇒x[v = v′]
That is,
(10) Γ′ ⊢UCC (n ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v)) ∧◇(n′ ● ⊺ ↑ decideuc(v′)) ⇒ (v = v′)
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5.4 Temporal Logic
The following subsections show axioms, rules and
lemmas from the basic temporal logic of Manna
and Pnueli [1] that we use.
5.4.1 Axioms and Inference Rules
Future Axioms.
Axiom 1 (FX0).
p→ p
Axiom 2 (FX1).◯¬p⇔ ¬◯p
Axiom 3 (FX2).◯ (p→ q)⇔ (◯p→ ◯ q)
Axiom 4 (FX3).
(p→ q)⇒ (p→ q)
Axiom 5 (FX4).
p→ ◯p
Axiom 6 (FX5).(p⇒ ◯p)→ (p⇒ p)
Axiom 7 (FX6).
p ω q⇔ [q ∨ (p ∧ ◯ (p ω q))]
Axiom 8 (FX7).
p⇒ p ω q
Past Axioms.
Axiom 9 (PX1).⊖p⇒ ⊖˜p
Axiom 10 (PX2).⊖˜(p→ q)⇔ (⊖˜p→ ⊖˜q)
Axiom 11 (PX3).
(p→ q)⇒ (p→ q)
Axiom 12 (PX4).
p→ ⊖˜p
Axiom 13 (PX5).(p⇒ ⊖˜p)→ (p⇒ p)
Axiom 14 (PX6).
p β q⇔ (q ∨ [p ∧ ⊖˜(p β q)])
Axiom 15 (PX7).⊖˜F
Mixed Axioms.
Axiom 16 (FX8).
p⇒ ◯⊖p
Axiom 17 (PX8).
p⇒ ⊖˜◯p
Rule 1 (Generalization).
Gen
p⊢ p
Axiom 18 (∀◯ -Comm (Universal commutation)).
∀x. ◯p(x)⇔ ◯∀x. p(x)
5.4.2 Derived Rules and Lemmas
Lemma 76 (CM1).∀x ∶ ⊖p(x)⇔ ⊖∀x ∶ p(x)
Lemma 77 (CM2).∃x ∶ ⊖p(x)⇔ ⊖∃x ∶ p(x)
Lemma 78 (CM3).∃x ∶ ◯p(x)⇔ ◯∃x ∶ p(x)
Lemma 79 (Rule E-MP (for n = 1)).
p⇒ q,p ⊢ q
Lemma 80 (⇒T).
p⇒ q, q⇒ r ⊢ p⇒ r
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Lemma 81 (◯M).
p⇒ q ⊢ ◯p⇒ ◯ q
p⇔ q ⊢ ◯p⇔ ◯ q
Lemma 82 (CI).
p⇒ ◯p ⊢ p⇒ p
Lemma 83 (T4).
p⇒ p
Lemma 84 (T9).
(p ∧ q)⇔ p ∧q
Lemma 85 (T25).
(p ∧ q)⇔ (p ∧q)
ˆ(p ∧ q)⇔ (ˆp ∧ ˆq)
Lemma 86 (T27).xp⇔xxpxˆxˆp⇒ xˆpxxˆp⇒ xˆpxˆxp⇒ xˆp
Lemma 87 (T11).◇p⇔◇◇p
Lemma 88 (xT).
p⇒xq, q⇒xr ⊢ p⇒xr
Lemma 89 (◇T).
p⇒◇q, q⇒◇r ⊢ p⇒◇r
Lemma 90 (T26).
p⇒xp
Lemma 91.¬p⇔◇¬p¬◇p⇔ ¬p
Lemma 92 (T6).
p→ ◯p
Lemma 93 (CN1).◯ (¬p)⇔ ¬◯p
Lemma 94 (FP8).
p→ ⊖˜◯p
Lemma 95 (◇M).
p⇒ q ⊢◇p⇒◇q
Lemma 96 (xM).
p⇒ q ⊢xp⇒xq
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5.4.3 Extra Temporal Logic Lemmas
Lemma 97.((p⇒ q) ∧ p)→ q
Proof.
By Axiom 1.
Lemma 98.xp→ ◯xp
Proof.
We assume
(1) xp
We prove◯xp
From rule T28 and [1],◯xp
Lemma 99.
p⇒◇q ∧ q⇒ r →
p⇒◇r
p⇒xq ∧ q⇒ r →
p⇒xr
p⇒ xˆq ∧ q⇒ r →
p⇒ xˆr
Proof.
Immediate from Rule ◇M (xM) and Rule ⇒T.
Lemma 100.
p⇒ q ∧ q⇒ r →
p⇒ r
Proof.
Immediate from Rule M and Rule ⇒T.
Lemma 101.xp⇒ pxˆˆp⇒ pxˆp⇒ p
Lemma 102.xˆp⇒ ˆpxˆp⇒ pxp⇒ p
Lemma 103.
p→ (ˆ(p⇒ ◯p)⇒ p)
Lemma 104.
p⇒ q⇒ r↔(xp ∧ q)⇒ r↔(p ∧◇q)⇒◇r
Lemma 105.(◇p ∧◇q)⇒◇(p ∧◇q) ∨◇(q ∧◇p)
(xp ∧xq)⇒x(p ∧xq) ∨x(q ∧xp)
xp ∧◇q⇒x(p ∧◇q)
Lemma 106.(◇p ∧ ˆ¬p)⇒ p(xp ∧ ˆ¬p)⇒ p
Lemma 107.xp⇒ xp
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Lemma 108.(p⇒ ˆ¬p)→(p⇒ ˆ¬p)
and(p⇒ ˆ¬p)→(p⇒ ˆ¬p)
Proof.
We assume
(2) (p⇒ ˆ¬p)
We prove(p⇒ ˆ¬p)
That is,xp⇒ ¬p
From [2]
(3) (xˆp⇒xˆ¬p)
By Lemma 101,
(4) xˆˆ¬p⇒ ¬p
From [3] and [4],
(5) (xˆp⇒ ¬p)
Lemma 109.
p⇒x(p⇒ q)→(p⇒ q)
Lemma 110.
ˆp⇒ p→
p
Lemma 111.
ˆp ∧ ˆq⇒ p ∧ q →
(p ∧ q)
Proof.
Immediate from Lemma 110 and Lemma 93.
Lemma 112.x◇p⇔◇p ∨xpxˆ◇p⇒◇p ∨xp◇xp⇒◇p ∨xp◇xˆp⇒◇p ∨xpxˆ◇ˆp⇒◇p ∨xp
Lemma 113.xp ∨◇p⇔ xˆp ∨◇p
Lemma 114.xp⇔ ◯xˆp
Lemma 115.◇p ∧q⇒◇(p ∧q)
Lemma 116.◇ˆ◇p⇒◇p
Lemma 117.¬xˆp⇒ ˆ¬p
Lemma 118.
ˆp⇔ ⊖˜p
Lemma 119.
p ∧ xˆq⇒xˆ(q ∧◇p)
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Lemma 120.
p ∧p⇒
 ˆp ∧ˆp
Lemma 121.xˆ◯p⇔xp
Lemma 122.
p ∧◇ˆ¬p⇒◇(p ∧ ˆ¬p)
Lemma 123.◇p ∧ ◇ˆq⇒◇(p ∧ ◇ˆq) ∨◇(p ∧q)
Lemma 124.◇p ∧ ◇ˆq⇒◇(◇p ∧ ◇ˆq) ∨◇(p ∧q)→◇p ∧ ◇ˆq⇒◇(p ∧q)
Lemma 125.
p⇒ p→¬p⇒ ˆ¬p
Lemma 126.x◇ˆp→◇ˆp
Lemma 127.◇p ∧◇q⇒◇(x◇p ∧ q)
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